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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the potential offered by deconstructive
criticism in general, and the insights of Jacques Derrida in particular, to feminist
interpretation of the bible. I wish to argue broadly that feminism incorporates a
programme which is "deconstructive" in that it is committed to the dismantling of
patriarchal power-structures, and thus that feminist biblical interpretation, in having to
deal with texts that are patriarchal in outlook, should operate according to a hermeneutics
which recognises and exploits at least some of the reading strategies currently associated
with deconstructive literary criticism.
The first chapter provides a critical outline of various kinds of feminist biblical
interpretation, paying particular attention to the rhetorical criticism of Phyllis Trible and
her assumptions concerning reading, writing and textuality. Chapter two broadens the
discursive focus to look at patriarchal dualism and the concept of the essential Female,
and goes on to consider the strengths and weaknesses of essentialism and relativism in
feminist theory and exegesis.
Chapter three looks at deconstruction and the work of Derrida, and assesses its
viability as a matrix for a feminist biblical hermeneutics. Arguments against the kind of
criticism deconstruction involves are introduced, beginning with Robert Alter's
objections to modern critical theory and his call for a return to a disinterested, "neutral"
reading. Chapter four continues the case against deconstruction, considering the claim
that deconstruction is an inherently atheistic programme which cannot be brought to the
bible without serious theological compromise. The relationship between rabbinic
midrash and deconstruction is examined, along with the relevance this relationship has to
feminist biblical interpretation.
Finally, chapter five offers a reading of the Garden of Eden story in Genesis
2:4b-3:24 which demonstrates some possible outworkings of the reading strategies
discussed; a reading which argues that "commentary from the margins" is less an
outlandish critical option than an activity which inheres in our most fixed cultural/
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Introduction
It has become customary to begin any discussion which deals at any length with
deconstructive critical theory by meditating upon the function of introductions.1 For there
is a strange paradox inherent in the phenomenon of the introduction, a paradox at work
both in the introduction's production and in its reception. Anybody who has written a
reasonably lengthy piece of work knows that the introduction is usually written after
everything else has been completed, and it is then placed at the beginning of the
discussion as "a gesture of authorial command",2 a kind of preparatory summary which
in effect tells the reader not only what is about to be read, but also how it is to be
processed and understood. Such information, however, is only of limited value while
the main body of the text remains unexplored, not only because the introduction
paradoxically calls upon a certain level of familiarity with the work under discussion, but
also because the introduction in turn cannot really be understood or evaluated until that
work has been read. To read a preface to Don Quixote, for example, is to begin to
formulate a skeletal reading of Don Quixote itself; once the main text has been
assiduously worked through, this pre-reading can be assessed and adjusted, and thus the
Quixote becomes a preface to its preface - an elegant reversal, whose ironies would
surely not have been lost on Cervantes.
Such introductory musings are often irresistable to scholars of deconstructive literary
criticism because they conveniently and immediately open onto a key strategy in the
work of Jacques Derrida: that of questioning the distinction between text and
commentary. Perhaps Derrida's most notorious claim is that there is no such thing as a
stable, authoritative master-text against which its interpretations can be measured; rather,
the meaning of any text resides precariously and elusively in the play (an important
Derridean term) of those innumerable readings. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, in her
introduction to Derrida's OfGrammatology, writes that
two readings of the "same" book show an identity that can only be defined as a difference.
The book is not repeatable in its "identity": each reading of the book produces a simulacrum of
an "original" that is itself the mark of [a] shifting and unstable subject....The preface, by
daring to repeat the book and reconstitute it in another register, merely enacts what is already
the case: the book's repetitions are always other than the book. There is, in fact, no "book"
other than those ever-different repetitions....3
The paradox of introduction/primary text has been expounded in various ways and
contexts. Jorge Luis Borges invokes it when he suggests that Kafka is as much a literary
precursor of Robert Browning as vice versa; when the two authors are compared, he
says, the way in which Kafka's work illuminates that of Browning means that the
twentieth-century novelist provides the "introduction" to subsequent readings of the
nineteenth-century poet.4 Fred W. Burnett, in a similar fashion, points out that the
relationship between modernism and postmodernism is distinguished by the way in
which "[e]ach concept is the condition for the other",5 that it is only our (historically)
postmodern perspective that enables us to understand or even to perceive modernism -
and rarely has there been a concept less extricable than modernism from our
interpretations of it. Elsewhere, Derrida argues (as we shall examine in greater detail
further on) that in philosophical discourse, the "centre" of argument has no
self-validating claim on truth, that it can only be determined as central by prescribing the
marginal; marginality thus becomes the necessary condition for centrality, the centre of
the centre.6
It is this last formulation that is most readily expressed in social/political terms, and
which thus has the most immediate bearing on the subject of this thesis. For if feminist
biblical interpretation has been accorded marginal or secondary status in official
biblical-critical discourse, the insights offered by Derrida and deconstructive criticism
enable it to become apparent that feminism's "marginality" is in fact not a result of, but
the necessary condition for patriarchy's centrality. It is only a short step from this
realisation to the point where the issues at stake in the feminist struggle can be seen not
so much as issues of truth and propriety as ones of influence and power, in particular the
power of those at the centre to determine where the margins lie and who inhabits them.
Traditional biblical scholarship - reflecting the patriarchal leanings of Church and
academy - has long sought to sideline feminist concerns on the grounds of what is and is
not relevant to what the bible has to say. A deconstructive response to this involves
arguing that "what the bible has to say" is no more than what patriarchal scholarship
would have it say, and that the authoritative status claimed by male-oriented readings of
biblical texts is not grounded in "real" or authentic meaning, but in the institutional
power to devalue interpretative approaches which (like feminism) contradict established
orthodoxy. Furthermore, where patriarchal discourse cites objective Truth as the
overarching master-text to which it alone provides the sanctioned commentary,
deconstruction interrogates both the hierarchy and the distinction at work in such a claim.
The text/commentary dichotomy is first reversed by demonstrating that determinations of
truth actually function as legitimising commentaries on patriarchal power, and the
dichotomy is then questioned at a deeper level by showing that both the power-structure
and its ideological buttresses rely fundamentally on each other for their identity, and also
that they form part of a larger network of social codes and conventions. My main
intention in this thesis is to argue that this kind of strategy is indispensible to feminist
readings of biblical texts.
The subtitle of this thesis was originally drafted as "On the Uses of Deconstruction in
Feminist Biblical Interpretation"; I decided on the insertion of the word "necessity" partly
to make things a little more polemical, but also more simply because the word seems apt.
If feminist biblical interpretation is to engage with patriarchy - as it inevitably must,
given the nature of the society from which both the bible and biblical religion have
emerged - and if patriarchal power is a social construct rather than a Divine order, then
feminist "deconstruction", in at least a broad sense of the word, is indeed necessary. The
above paragraph offers perhaps a gross oversimplification of a deconstructive
perspective on patriarchy, but it should suffice to indicate in general terms (terms which
will shortly become more specific) how and why the necessity of deconstruction in
feminist exegesis stands. The questions which these opening remarks raise are, of
course, numerous. Is feminism no more than a commentary on patriarchy, with no
definitive qualities of its own? Do texts possess definitive qualities, or are these always
supplied by the reader? What is the author's role in the production of meaning? Does
marginality automatically guarantee "deconstructive" legitimacy in interpretation, or are
there hermeneutical constraints? Perhaps most importantly, if the meaning of a text is a
product of the society in which it is received, what use does this insight have for those
(feminists and others) who read the bible in search of truth? The following discussion
should be read not necessarily as an endeavour to come up with conclusive answers to
these prefatory questions, but as the attempt to provide (in the manner of all primary
texts) a satisfactorily extensive introduction to them.
This thesis takes the following form: in chapter 1, a discussion of sexism (particularly
sexism in what I have, for the sake of brevity, chosen to call "Judaeo-Christian"
religion) leads onto an examination of various existing feminist biblical-critical responses
to the bible's patriarchal concerns. The appropriation of the Old Testament prophetic
tradition, "depatriarchalizing" reading strategies, the search for a women's history
behind biblical narratives: these are assessed in an argument which focuses finally on the
rhetorical criticism of Phyllis Trible and her reading of the Garden of Eden story in
Genesis 2:4b-3:24. This reading (and the methodology behind it) is criticised for its
heavy reliance on a concept of the text's intrinsic or authentic meaning. The subject of
essentialism or definitive signification having been broached, chapter 2 looks at this
issue in the light of patriarchal dualism and the concept of the essential Female. I outline
Linda Alcoffs argument7 that neither radical ("cultural") feminism, with its valorisation
of "definitively" female characteristics, nor hard-line poststructuralist feminism, which
relativises gender issues out of discursive focus, provides a useful alternative to
patriarchal-dualistic determinations of woman, and I put forward Alcoffs concept of
"identity politics" as the achievement of a satisfactory middle ground where the tensions
between essentialism and relativism are allowed to operate fluidly and creatively.
Essentialism in biblical interpretation is then reexamined and criticised as a restrictive
approach to exegesis which has much in common with the logic of patriarchal
oppression.
Relativism in biblical interpretation receives both more specific and more extended
treatment, as chapter 3 presents deconstructive criticism and the work of Jacques Derrida
as providing a usefully non-deterministic understanding of writing, reading and
meaning. After an introductory outline of some important Derridean terms and gestures
(logocentrism, dijferance and so on), the discussion turns to the relationship between
deconstruction and feminism, arguing that both Derrida's call for an explicitly
"sexualised" approach to reading and deconstruction's ultimate concern with the politics
of interpretation can well serve feminist-critical interests. I then turn to consider various
arguments against deconstruction, first examining the case (put forward by such critics
as Robert Alter) that politics and reading do not mix, and that modem literary theories of
interpretation transgress the proper boundaries of respect for the literary text.
Chapter 4 continues the case against deconstruction by bringing up an issue central to
this thesis: that of whether or not deconstruction is an inherently atheistic programme
which goes fundamentally against the grain of religious faith. I first consider the
relationship between deconstruction and metaphysics, suggesting that rather than
"destroying" such metaphysical determinations of truth as God, deconstruction in fact
first relies on their structures and postulations for its efficacy, and then reconfigures
them, seeking not so much to deny truth as to "resituate" it.8 It is therefore not
unthinkable that the deconstructive-feminist reader of the bible and the religious reader of
the bible can be one and the same individual. I then go on to look at aspects of the
Judaeo-Christian theological tradition which evince turns of thought or belief congruent
with ideas now called deconstructive. After a brief detour touching on medieval Christian
mysticism and contemporary black American theology, the discussion arrives at
Rabbinic midrash; the controversy over whether or not Rabbinic hermeneutics prefigures
deconstruction is examined, and I argue that if the temptation to paint the Rabbis
systematically as early deconstructionists (or modern literary theorists as latter-day
Rabbis) is resisted, we can see that midrash does, in many if not all instances, show us a
species of biblical criticism which is at once informed by respect for the integrity of the
biblical text, underpinned by a positive theology and nascently, if inconsistently,
deconstructive.
The chapter closes with a comparison between the aims and intentions of Rabbinic
hermeneutics and those of feminist exegesis; I suggest that the marginal perspective
historically adopted by (or forced upon) both Jews and women has given rise to a strong
similarity between Judaic and feminist understandings of identity, difference and truth, a
similarity which indicates that those feminists who wish to experiment with
deconstructive criticism of biblical texts could benefit greatly from the close reading of
midrash. The fifth and final chapter consists of a reading of the Garden of Eden story in
Genesis 2:4b-3:24, a reading not intended to be taken either as definitively decon¬
structive or as definitively feminist, but which demonstrates one of an innumerable
number of possible outworkings of deconstruction in feminist exegesis.
The length of this study has, of course, necessitated a certain narrowness of scope,
which has in turn resulted in a number of condensations and omissions. I have, for
example, made rather free use of Stanley Fish's term "interpretative communities" while
relegating the important and extremely relevant work of Fish himself to only the most
occasional of footnotes. I have, perhaps more seriously, on the whole neglected to make
more than a passing mention of the work of such French feminists as Helene Cixous,
Luce Irigary and Julia Kristeva, writers whose cultural/philosophical links with Derrida
are strong, and whose insights might well be expected to have considerable relevance to
the subject under discussion. The principal reason for their marginal role in this thesis is
that their work is (like Derrida's) complex, rigorous, and requires extensive discussion;
piecemeal appropriation of isolated ideas would inevitably result in distortions and
shallow generalisations. I have, therefore, opted to treat the French feminists as
constituting a major field of study in themselves, one whose relationship to feminist
biblical interpretation invites further attention. In doing this, I have unfortunately done
little to narrow the much-criticised gulf between Anglo-American and French feminist
discourse. Ironically, this exclusion (in tandem with a similar curtailment of discussion
concerning Derrida's philosophical forebears and sympathetic contemporaries) has also
resulted in a more-or-less constant reversion to Derrida as the founding or exemplary
practitioner of deconstruction, a reversion which contradicts both the notional autonomy
offeminist criticism and the extreme scepticism with which deconstruction is meant to
treat origins and authoritative "presences".9 This contradiction is noted further on, but
not to any final degree resolved; it provides, perhaps, an appropriate point of entry for
the deconstructive reader of this work.
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Chapter 1
Feminism, Religion and the Biblical Text
To introduce something as overtly political as feminism into what is essentially a
literary-critical study (the extent to which the literary is the political will be dealt with
further on) raises uncomfortable questions concerning motives and propriety - if
feminism is to be understood as dealing first and foremost with women's issues, then
the thesis of a "male feminist" (if the term is allowed) is perhaps by nature ideologically
problematic, rather like the kind of earnestly "socialist" press article which occasionally
emerges from the living room of a wealthy suburban flat. It seems necessary, therefore,
to begin with some kind of explanation as to why the aims and interests of this paper
should be centred around those of feminist hermeneutics. I do not wish to attempt any
systematic definition of feminism; such a definition would have to take into account
liberal feminism, radical feminism, black feminism, Marxist, Jewish and Christian
feminism, and so on. If a definition were to be offered, it would be more appropriate to
speak of "feminisms", given the diversity of women's experience and political activity.
This study, however, is less directly concerned with women's experience than with the
fruits of that experience as evidenced in feminist critical theory, and so my answer to the
question "why talk about feminism in the first place?" has to do with the way feminism
works, a kind of model which it provides, rather than with the day-to-day struggle of
women against patriarchy - although of course one grows out of the other, and I do not
believe there is an identifiable point at which feminist theory cleanly separates from
women's experience.1
Sexism and Religion: The particular strength of feminism in the sphere of religion
is that it offers a critical paradigm which has its roots firmly planted in the
social/political, and yet which is, at the same time, widely applicable as a paradigm in
considering and criticising other forms of oppression apart from the patriarchal. In his
book Domination or Liberation, Alistair Kee looks at the ambivalent role played by
Western religion in social and political oppression, and it is no accident that Kee takes
issue first with the oppression of women. He writes:
I begin with this area of domination....because it is the most extensive, running
throughout recorded human history, across most if not all known societies, and directly
affecting more than half of the world's population. Domination on the basis of gender is so
pervasive because it is present everywhere in addition to other forms of domination.2
Kee goes on to point out that this results in a particularly acute form of oppression for
women in societies already suffering the experience of domination on the basis of race,
class or economic status: "rich people can dominate poor people....but poor men can still
dominate poor women".3 Similarly, Rosemary Radford Ruether sees the subordination
of women as the most basic form of social oppression, an oppression so
deeply-ingrained and long-lived that even the "subversive memory" of freedom is
denied:
Unlike subordinated races who have preserved some remnants of an alternative culture from
a period prior to their enslavement, the subordination of women takes place at the heart of
every culture and thus deprives women of an alternative culture with which to express their
identity over against the patriarchal culture of family and society.4
If women are indeed "the first and oldest oppressed, subjugated people",5 whose
domination "takes place at the heart of every culture", then it could well be that sexist
oppression is the most basic form of oppression. Even a racially homogenous, classless
society will be made up of women and men, and so its members will differentiate
according to gender if to no other criterion. This means that, in social terms, gender
issues raise questions of Self and Other, of identity and difference, which engage human
society at its most personal level, regardless of cultural boundaries. And so sexism may,
in its "genderedness", lie closest to the heart of the Self/Other crisis from which spring
all forms of social discrimination. The dualistic psychology of sexism in Western society
is well-documented; androcentric thought conceives the male/female opposition as
paradigmatic of any number of other binary distinctions - mind/body, heaven/earth,
spirit/matter, reason/instinct, order/chaos, and so on. The former term is valued as male-
identified over and above the latter, which is held to represent the "female" realm, and so
in a society dominated by this kind of thinking, the female stands for all that is most dark
and dangerous in the human psyche - that which must be controlled. The theological
perspective is significant: Sallie McFague, among others, sees this way of structuring
reality as partial evidence of man's (i.e. men's) fundamental sense of alienation from a
distant, transcendent God:
At the heart of patriarchalism....is a subject-object split in which man is envisioned over
against God and vice versa. God, as transcendent being, is man's superior Other and woman in
this hierarchy becomes man's inferior other...man, alienated from God, has projected the
pattern of subject-object dualism down the line with woman - as man's most significant
human "other" - the chief repository of his alienation.6
This pattern of alienation, then, works not just at a general social level, but "at the level
of man's being: it is ontological warfare in which women are the first victims".7
I would say, therefore, that the case against sexism as the root form of discrimination
in society is a strong one. And so feminist criticism, in directly addressing the issues of
sexism and sexist oppression, could well be dealing with the most fundamental form of
the psychic/social malaise which gives rise to other forms of discrimination and
subjugation such as racism and classism. The importance of feminism, then, should not
be underestimated, particularly in the area of religion, where there is (or should be) a
profound commitment to a "healing" of society and to the cessation of oppression and
injustice - feminist theology may, in at least some of its forms, constitute the
paradigmatic theology of liberation, and feminist biblical hermeneutics may serve to
illuminate and throw into sharp relief a message of wholeness and social responsibility
not only critical to the Judaeo-Christian tradition, but in a wider sense essential to the
maintenance of any kind of just or harmonious society.
But what exactly is it that feminism has to offer in place of alienation and oppression?
It is difficult to answer this without resorting to a kind of forensic analysis of Feminism
and its vital qualities, and this in turn is difficult because feminism, as an essentially
political practice with its major concerns in the here and now, has a constant current of
redefinition and self-critique running through it - and this resistance to final definition
can, in itself, be seen as a valuable thing in a culture overloaded with rationalism and the
impulse towards scientific scrutiny. There is a large and well-worn catalogue of terms
associated with feminism and what it identifies itself with: subjectivity, community,
intuition, fertility, holism, flux and so on. There is no doubt that these are necessary
aspects of human existence, and few feminists would disavow them as being cardinal
"feminist" virtues. The problem is that they are also convenient tags which have been
attributed to the essential nature of women in the attempt either (by patriarchy) to contain
women within a predictable, readily-identifiable framework of gender-specified
expectations, or (by some separatist feminists) to make feminism exclusively a
"women's group", which equates sexism in general with men in particular, and sets
itself up in ideological opposition to them. I would suggest that a feminism which claims
the so-called "female" qualities devalued by patriarchal society as redemptive - even
essential - within an ailing culture, and yet which avoids rigid gender determinism or
political exclusivity, is a feminism which
offers us hope (perhaps, historically, our last hope) that we can move away from
fundamentally life-denying values, principles and policies to life-giving ones....It offers us
individually and collectively the possibility of making connections with ourselves, one
another, the earth and all that is and can be. It offers us the possibility, thus, of making
connections with the rhythms and powers of life.8
From a traditional "scholarly" perspective, these concepts of "life-giving" and
1 3
"life-denying" principles, of "rhythms and powers" may all sound very portentous, but
not easily graspable for the purposes of practical enquiry. It has been said of the New
Age that it is more a mood than a movement, and the same could perhaps be said for
feminism if feminism were simply an amorphous kind of utopianism, a broad-based
impulse towards a "softening" of society whereby nurturing, relational instincts were
valued over and above aggressive, competitive ones. But while this impulse is essential
to feminism (as it is and has been to a great many other progressive movements), it is
feminism-as-political-practice rather than feminism-as-nice-idea which activates
perceivable social change. Modern feminism has its roots in the Women's Liberation
movement of the 60's-70's, and while the term "women's liberation" may now be
unfashionable, it still seems as good a name as any for the fundamental historical
imperative of feminist politics. The question is: liberation from what?
I have already used the term "patriarchy" a number of times in a rather vague sense;
loose usage to meet the loose understanding that patriarchy is simply the great social evil
against which feminism sets its face. But a closer look at patriarchy could be helpful; if
feminism embodies a certain resistance to neat systematic analysis partly because of its
multifaceted nature, but partly also because this kind of approach to knowledge is typical
of the arid, dissecting rationalism of the androcentric mind-set, then an examination of
that mind-set and the way it works in our society may reflect something of the nature and
aims of feminism as patriarchy's antithesis. It could be said that, to an extent, patriarchal
thought is more amenable to rigorous analysis than its feminist equivalent because it
operates in accordance with a concept of reality which upholds rationality, objectivity,
abstract speculation and empiricism as the ideal means of apprehending the true nature of
things. In its search for meaning, patriarchal thought generally inquires, analyses,
separates constituent elements, and arranges those elements in a fixed order, usually a
hierarchical order in which relative value is accorded to each element. Of course, those
who conceive hierarchies generally tend to place their own values and interests
somewhere towards the top, with the concerns of those who stand in opposition to them
towards the bottom, and so the classic "patriarchal pyramid" is, in its root form, a
system of values according to which the perceived interests of women are subordinated
to those of men.
This, then, is what a feminist critique of society has to deal with; if patriarchy were
simply androcentrism (i.e. a male-centred worldview), then we might need no more
powerful weapon against it than a kind of indulgent mockery, but patriarchy exists in
very real terms as a power structure which directly affects the lives of those who inhabit
it. Paula Cooey's analysis of patriarchy is telling in that it describes the patriarchal
structure of society in the familiar language of the domination of the many by the few.
Cooey sees patriarchy basically as
the social organization of a culture into systems that are hierarchical and male-dominated in
terms of power and value. Though slightly more fluid than the image of a pyramid suggests,
patriarchy, nevertheless, resembles a pyramid in that an extremely small minority of people
hold the greatest power over a remaining majority.9
This structural imbalance is reflected, in Western society, in the day-to-day injustices
experienced by women in domestic, professional and religious life. Discrimination and
harassment are well-documented and operate on many levels, from the kind of
objectification ofwomen observable in the language and imagery of advertising through
to the frequency of physical and sexual abuse, and the inadequacy of (male-dominated)
legal systems in dealing with both perpetrators and victims. Women's lack of social
power, or at least their relatively slender means of access to the apparatus of power, can
be attributed in some measure to the way in which patriarchal culture assigns modes of
self-understanding to women which are essentially male-identified, thus depriving
women of any kind of effective autonomy, and confining them within gender-determined
social roles. To quote Paula Cooey again:
As the word patriarchy denotes, the fathers rule the system....within the designation of
class, ethnicity or creed, a woman's status, power and authority, indeed her identity as a
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woman, derive from affiliation with a man....according to whether he is her father or her
husband....The substance of her role in society will ordinarily be determined according to a
division of labour broken down along the lines of sexual difference....the tasks allotted to men
will most likely be more highly valued than those allotted to women.10
Cooey goes on to say that with gender-determined roles come gender-determined
expectations of certain qualities suited to those roles, expectations which reflect "severe
dualisms of feeling and reason, body and mind, nature and culture, and other and
self'.11 Women are expected to cultivate characteristics appropriate to their essentially
derivative status, traits of "other-directedness" such as passivity, nurture and
self-sacrifice. Again, it could be argued that these are valuable qualities at a point in
history where our aggressive instincts have a technology at their service which is capable
of precipitating disaster on a scale unparalleled in human experience. But in a society
whose "norms and values center on male perceptions, interpretations, experience, needs
and interests",12 and where these "male" interests favour detatchment, autonomy and
competitiveness as the ideal means to success, a self-sacrificing "other-directedness"
renders its agent more vulnerable to exploitation than effective of perceivable change in
the social value-system. Thus patriarchy consolidates and maintains its power-base: by
assigning roles and characteristics to women which are, to a great extent, derivative of or
dependent upon a "male" norm, and thereby limiting women's freedom of
self-expression (by circumscribing their sense of a "self" to express) and denying them
the power to shape or change the practical values of their culture.
The aim of the discussion so far has been to arrive at a broad understanding of
sexism, and of the interaction between feminism and patriarchy. In its simplest form, the
argument goes like this: sexism is a form of negative discrimination, perhaps the
fundamental form of negative discrimination in society because it differentiates according
to gender, the difference par excellence recognised in all human cultures. Patriarchy is a
system of social relations based on sexist principles, a power structure in which the
interests of women are determined according to an essentialist idea of the Female, and
then devalued and subordinated to the interests of men. Feminism takes many forms, but
at the root of all its forms is a commitment to altering the balance of power in patriarchal
culture and claiming the right of women to freedom from exclusively male-identified
roles and gender expectations. In what follows, I will be narrowing the focus of inquiry
from society in general to the more specific field of religion (in particular
Judaeo-Christian religion): whether or not patriarchal ideology is endemic to it, and the
response of feminism to this ideology where it appears.
Patriarchal codes and assumptions are evident at most levels of our culture, but
religion seems particularly important among them; religious dogma in the West has
always had an overwhelming amount to say about sex and gender, and whether its
authority is seen as active upon or symptomatic of corresponding attitudes outside the
religious sphere, religion and religious issues are never far from any discussion of the
roles of women and men in society:
It is a commonplace that religious values frequently have reflected some of the most basic
perceptions, aspirations and values of their own cultures. The importance of this aspect of
religion has been matched only by the authority of its tradition in Western thought about the
nature of women and men, and by its mediation in helping to shape, legitimise and sanction
social attitudes towards the sexes, social expectations of gender-based behaviour, and social
rewards and penalties for conformity and deviance.13
That religion is a powerful force cannot be denied; exactly what religion acts as a
powerful force for is more open to question. To assert, as a "religious" person, that
religion is an essentially liberating force, a force which acts on behalf of the oppressed in
society, is to sail dangerously close to the wind of pure comic irony, especially if one
speaks from within the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Critics of that tradition will respond,
justifiably enough, by pointing to the militaristic cultural chauvinism of ancient Israel,
the ferocity of the Crusades and the Inquisition, the corruption and ostentatious wealth of
the modern Church, and any number of other signs which indicate that what Western
religion really liberates us from is any hope for establishing a just or egalitarian society.
And as far as patriarchal oppression is concerned, it can be easily seen that both Judaism
and Christianity are shot through with a clear moral agenda for legitimising the
domination of women: from the ambiguous attitudes to women displayed in the Hebrew
Bible narratives, through the sexist imagery of the Hebrew prophets and the anxiety and
suspicion of women palpable within Rabbinic literature, to the repressive dictates of the
Pauline household codes and the virulent misogyny of the early Church Fathers, it is
evident that Judaeo-Christian religion both reflects and perpetuates patriarchal ideology.
This can hardly be surprising if we consider that the religion developed out of an ancient
culture which was patriarchal to the core, and while it is perhaps anachronistic to
condemn retrospectively a society thousands of years distant from our own on the
grounds of a twentieth-century understanding of patriarchy (just as it is anachronistic to
assert that Jesus, for example, was a "feminist"), it must nevertheless be considered
whether or not Western religion has outlived its redemptive potential in an age when the
struggle of women against sexism assumes an increasingly high social profile, and when
the divisive, competitive worldview commonly ranged with sexism can be seen as
life-threatening on a global scale. I have already indicated that I view domination on the
grounds of gender as fundamental to other patterns of domination and subjugation; it
follows, then, that a religion which is inherently sexist can provide, at best, only an
inadequate model for the liberation of any oppressed group within society. And so, more
particularly, the possibility of extracting any kind of "liberation theology" from the
Judaeo-Christian tradition depends very much upon the extent to which the religion with
which that tradition is entwined stands irredeemably in support of patriarchal
ideology-in-practice.
I should establish clearly at this point that I do not intend to enter the "is
Judaism/Christianity sexist?" debate; not, at least, with any hope of coming up with
conclusive answers. To assert confidently that it is not sexist is to fly in the face of four
millenia of literature and history which fairly transparently embody sexism in theory and
practice. To assert that it is sexist, without any hope for redemption, may be defensible
at an intellectual level,14 but seems to deny integrity to the faith and testimony of
practising Jewish and Christian feminists who experience growth and fulfilment both as
Jews/Christians and as Jewish/Christian women. Any pro- or anti-religious polemic on
my part, therefore, is bound to run into trouble, and so I am more interested in simply
accepting that feminism faces a profound challenge from (as well as constituting a
profound challenge to) Western religion, and considering ways in which
Jewish/Christian feminism might most fruitfully deal with the resulting tensions.
The Bible and the Prophetic Tradition: Any examination of Judaeo-Christian
religion must sooner or later turn to the bible; I would suggest sooner because it is the
bible which is most often cited as ultimately carrying the weight of authority for codes of
conduct, morality and social roles. We do not have to look far into the bible to see that its
authors and redactors tended to be very much the products of their cultures, cultures in
which the interests of women were subordinated to those of men. I have already
mentioned the misogynistic tone and imagery running through the prophetic tradition and
many of the New Testament epistles; if further proof were needed, we could look to
narrative strategies in stories like that of Jephthah's daughter (Judges ch.ll) and the
Levite's concubine (Judges ch.19), where the status of women as property to be
disposed of - literally - in the interests of the male protagonists is passed over with
breathtaking matter-of-factness. And yet women continue to find messages of hope and
liberation from patriarchal oppression within the same collection of texts. For example,
in amongst a proliferation of images of the Divine as father, husband, warrior, lord,
king, destroyer and judge can be found images of a more compassionate, nurturing and
maternal type;15 they are relatively few in number, but they indicate that there has been a
"women's voice" speaking in biblical times, just as contemporary feminism speaks from
within patriarchal society today. More generally, a number of feminist theologians and
biblical scholars find "prophecies of egalitarianism" in the books of the Hebrew
prophets; these prophecies provide hope for the establishment of a just society in which
the distribution of power is re-aligned according to the dictates of a bountiful,
non-discriminatory God.16
Perhaps most significantly, the prophetic tradition as a whole has been seen as
providing the key to a creative and holistic interpretation of the bible, as it offers a
critique of society which is in keeping with the tenets of the feminist critical principle and
its rejection of hierarchical power abuses. According to Rosemary Ruether, the prophetic
tradition, particularly in the books of the later prophets, offers an indictment of the status
quo in Israelite society which closely parallels the criticisms brought to bear on
patriarchal culture and its power base. Furthermore,
this critique of society includes a critique of religion. The spokesperson ofGod denounces
the way in which religion is misused to countenance injustice and turn away the eyes of the
pious from the poor, In the words of Amos 5:21, 24: "I hate, I despise your feasts, and I take
no delight in your solemn assemblies....But let justice roll down like waters, and righteous¬
ness like an everflowing stream".17
This approach is encouraging, as it indicates that the prophetic tradition - rather like
feminism itself - describes an elastic, self-examining process which allows for shifts in
interpretation across changing cultural patterns. Could the critique of religion
encountered in such books as Isaiah and Amos be stretched to include a critique of the
religious legitimation of patriarchal oppression? Stranger things have happened: what
now exists in North America under the umbrella of "the black church" - a religious
community in which women play a vital, creative role - has developed paradoxically
from a slave community which received its Gospel from the hands of its oppressors in
the form of a sexist, racist canon specifically geared toward reconciling the slaves to their
"God-ordained" role as beasts of burden.18 The Hebrew prophetic tradition has been
cited as the locus of orientation within the bible of black religious consciousness, and
this bears witness to the power of that tradition to continue to evolve and transcend its
historical moment.19 But, as I have indicated above, the problem for anyone wishing to
use the prophetic tradition in any fundamental way as a means of critiquing patriarchal
religion is that much of the prophecy contained therein is couched in relentlessly
patriarchal language: God is imaged as either benign or vengeful husband/lover,
dispensing mercy or punishment as required upon Israel, the faithless wife or harlot.20
To construe this kind of imagery as being positive for women requires a leap of the
interpretative imagination which many, bearing in mind the reality of violence meted out
against women by men in various kinds of social relationships, may find it meaningless
or painful to attempt.
It seems, then, that any attempt to locate a critique of patriarchal oppression within the
biblical prophetic tradition must inevitably run into the problem of sexist language at its
most obstinate. At the same time, however, the prophetic tradition calls for the liberation
of all oppressed and for an end to all abuses of power and privilege. Does the bible,
then, embody a message of redemption which is able to be rescued intact from its
linguistic and cultural context?
Text and Context: the Book of Ruth: Phyllis Trible, in an essay which has
helped provide the framework for a whole "school" of feminist exegesis, writes of
"depatriarchalization" as "a hermeneutic operating within Scripture itself',21 by means of
which just such a rescue operation might be possible. To "depatriarchalize" biblical texts
is to read them in the light of a kind of higher theological conceptualisation: "the nature
of the God of Israel defies sexism", says Trible confidently, and so "cultural and
grammatical limitations [e.g. the use of sexist language]....need not limit theological
understanding".22 Biblical symbols and stories can be reappropriated and
re-contextualised to underpin the message of feminism, and the justification for this is
implied in the ethos of equality and justice which lies at the root of biblical faith:
....the intentionality of biblical faith, as distinguished from a general description of biblical
religion, is neither to create nor to perpetuate patriarchy but rather to function as salvation for
both women and men....In rejecting Scripture women ironically accept male chauvinistic
interpretations and thereby capitulate to the very view they are protesting. But there is another
way: to reread (not rewrite) the Bible without the blinders of Israelite men or of Paul, Barth,
Bonhocffer and a host of others. The hermeneutical challenge is to translate biblical faith
without sexism.23
This approach calls for close reading; the "blinders" of patriarchal religion may, for
Trible, amount to no more than "cultural and grammatical limitations", but they are
nevertheless held firmly in place by centuries of exegetical tradition. If the books of the
Hebrew prophets present rather a formidable hurdle for a non-sexist hermeneutics,
perhaps the narrative tradition is more amenable to exegesis in keeping with what we
might for the moment agree is "the intentionality of biblical faith". The book of Ruth
seems as good a text as any in which to look for a "depatriarchalizing" principle; better
than most, in fact, because unlike many or most of the Hebrew Bible narratives, the
book of Ruth is very much a "women's story", and it has been read by many feminist
exegetes as affirmative of women's power to influence and act upon the workings of
patriarchal society.24 A positive feminist reading of the story sees Ruth's opening vow of
allegiance to Naomi in 1:16-17 as a completely revolutionary act, the voluntary binding
of one woman to another in a statement of radical faith which mirrors Abram's seminal
act of faith in Genesis 12:1-5: both characters undertake a journey to make their home in
a strange land, but while Abram is led to Canaan by a Divine promise of spectacular
success in his enterprise, Ruth's sole motive appears to be that of love and sisterhood,
with no apparent expectation of reward. Indeed, in journeying to Bethlehem with
Naomi, the recently-widowed Ruth effectively indicates her lack of interest in the one
avenue of security offered to her by the culture of the time - that of finding another
husband. In her unswerving devotion to Naomi, and in her initiative, as a Moabitess, in
forging an identity for herself within the confines of an alien society, Ruth acts as an
exemplary figure of solidarity and power within patriarchal culture.25
Naomi, on the other hand, appears at first glance to be a good deal less attractive. Her
defeatism and proneness to extravagant lamentation (1:11-13, 20-21), her seeming
obsession with sons and husbands, and her apparent disregard for Ruth's safety in
making her the vulnerable party in an extremely risky plan (3:2-4) all combine to make
Naomi something other than a model of female grit and sisterhood. But if she appears in
a harsh light, at least it is the light of something approaching three-dimensional
characterisation. Biblical narrators who condescend to placing a female character
anywhere near centre stage often display a tedious propensity for presenting her as an
archetype, or at least as a male-determined stereotype of the Female, to be praised or
judged, and by this means the woman is placed safely outside the realm of immediate,
realistic agency within the story. But the warts-and-all presentation we are given of
Naomi comes complete with the kinds of rough edges and ambiguities that invite
psychological inquiry, and these contribute to making her a well-rounded dramatic
creation, rather than the all-too-familiar figure of female typology.
This kind of focus on Ruth and Naomi results in Boaz, the male hero, becoming
somewhat marginalised. Although he appears as an authoritative central character in the
story, his status is undermined (as, by implication, is the patriarchal system within
which he operates) by the fact that his role is essentially reactive - everything he does is
in response to the situation that Ruth and Naomi have engineered, and this is borne out
explicitly by the "chorus" of women in 4:17, who identify the child bom to Ruth as
having been bom to a gynocentric lineage: "a son has been bom to Naomi", rather than
to the houses of Elimelech or Mahlon, deceased husbands of the female protagonists.
So close reading reveals a whole-hearted affirmation of women as "paradigms for
radicality....women in culture, against culture and transforming culture".26 This reading,
however, fails to deal with one element of the story which should be essential to any
interpretation; that is, the role of the narrator. It may be true that a feminist reading of the
book of Ruth like the one briefly delineated above, one which starts from the theological
assumption that "the God of Israel [and, by implication, the spirit of the Holy Writ of
Israel] defies sexism", is just as defensible as a male-chauvinistic interpretation which
rests on the parallel view that patriarchy is God-ordained. But I would question the
assumption that Phyllis Trible's "egalitarian faith" is a clear, culture-resistant lens
through which to view scripture; her very terminology indicates that "biblical faith"
comes from the bible, and she allows that the bible comes from a patriarchal society.27
More importantly, I do not believe that the "cultural and grammatical limitations" which
Trible finds herself able to sideline can be confined to such issues as androcentric
language for (and imagery of) God - not that even these are to be lightly ignored. The
point is that cultural presuppositions operate at the deepest rhetorical level, in the way in
which a story is told, in what is both spoken and left unspoken. A broader perspective
on the book of Ruth, one which acknowledges its nature as a crafted text, reveals that the
voice which tells the story, which shapes characters and action by both stressing and
suppressing detail, is clearly the voice of patriarchy.
If, for example, the scene at the threshing floor in 3:6-15 presents Ruth as claiming a
place and an identity for herself within Israelite culture, it is important to examine the
particular language and details employed by the (presumably male) narrator in relating
the events which take place. The sexual orientation of the episode becomes apparent:
Ruth's appearance after dark at the feet of a man whose heart, we are told, is merry with
wine, in addition to the language of "feet" and "skirts" which characterises Ruth's
speech, raises the familiar spectre of female sexuality as subversive and manipulative, an
ethical commonplace in biblical literature - and one which, in this context, brings to mind
the story in Genesis 19:30-37 of Lot's daughters and the depraved origins of Ruth's
people, the Moabites. This could, in turn, shed some rather ugly light on the narrative
strategy behind the frequent and pointed identification of Ruth throughout the story as
"the Moabitess". The end of chapter four similarly raises doubts as to the story's alleged
anti-patriarchal bias; hard on the heels of the women's announcement that "a son has
been born to Naomi" comes the narrator's final word - the child is identified as the
descendent of Perez and the ancestor of David: in short, a son to the house of Judah and
the Davidic line.
There seems to be no way around this contradiction between what the story is "really
about" and the way in which it is told. Trible isolates the closing verses of the book as a
kind of coda; it and the generally patriarchal cast of the entire fourth chapter are
dismissed as "alien to the letter and spirit" of the first three chapters,28 a judgement
which I would suggest is fair enough, but which springs from Trible's own desire to
render the story palatable to feminist exegetical concerns, rather than from some seed of
"depatriarchalizing" polemic within the text itself. Johanna Bos, in her study of Ruth,
admits that the actions of Naomi and Ruth ultimately serve the interests of a patriarchal
community, but she stresses that
[o]n a theological level, the well-being of the community is of enormous importance,
since its well-being is founded on divine promises....[the house of Judah is] a house which
reflects God's choice for Israel and for the creation.29
We are uncomfortably close here to the view that patriarchal culture is Divinely
prescribed, and the implication that the best we can do is to see it as a kind of coccoon
which will shrivel up and fall away as the New Society emerges in God's good time - an
idea which may have considerable theological weight behind it, but which can hardly be
said to serve the immediate interests of feminism in its day-to-day struggle against sexist
thought and patriarchal institutions. Finally, cold water of a more speculative nature is
thrown at (if not directly on) the desire to separate text from context by Danna Fewell
and David Gunn, who invoke the sordid issue of editorial politics: the view, it is said,
that narrative strategy in Ruth serves principally to reflect favourably upon David and the
house of Judah
is especially popular among scholars who wish to date the book of Ruth during the period
of Ezra and Nehemiah. The work is, in their view, a polemic against Ezra's and Nehemiah's
religious reforms.30
It seems, then, that the book of Ruth, being a text which overtly concerns itself with
women, might be expected to reveal a biblical attitude to them which satisfies our best
expectations of "biblical faith". And a close, detailed analysis of the story does indeed
bring positive aspects to light. But the process of interpretation neither begins nor ends
there; it is necessarily circular, and while throughout a great deal of biblical literature we
find avenues which lead us to symbols for redemption and transformation of restrictive
social structures - Trible's "depatriarchalizing" principle included - our findings are
undermined by the patriarchal cast (or militaristic, or racist) of the contexts within which
these texts are presented, which are in turn redeemed by the locating of positive symbols
of transcendence, and so on. To say that there is a "depatriarchalizing" principle at work
within the bible is not to say that the bible can be "depatriarchalized" in any final or
conclusive way, as Trible seems to imply when she speaks of the challenge "to translate
biblical faith without sexism". Sexism is endemic to the bible at the narrative, editorial
and redactional levels, the dark backdrop against which messages for hope and justice
for women stand out in such sharp relief.
Text and History: the Search for a Women's Tradition: Is it necessary,
then, or even possible to "depatriarchalize" the backdrop, to examine the society of
biblical times in search of a "women's tradition" within the patriarchal structure? If we
are to attempt any kind of accurate socio-historical reconstruction of the lives of women
in early Christian or ancient Israelite times, the bible is at best unreliable as source
material; women and their concerns are simply erased from much biblical literature, and
in any case, the history that we can glean from biblical texts is fairly obviously
concerned with matters other than facticity:
Israel was acutely conscious about its distinct place in the world, but the biblical self-
description does not appear in categories that can easily be translated into facts essential for
social scientific analysis....[t]he language is theological; it describes human events in terms of
God's actions. Furthermore....the writings reflect later concerns intertwined with original
materials.31
Thus Carol Meyers on the Hebrew Bible as a historical document, and her words could
equally well apply to the New Testament, a collection of texts whose historical details are
clearly manipulated to serve partisan theological interests. Meyers goes on to speak of
the potential progress that could be made by means of an interdisciplinary approach to
uncovering women's history, one which made use of archaeological and social-scientific
expertise in addition to biblical scholarship.32 There can be no doubt that such an
approach would be fruitful, but just how far the benefits would reach is something
which should not be overestimated. There is a great deal of discussion in feminist
theology and biblical interpretation concerning the possibility of constructing a women's
history or tradition from the evidence - as yet still meagre - of archaeological discoveries
and ancient texts. I have already quoted Carol Meyers' Discovering Eve, a study which
claims to reconstruct the everyday life of women in ancient Israel, and the work of
Elisabeth Schiissler Fiorenza follows a similar line in the context of the New Testament,
as she examines the role of women in the early Christian church.33 Both authors show
that although women are marginalised in biblical literature, the role of women in the
cultures from which that literature has emerged was by no means marginal. But I have
two strong reservations about the efficacy of this kind of approach as a means of
effectively "depatriarchalizing" the background to biblical texts. The first is that it is not
clear exacdy how a reconstruction of women's history might further the cause of modem
feminists in their struggle against sexism in religion; it may be important to realise how
women under patriarchy today share this or that facet of the experience of women under
patriarchy in biblical times, but cultures change, the ground shifts, and women today
really face a set of problems and potential solutions which differ vastly from those of
their foresisters. Daphne Hampson articulates the problem in her critique of Fiorenza:
....even if one considers those women in the modern western world who are less fortunate,
they still have, for example, an entirely different legal status than had a first-century woman.
The difference in lifestyle between myself (and herself) as white, middle-class women living in
the western hemisphere today and that of first-century women is such as to make all
comparison meaningless. To be asked to see myself as one in solidarity with first-century
women strains my credulity.34
In addition to this, there is Mary Ann Tolbert's objection that seeking authoritative
revelation from history is not only a tactic too commonly used against women - as, for
example, in the argument that Jesus appointed men as disciples, and therefore only men
are fit to be ordained as priests or ministers35 - but it can also be a manoeuvre which
further alienates other marginalised groups whose place in biblical history is impossible
to determine, or perhaps even nonexistent:
While feminist reconstructions have done much to explode the patriarchal myth of
women's marginality in early Christianity, the underlying assumption that historical
participation is a necessary prerequisite for full status in the present has not really been
challenged. Hence, other groups who cannot reconstruct their historical participation (as, for
example, certain racial groups, homosexuals, handicapped people, etc.) still face
disenfranchisement.36
But perhaps more importantly, the attempt to solve the problems inherent in biblical texts
by going "behind" those texts in search of real life will never be successful while we
place our faith in the unquestionable veracity of history. The hermeneutical process in
which the positive and the negative, the ideologically acceptable and the unacceptable,
exist in a state of continual tension is not caused by some rare virus that plagues only
biblical criticism, but is the result of an undecideability which is fundamental to all texts
(an important point which will be argued and developed in greater detail in chapter 3).
And history, ultimately, comes to us in the form of a text, complete with all the
prejudices of its author. Like the bible, history has a narrative voice, and if it is pristine,
unclouded accuracy we are after, a non-reflecting window onto the lives of women in
ancient Palestine, will this not be as obscured by twentieth-century Western liberal
feminist concerns as it is by the distortions of sexist authorship in any age?
All this is not to say that historical scholarship has no meaning or value for a feminist
critique of Western religion. But it must be remembered that the results of such
scholarship are generally disseminated as knowledge in the form of written texts, and
just as the bible has the (patriarchal) cultural presuppositions of its authors writ large all
over its claims to history and truth - to say nothing of its calls for justice - so does any
"ideological" restructuring of biblical material reflect first and foremost the politics of the
architect. And while modern feminist politics may be better and fairer than ancient sexist
politics, as a narrative filter neither brings us face-to-face with what was really going on
in the society of biblical times. The point is that whether our search is for a
"depatriarchalizing" biblical principle or a history which (arguably) establishes solidarity
between modern and ancient women in patriarchal societies, in either case we are left
having to deal with a text and its mediating authorial voice. And so the most immediate
concern for a feminist critique of Judaism or Christianity, as for any critique motivated
by a liberation ethic, is that it should acknowledge its own text-centredness, which
means that it should develop a self-conscious hermeneutics which focuses both on
biblical literature and on the broader issues involved in how any literature is both
produced and received - how texts "work".
The "Text Itself": Phyllis Trible and the Garden of Eden: The success and
influence of Phyllis Trible in the field of feminist biblical interpretation owes much to the
comprehensive way in which she deals with the former aspect of this hermeneutical
requirement. Her work is almost exclusively text-centred, and she has done a great deal
to bring biblical scholarship to the point where it can no longer take for granted its own
long-held assumptions about the importance (or lack of importance) of gender issues in
exegesis. In God and the Rhetoric ofSexuality (1978), Trible identifies her methodology
as "rhetorical criticism", according to which operation
the major clue is the text itself. Thus, I view the text as a literary creation with an
interlocking structure of words and motifs. Proper analysis of form yields proper articulation of
meaning.37
Her approach to a text, then, involves a detailed examination of the words on the page
and the way in which they are arranged; in Trible's eyes, the bible is as manifestly
"literary" a work as the Iliad, the Odyssey or the Bhagavad Gita, and this understanding
is essential to any understanding of the bible as Divinely inspired:
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the Bible as literature is the Bible as scripture, regardless of one's attitude towards its
authority. And conversely, the Bible as scripture is the Bible as literature, regardless of one's
evaluation of its quality.38
In God and the Rhetoric ofSexuality, Trible sets out her textual modus operandi, and
then offers rhetorical-critical analyses of three biblical texts: the Garden of Eden story
(Genesis 2:4b-3:24), the Song of Songs, and the book of Ruth. Her treatment of Gen.
2:4b-3:24 is worth looking at in some detail here, partly because from a feminist point of
view the Garden of Eden story is a critical piece of biblical literature, having provided the
outline for generations of orthodox Christian (and, to a lesser extent, Jewish) doctrine
concerning the nature, roles and expectations of women. But also, Trible's analysis of
the story provides, in its strengths and limitations, a clear illustration of an exegetical
strategy which seems to offer a positive feminist critique of scripture, but which
ultimately finds itself limited by some highly questionable assumptions which Trible
makes concerning the activities of reading and writing.
Basically, Trible wishes to establish that the Garden of Eden narrative is by no means
inherently sexist; that a patriarchal tradition has developed and made normative an
interpretation of the story which is based on ideas that "violate the rhetoric of the story",
and which "fail to respect the integrity of this work as an interlocking structure of words
and motifs with its own intrinsic value and meaning".39 Her aim is to strip away the
layers of culture-specific perspectives from the story and "to contemplate it afresh as a
work of art".40 In doing this, Trible arrives at the conclusion that the notions of male
superiority and female inferiority traditionally associated with this story have no essential
grounds within "the text itself'.
In the following outline of Trible's analysis of Gen. 2:4b-3:24,1 have considered
only parts of what is a long, detailed and closely-argued thesis, choosing to concentrate
on five key points upon which I believe the sexist/non-sexist argument hangs: (a) the
order of creation of the man and the woman; (b) the disputed status of the woman as the
man's "helper"; (c) the "naming" of the woman by the man; (d) the dialogue between the
woman and the serpent; and (e) the significance of the punishments meted out by
Yahweh to the human couple. In the first instance, (a), Trible argues against the
traditional view that the man holds superior ontological status over the woman because
he was created first, and that woman's inferior position in the hierarchy of being stems
from her being created "from" man. Rather, says Trible, the woman can be seen as
"elevated in emphasis by the design of the story", as her appearance in the final episode
of the drama of creation is perhaps the climax of this part of the narrative, the pinnacle
and fulfilment of the creative process rather than some kind of afterthought.41 In addition
to this, the first-created earth-creature, ha-'adam, is not "male" but a sexually-
undifferentiated being, "neither male nor female but a combination of both".42 It is only
with the creation of woman that sexual differentiation takes place, as now ha-'adam has
what he previously lacked; a sexed being to differ from. "His sexual identity depends
upon hers even as hers depends upon him",43 and so to all intents and purposes, "male"
and "female" as sexual designations are created simultaneously.
We consider next (b), the vexed question of the woman's function - the reason why
she was created in the first place. The Hebrew expression used in Gen. 2:18, 20 to
denote the kind of companion Yahweh had in mind for ha-'adam is 'ezer Ifnegdo,
translated in RSV as "a helper fit for him", and implying both derivative and inferior
status. Trible, however, sees 'ezer as carrying no such connotations; indeed, she cites
other passages in the Hebrew Bible where 'ezer is used to describe God, the utterly
superior "helper" of Israel.44 But the qualifying hfnegdo, "corresponding to it", indicates
that the relationship is one of identity and equality rather than either superiority or
inferiority. The woman, then, as 'ezer kenegdo, is "a companion corresponding to"
ha-'adam, "one who alleviates isolation through identity"45
It is generally recognised that the act of naming in biblical literature carries particular
significance; to name something is to establish authority or at least ontological
precedence over it, and a reading of Gen. 2:23 in line with the patriarchal exegetical
tradition suggests that just as ha-'adam "named" the animals and thus asserted dominion
over them, so the man's "naming" of the woman implies his authority over her. But
Trible points out that the standard Hebrew naming-formula involves the use of both the
verb "call" (qara') and the noun "name" (shem), to form the formulaic phrase "to call the
name" and to connote the existence of some kind of hierarchical relationship.46 The
Hebrew of Gen. 2:23, however, in which ha-'adam "names" the woman 'ishshah,
employs the verb qara' but not the noun shem, and so according to Trible, ha-'adam's
act is simply one of recognition:
The earth-creature exclaims, "This shall be called 'issa". The noun name is strikingly
absent from the poetry. Hence, in calling the woman, the man is not establishing power over
her, but rejoicing in their mutuality.47
Turning to (d), the dialogue at the beginning of Genesis 3 between the woman and
the serpent: it has been affirmed with depressing regularity and fervour that the serpent,
as the incarnation of evil-in-creation, chooses to tempt the woman because it recognises
that she is spiritually and intellectually inferior to the man, more vulnerable to "subtle"
argument and likelier to succumb to a temptation which appeals to the base instincts of
appetite - and sure enough, events prove that the serpent is a perceptive judge of female
nature. Trible recognises that the serpent is used in the story as an agent of discord and a
threat to "the harmony of life" in the Garden 48 but she sees the woman's performance in
the drama as anything but shameful or weak. The serpent addresses her in plural verb
forms, implicitly conferring upon her the honour of "spokesperson for the human
couple....equal with the man in creation".49 The woman's statement that Yahweh
forbade not only the eating but the touching of the fruit involves an embellishment which
is similar in intention and style to the Rabbinic activity of "building a fence around the
Torah", or putting imaginative commentary to the service of protecting the essence of a
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Divine decree. "Theologian, ethicist, hermeneut, rabbi, [the woman] speaks with clarity
and authority",50 and in eating the fruit, she makes a reasoned and independent decision
in the full and complete realisation that such an act will be "sapientially transforming".
The man, by contrast, maintains a deep and unimpressive silence throughout all this.
Present, but no doubt only dimly aware that nothing less than the dawn of civilisation is
being initiated before his very eyes, he takes his cue unquestioningly from his more
dynamic partner:
He does not theologize; he does not contemplate; and he does not envision the full
possibilities of the occasion. Instead, his one act is belly-oriented, and it is an act of
acquiescence, not of initiative. If the woman is intelligent, sensitive and ingenious, the man is
passive, brutish and inept51
Finally, we come to (e), the close of the drama (Gen. 3:8-24), where the traditional
understanding of events is that the outraged Deity punishes his wayward humans in a
manner which determines their subsequent fortunes in the world as we know it: the man,
because he has listened to the advice of the woman (Heb. qol 'ishthekha, "the voice of
your woman" says Yahweh, forgetting in his anger his egalitarian principles), is doomed
to eke out a meagre living in the sweat of his brow from a hostile earth, and finally to
return to the dust out of which he was fashioned. As for the woman, she has to endure
labour pains (or unspecified problems in addition to bearing children, depending on the
favoured translation of 'ishshbonekh v^heronekh), and a life of servitude to a husband
she nevertheless desires; the role of women as tied to men, both sexually/emotionally
and according to the dictates of female obligation is thus seen as Divinely ordained.
Trible, however, while agreeing that in this "decree" we find the origins of patriarchal
society, sees it more as a premonitory statement of fact by Yahweh than the deliberate
instigation of a repressive social structure. Disobedience has resulted in hierarchy where
once there was mutuality, but the initiative in this was taken by the human couple, not
the Deity, so the male/female tension is the consequence of a human event, not the
fulfilment of a Divine oracle:
His [i.e. the man's] supremacy is neither a divine right nor a male prerogative. Her
subordination is neither a divine decree nor the female destiny. Both their positions result from
shared disobedience. God describes this consequence but does not prescribe it as a judgement.52
This brief summary of the key points of Phyllis Trible's argument should suffice to
show that she has interpreted the Garden of Eden story in a way which seriously
challenges any traditional patriarchal reading, and which indicates that such a reading is
by no means given at the rhetorical or linguistic level. But whether or not her own
reading is finally "correct", or closer to the core of the text than a more sexist
interpretation is maybe not so clear. She has been convincingly refuted at the level of her
own "rhetorical criticism": David Clines, for example, has countered that 'ezer does in
fact imply hierarchy, as a helper is by definition someone who operates according to
someone else's previously-established agenda,53 and so the implication is that the
woman, as 'ezer, is created from the outset as a secondary, other-directed being. Anne
Gardner throws a similarly sceptical light on the meaning of kfnegdo, which, she argues,
simply denotes a complementary creature, one of the same species, and says nothing about
the balance of the relationship between the male and the female.54
Gardner also considers the implications of the woman's ontological predicament,
pointing out that if ha-'adam is linguistically related to ha-'adamah, and if the
earth-creature is created "to till and to keep" the earth (Gen. 2:15), then the linguistic
relationship between 'ish and 'ishshah could mirror a correspondingly hierarchical
relationship of primacy and servitude between the first and second created humans.55 I
would similarly point out that this structure is mirrored again in the distribution of
punishments, as the man's punishment relates back to the earth from which he was
taken, and the woman's punishment relates to the man: for all Trible's arguments that the
punishments are descriptive and not prescriptive, the fact that they hark back structurally
to the mythical creation of the species as well as forward into history suggests that
something other than human agency is at work in the institution of gender-determined
hierarchy. Still operating at the rhetorical level, but from a slightly different perspective,
Susan Lanser has wondered pertinently why, if Trible is correct in arguing that the man
and the woman share equal responsibility for their disobedience, "male dominance
should be the particular consequence" for this act.56 Moreover, Lanser charges Trible
with carrying out a too-rigorously-formal analysis which ignores the "inferential"
structure of the text: for example, a simple sequential cause-and-effect view of the
punishments, one that sees the humans' transgression as a historical act with historical
consequences which God merely describes from a position of detatched observation, is a
view which ignores the fact that from the moment the tree of knowledge is mentioned in
the story, the prohibition delivered and death threatened, a palpable weight of dramatic
tension hangs about the narrative, creating
an overdetermined context in which God is expected to deliver punishment long before he
does so, and the pronouncements of 3:14-19 fulfil this expectation even if their surface form
allows other possibilities.57
These counter-interpretations to the kind of exegesis offered by Trible rely themselves
on close rhetorical-critical reading; a brief look at the Garden of Eden story in its wider
context both as part of the canonical corpus of the Hebrew Bible and as an ancient Near
Eastern mythological text should further problematise claims to locating any
anti-patriarchal rhetoric which is "intrinsic" to the story. George Ramsey has taken issue
with Trible on the question of naming, and while he too wishes to establish that the
utterance of the word 'ishshah at Gen.2:23 does not constitute an act of domination, he
refutes the suggestion (critical to Trible's argument) that the Hebrew naming-formula is
limited to the use of the verb qara' in conjunction with the noun shem. Ramsey cites a
number of biblical passages in which the act of naming is performed,58 and he finds that
in addition to qara'....shem, a formula is often employed which makes use of qara'
together with the inseparable preposition represented by lamedh. The latter formula is
used in Gen. 2:23, and according to Ramsey, it is more a variation on a theme than a
significant break with rhetorical tradition:
Rather than there being a "radical" difference between Gen. 2:23 on the one hand and
2:19-20 [the naming of the animals] and 3:20 [the naming of the woman "Eve"] on the
other....what we discover is that 2:23 simply uses one variation (qara' with lamed plus the
pronoun zo't) to express the act of naming, whereas 2:19-20 and 3:20 use another variation
(qara' plus sem)?^
Background knowledge of a different sort qualifies Trible's positive portrayal of the
relationship between the woman and the serpent. Anne Gardner's article, quoted above,
examines Genesis 2:4b-3:24 in the light of parallel Mesopotamian mythology, and she
criticises Trible for ignoring "the rich mythological background upon which the
Yahwist writer of Genesis 2:4b-3 draws".60 This mythological background includes,
among other things, the symbols, legends and rituals of Near Eastern goddess cults,
almost all traces of which have been excised from the literature of the Yahwist (if indeed
they were ever there in the first place) except for the occasional piece of strident polemic
directed against heathenish Canaanite religious practices. Gardner, however, identifies a
kind of literary subconscious within the Garden of Eden story, which places the story
firmly within its cultural/mythological context, and where sinister shadows of
anti-goddess ideology lurk shark-like beneath the surface of the text. The serpent, for
example, is a widely-recognised sexual emblem featuring prominently in the symbolic
structure of goddess-cults, which are "intimately connected with sexuality and
fertility".61 Sexual experience is linked to wisdom in myths such as the Gilgamesh epic,
where the savage Enkidu gains "wisdom", "broader understanding" and god-like status
through intercourse with a Temple prostitute.62 The serpent and the acquisition of
knowledge are of course key elements in the Genesis text, and if the formal mythological
serpent-goddess-sexuality-knowledge chain of association appears to be broken in Eden
by the tree as the source of knowledge, this too can be accommodated within the
symbolic tradition of goddess religion:
[s]nakes are often pictured with the goddess, sometimes standing upright beside her, with
the deity herself frequendy represented beside a fruit-bearing tree.63
This associative structure enables us to read the Garden of Eden story as redolent with
Israelite patriarchal/monotheistic politics: Yahweh warns his children away from fertility
cults (as symbolised by the fruit-bearing tree); disobedience results in a kind of
knowledge which is linked to nakedness and shame (a kind of guilty sexuality is
apparent here); and Yahweh's subsequent displeasure is the anger of the jealous God of
Exod. 20:5, whose creatures have been seduced by the representative of a rival Deity.
The gender of this rival Deity can be inferred by the fact that the serpent (itself
traditionally associated with goddess cults) chooses to speak with the woman, in the
realisation that she will be particularly attracted to the kind of knowledge it has to offer.
And the punishment meted out to the woman places her, significantly enough, "firmly
under the control of her husband",64 who will presumably ensure that her cultic activities
remain circumscribed within the Law of the God of the Patriarchs of Israel.
The foregoing outline of readings of Gen. 2:4b-3:24 which contradict, in some
respect or other, that of Phyllis Trible is not meant simply as a bombardment of
arguments intended to knock Trible down a few rungs on the ladder of acceptable
biblical hermeneutics. Rather, I hope to have shown that Trible's is just one of a whole
chorus of voices and counter-voices all clamouring to be heard and understood. It is easy
enough for me to point out what I see as gaps in Trible's interpretation and to find other
readings which have corresponding strengths; further study would no doubt in turn
show that the works of Clines, Lanser, Ramsey, Gardner and any number of others
embody gaps and inconsistencies which could be made coherent by using Trible as a
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reference. What would be difficult - I would say impossible - would be to establish
incontrovertibly that any one interpretation was complete or final, that one interpretative
voice spoke the "truth" about the Genesis story in opposition to a host of false
hermeneutical prophets. There is an important caveat implied here for feminist
hermeneutics, where the strong political imperative at work in interpretation can overly
polarise the position of the interpreter: it is, I believe, as mistaken to make triumphant,
comprehensively pro-feminist statements out of texts (especially in biblical literature) as
it is to read the same texts as wholeheartedly pro-patriarchy, as Danna Nolan Fewell has
commented:
....any reading that produces a text with a complete thematic unity....is a misreading. We
are called upon constantly to reread. What this means in feminist literary criticism is this: we
cannot naively accept positive feminist texts as unmediated words of liberation, neither can we
reject patriarchal texts as unredeemable words of subjugation.65
It is possible that Trible does not seek explicitly to establish Gen. 2:4b-3:24 as a text
with "a complete thematic unity"; it could be that she is simply working through some of
the redemptive possibilities suggested by what she sees as the "depatriarchalizing
principle" within it. But while Trible on the one hand appears to eschew dogmatic
ideology, claiming with an easy-going flexibility to see the bible as
a pilgrim wandering through history to merge past and present....composed of diverse
traditions that span centuries, [embracing] claims and counterclaims in witness to the
complexities and ambiguities of existence,66
she displays, on the other hand, a devotion to the semantic integrity of "the words on the
page" of scripture which has, in fact, very little to do with past, present, diverse
traditions, claims or counterclaims. Her explication of the literary assumptions behind
her methodology is worth quoting at length:
38
I view the text as a literary creation with an interlocking structure of words and motifs.
Proper analysis of form yields proper articulation of meaning....A literary approach to
hermeneutics concentrates primarily on the text rather than on extrinsic factors such as
historical background, archaeological data, compositional history, authorial intention,
sociological setting, or theological motivation and result....the stress falls upon interpreting
the literature in terms of itself
and her avowed intention concerning Genesis 2:4b-3:24 is
to respect the integrity of this work as an interlocking structure of words and motifs with
its own intrinsic value and meaning.68
There are two main problems here: the first is that if you relegate history, archaeology,
authorship, sociology and so on to the outer darkness of "extrinsic factors", then you are
left with rather a blank page, and if Trible's own reading of the Garden of Eden story
runs to some seventy very full pages, surely this has everything to do with her own
social background, her theological motivation, and her intentions as an author. To claim
that your own politics are inherent in "the text itself is precisely what many feminist
critics have denounced as a spurious interpretative manoeuvre; it has always been a
favourite strategy of patriarchal religious thought to read its own self-serving ideology
into the bible and claim that its authority is self-evident, intrinsic to scripture and
therefore resistant to subjective reappraisal or the challenge of alternatives. In saying that
her reading of scripture is final and autonomous (which she unavoidably does when she
claims access to scripture's "intrinsic value"), Phyllis Trible sets up a monolithic
interpretation which rests on the false assumption that her own participation in the
process is "scientific" and purely objective, and which owes much to the dualistic logic
of proper/improper "articulation of meaning". The other objection is that feminist
theology is something which has grown out of a primarily historical struggle, and which
works to remedy a social disease; it is a politically explicit practice. But if the literature
with which it deals is somehow sealed off from history and de-politicised to become "the
text in terms of itself, it can ultimately have only a limited part to play in the process of
continued historical change which does, after all, provide the arena for all progressive
theologies, whether feminist, liberationist or environmentalist.
So rhetorical criticism, as employed by Phyllis Trible, is essentially a static activity
which attempts to establish the text as a kind of counter-myth. The familiar patriarchal
creation myth presents the eating of the fruit as the archetypal Sin, with the serpent and
Eve as its archetypal agents. In this light, "fallen" society as we know it is steeped in the
rituals which keep the myth alive: our moral transgressions re-enact the exemplary Sin,
and when women exercise guile, lack of control and any number of other crimes to
which they are said to be naturally inclined, they are then most clearly epiphanies of Eve
and her exemplary manifestation of dangerous female nature back in the time of sacred
Beginnings. Thus it becomes a "sacred" or scriptural injunction to mistrust and try to
control women. Phyllis Trible certainly redresses the balance, but in a manner which
nevertheless conforms to patriarchal critical practice, in that she too calls timeless truth,
or what the text "really means", into the service of fixing and furthering her own
interests; interests which have a historical and not a mythological ancestry, and which
could hardly have been further from the minds of the people who put the story together -
their motives seem to have been more along the lines of carrying out a Yahwist
salvage-and-demolition job on a rival mythology than of producing a feminist classic. So
Phyllis Trible locates her heart's desire at the heart of the text, and like so many other
exegetes mistakes her own hermeneutical politics for the "intrinsic value and meaning" of
scripture. There can be no doubt that it is a timely come-uppance for patriarchal religion
to have its own creation myth transformed into the story of a courageous heroine and her
effete male sidekick. But this too is a chauvinism of sorts, and the assumptions which lie
behind it pose problems for feminist hermeneutics, or for any hermeneutics which
seriously espouses a program of social equality and reform.
What feminist theology and biblical interpretation must be based on, then, is a theory
which does not seek to demarcate so confidently between the "intrinsic meaning" of
scripture and its alleged distortions, between what is orthodox and heterodox according
to feminist principles, and so which resists inflexibility and closure in interpretation.
The following two chapters will see the attempt to formulate and demonstrate the
mechanics of such a theory; first in a chiefly negative sense by considering two kinds of
approaches which should be avoided by feminist criticism, and then, in chapter three, by
examining the deconstructive strategies of Jacques Derrida and assessing the viability of
deconstruction as a positive feminist exegetical framework.
41
Notes:
1: The theory/experience opposition is, ironically, one often upheld by feminist writers
who elsewhere denounce dualistic constructs. Feminist antipathy to theory rests
primarily on the association of abstract, rationalistic thought with male-dominated
systems of power and control, and patriarchal society's privileging of the
rational/spiritual over the intuitive/physical. According to this view, theory is
....a way of denying the centrality of women's experience, a way of removing the control
of the meaning of our lives from individual women and telling us what we should think
(Weedon, 1987, p.6).
But it is not necessary to see theory as an irredeemably "patriarchal" practice. To
theorise is to generalise, to establish models from patterns of experience which can be
helpful or even essential to an understanding of how the individual functions in society
- if there is no theory without experience, it could also be said that experience has no
meaning without some kind of theory. Chris Weedon sees the theory/experience
problem as existing at a social/political rather than an ethical/ideological level:
To dismiss all theory as an elitist attempt to tell women what their experience really
means is not helpful, but it does serve as a reminder of the importance of making theory
accessible and of the political importance of transforming the material conditions of knowledge
production and women's access to knowledge....rather than turning our backs on theory and
taking refuge in experience alone, we should think in terms of transforming both the social
relations of knowledge production and the type of knowledge produced (p.7).
2: Kee (1986), p.l.
3: Ibid. p.l.
4: Ruether (1986), p.22. As far as the possibility of access to a "lost" women's religion
or religious history is concerned, Ruether seems to share a certain scepticism with
those who believe that "the story of the pre-patriarchal women's religion seems more
like the in illo tempore of an attractive myth than real history" (p.24).
5: Ruether (1979), p.51.
6: McFague (1982), p.148.
7: Ibid. p. 149.
8: Haney (1980), p. 124.
9: Cooey (1990), p.9.
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11: Ibid. p. 10.
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13: Ochshom (1981), p.x.
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14: Cf. e.g. Daphne Hampson's closely-argued "post-Christian" thesis in Theology and
Feminism (1990), a critique of Christian theology and the assumptions which lie
behind the "historical" aetiology of Christian faith.
15: Cf. Exod. 19:4; Deut. 32:11-12; Isa. 49:15; Hos. 11:4, 13:8; Matt. 23:37.
16: Cf. Isa 11:6-9; Jer. 31:22, 31-4; Joel: 2:28-9.
17: Ruether (1985), pp.117-18.
18: Cf. Gilkes (1989), pp. 63-4.
19: Cf. Cannon (1985), p. 35.
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21: Trible (1973), p.48.
22: Ibid. p.34.
23: Ibid. p.31.
24: Cf. e.g. Aschkenasy (1986), pp.87-8; Bos (1988), pp. 58-64; Brenner (1985),
pp.106-8; Fewell and Gunn (1988); Trible (1978), ch.6.
25: Cf. Trible (1978), p. 173.
26: Ibid. p. 196.
27: Cf. Trible (1973), p.30:
It is superfluous to document patriarchy in Scripture. Yahweh is the God of Abraham,
Isaac and Jacob as well as of Jesus and Paul. The legal codes of Israel treat women primarily as
chattels-Considerable evidence indicts the Bible as a document ofmale supremacy.
28: Trible (1978), p. 193.
29: Bos (1988), p.38.
30: Fewell and Gunn (1989), p.59 (footnote to p.53).
31: Meyers (1988), pp.9-10.
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34: Hampson (1990), p.34.
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whereby a secondary term is derived from a primary one, and she does not take issue
with the highly significant question of why such a pun should be made by the author at
this point.
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The Concept of "Woman" in Interpretation
TO STEP OUTSIDE OF PATRIARCHAL THOUGHT MEANS: Being sceptical toward
every known system of thought; being critical of all assumptions, ordering values and
definitions.1
Gerda Lerner's rigorous formula for non-patriarchal thinking carries the daunting
implication that feminist theory and practice demand nothing less than a kind of cultural
revolution - to refuse to take for granted the governing "assumptions, ordering values
and definitions" of patriarchal society is, for women in Western culture at least, to think
and act in a spirit of radical criticism which may lead to a complete overhaul of our
inherited philosophical/metaphysical tradition. And indeed this dramatic prospect is not
unlikely: if, as Lerner implies, "every known system of thought" is in some way
patriarchal, then feminist criticism must inevitably venture into the unknown, or at least
the unfamiliar, to disturb and bring us uncomfortably face-to-face with some of our most
cherished and deeply-held (mis)apprehensions concerning ourselves and our society. In
what follows, I am working on the assumption that Lerner's premise is valid - that our
society is a patriarchal one, although perhaps not irredeemably so - and that the first task
of any feminist practice is to dismantle or harass patriarchal values wherever they
operate. In the previous chapter I offered a brief description of patriarchy more or less by
way of introduction; what I propose to do in the following discussion is to look in closer
detail at the dominant mechanisms at work in patriarchal thought, to consider the
potential for a feminist response or alternative to a patriarchal worldview, and finally to
translate the argument into biblical-critical terms, outlining the necessary criteria for an
effective feminist biblical hermeneutics.
Patriarchal Dualism: It is difficult to trace patriarchy back to any point of origin,
either historical or psychological. Gerda Lemer's The Creation ofPatriarchy is less of a
Genesis-story than its title suggests, as its first two chapters offer no more than a
thorough but speculative overview of various theories of patriarchal origins, before
commencing its historical inquiry roughly around the time of the emergence of archaic
urbanised states. Similarly, mythological or religious ontologies of patriarchy are
fascinating but ultimately frustrating for anybody looking for hard evidence of a
pre-patriarchal society or culture.2 It can be argued, however, that there are certain salient
features of patriarchy in Western society which can be criticised regardless of origins.
Perhaps the most important and pervasive of these is dualism, or the division of reality
into conceptual pairs of opposites. Dualistic thought has a long and complex philo¬
sophical history,3 but in all its manifestations it stakes out the nature and limits of reality
by placing male and female, reason and instinct, spirit and flesh, culture and nature, self
and other all at corresponding conceptual poles, and sees the relationship between the
elements in each pair as discrete, a relationship of independence and opposition. While
there can be no doubt that male, female, civilisation, nature and so on "exist", and that
ranging them in pairs can facilitate one way of understanding how each relates to the
other, critics of dualism point out that such binary oppositions lead to hierarchical
patterns of thought and behaviour which can also be exploitative. Certainly in patriarchal
thought, the two terms in any pair of opposites are "regulated by the law of contrariety",4
with all the connotations of disagreement that "contrariety" implies: rather than being
accorded equal value, the terms are divided with one being seen as somehow more
worthy or desirable than the other. Male, culture, rationality, logic, transcendence and so
on all become identified with each other by virtue of the fact that they all occupy the
"positive" side of the theoretical boundary, while female, nature, emotion, intuition and
carnality are all seen as interrelated "negative" concepts.
Criticism of this kind of hierarchical worldview ranges beyond exclusively feminist
issues: the validity of the subject/object dichotomy, for example, has been thrown into
question by modern particle physics and its understanding that the conductor of an
experiment is not a purely independent observer, but an active participant whose input
often directly influences the experiment's results. In the world being discovered by "the
new physics", subject and object are intimately related, and the faculty of pure rational
detatchment on the part of the former is made problematic. Usually, however, gender
issues of some kind never seem to be far from the centre of any examination of dualistic
thought. The Greek philosophical foundations of Western metaphysics, for example,
provide the traditional rationale both for dualistic hierarchy and for misogyny, as the
Platonic/Aristotelian discussions of form and matter demonstrate.5 The dualistic elevation
of culture over nature (which has led to mass industrialisation, the exploitation of natural
resources and many current global ecological crises) also has its suggestive parallels with
patriarchal domination: nature-as-woman (mysterious, enigmatic, dangerous and yet
passive), subjected to the penetrating scrutiny of rational empiricism, finds herself
analysed, quantified, manipulated and yet feared by the men of science who seek to
control her.6 Similarly, the oppression of such groups as Jews and blacks has, in the
past, been upheld by the belief that these people are "like women...more carnal and
irrational than the dominant men".7 The tendency of a sexual politics to emerge, either
explicitly or symbolically, wherever a dualistic worldview takes concrete, institutional¬
ised form, indicates both that dualism and patriarchy are enmeshed at a fundamental
level, and that the most effective and far-reaching critique of dualism is likely to be
articulated in feminist terms.
A recurrent feature of dualistic constructs, and one which principally accounts for
their hierarchical organisation, is the tendency for only one term in any pair of opposites
to be seen as positive, or possessing its own identity, while the other term is seen as
derivative, taking its identity from its opposite. Elizabeth Grosz outlines the pattern as
follows:
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Dichotomous structures take the form of A and not-A relations, in which one term is
positively defined and the other is defined only as the negative of the first....Within this
structure, one term (A) has a positive status and an existence independent of the other; the
other term [not-A] is purely negatively defined, and has no contours of its own; its limiting
boundaries are those which define the positive term.8
In patriarchal terms, this means that "woman" is a radically negative concept. The male is
seen as independent and carries not only the privilege of self-definition, but also the
power of defining his "other", and so the clearest definition of woman offered by
patriarchal dualism is that she is "non-man" - if the male is active, rational, spiritual,
logical and autonomous, the female is by definition passive, irrational, carnal, illogical,
and heteronomous, or subject to laws imposed from outside her sphere of influence.
Responses to this within feminist discourse are not unanimous; generally, in fact, one
of two contrary positions is adopted. Both positions have been discussed at some length
in an article by Linda Alcoff appropriately subtitled "The Identity Crisis in Feminist
Theory" (Signs 13:3, 1988), in which the vexed concept of woman is examined.
Alcoffs stated concern is not with patriarchal dualism, but it seems clear to me that to
discuss the definition of woman is inevitably to take issue at some point with patriarchal
dualism, given that the dominant social discourses within which the definition of woman
is an issue (medicine, psychology, anthropology, religion) are, in the main, both
male-dominated and based on the kind of hierarchical subject/object epistemology
described above. Alcoff states that
Man has said that woman can be defined, delineated, captured - understood, explained, and
diagnosed - to a level of determination never accorded to man himself, who is conceived as a
rational animal with free will.9
For this reason I believe that the two approaches to an understanding of the concept of
woman discussed by Alcoff are also two key positions from which to criticise patriarchal
dualism and the sexist ideologies which it fosters.
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Cultural Feminism and the Gendered Subject: The first position or type of
feminism Alcoff discusses is "cultural" feminism, described as
....the ideology of a female nature or female essence reappropriated by feminists themselves
in an effort to revalidate undervalued female attributes.10
In cultural feminist theory, a dualistic structure is maintained but the hierarchy is
reversed: what was before called passivity is now seen as a tranquil capacity for peaceful
influence; irrationality becomes a sensitive, intuitive awareness unbounded by the
artificial constraints of logic; rank carnality becomes a powerful sexuality, and women's
close ties with wild, untamed nature are affirmed and celebrated; powerlessness becomes
the will to nurture, and to foster a non-competitive, non-hierarchical understanding of
authority. The gender-determined identification of femaleness with some qualities and
maleness with others goes essentially unchallenged, and the oppressive machinations of
patriarchy are seen as stemming not from the perpetuation of dualism or biological
determinism, but from men's usurpation of power that belongs specifically to women -
power which, residing in the female nature, is only half-glimpsed and half-understood
(but often wholly feared) by men.11 Alcoff chooses the term "cultural" feminism because
of the view, held by such writers as Mary Daly and Adrienne Rich, that since society as
it exists is irredeemably infected with sexism and misogyny, it must be up to women to
redefine and reevaluate themselves outside the boundaries of patriarchal culture, and so
to develop a women's counterculture whose language and values reflect and celebrate
female nature.12
There can be no doubt that sexism is endemic to all levels ofWestern society, and that
aspects of the alternative culture offered by cultural feminism are invaluable for
individuals who, having suffered the various forms of alienation, humiliation and
violence which sexism perpetuates, need to find healing and a sense of self outside the
debilitating environs of patriarchy. For some, a journey to freedom and self-discovery
cannot be made without moving into new territory which is exclusively women's space.
But cultural feminism as a totalising strategy, advocated as the answer to patriarchy,
presents problems. While accepting that traditional sources of knowledge concerning
women are contaminated with sexism, and that patriarchy both devalues and seeks to
control women's sexuality, Alcoff nevertheless treats the cultural feminist premise that
there exists a "female essence" with suspicion. Statements such as Daly's assertion that
"female energy is essentially biophilic"13, and Rich's belief in a body-oriented "female
consciousness"14 indicate that for these and other cultural feminist writers,
....feminist theory, the explanation of sexism, and the justification of feminist demands
can all be grounded securely and unambiguously on the concept of the essential female.15
But to outline the programme for women's liberation on the basis of an innate
femaleness - and, by implication, to equate patriarchy with an innate maleness - rests on
a universalising outlook which ignores variety in women's lives and experience, and
which sidelines such phenomena as, for example, white middle-class women who
contribute to the oppression of their poorer sisters, or men who reject male stereotyping
and suffer under patriarchal expectations of what it is to be a man:
....white women cannot be all good or all bad; neither can men from oppressed groups.16
Alcoff also criticises cultural feminism for being overly culture-specific: the qualities
claimed by Anglo-American feminists as inherently female may not necessarily be seen
as such by women in other cultures, and so cultural feminism takes insufficient account
of the fact that gender divisions occur according to different criteria in different
societies17 - in theorising "woman" and supporting its arguments with our own Western
academic biological or psychological explanations, cultural feminism too often becomes
a forum in which educated Anglo-American or Western European women speak for all
women everywhere.
But perhaps most importantly, Alcoff points out that cultural feminism's insistence on
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the importance of female nature to feminist theory and practice is only a shade removed
from the establishment of dogmatic criteria for inclusion in the ranks of the "truly"
feminist: if liberated women can only exist as such in a gynocentric universe, then those
who choose to live elsewhere are not only deluded and still oppressed, but somehow
also denying their femaleness, and so (to quote Elisabeth Schiissler Fiorenza),
sisterhood risks coming to be understood "not as the bonding of the oppressed but as the
gathering of the ideologically 'pure'".18 Cultural feminism, in positing an essential
female mode of being which is tied to gender, gives rise to "unrealistic expectations
about 'normal' female behaviour"19 - and in this prescriptive tendency, of course, it
mirrors patriarchy. Nobody will argue that peacefulness, identification with nature,
intuition, selflessness and other traditionally woman-associated attributes are crucial to
any envisioning of a more holistic, egalitarian society, but
to the extent that [cultural feminism] reinforces essentialist explanations of these
attributes, it is in danger of solidifying an important bulwark for sexist oppression: the belief
in an innate "womanhood" to which we must all adhere lest we be deemed either inferior or not
"true" women.20
The main problem with cultural feminism with regard to patriarchal dualism, then, is not
that it reasserts the value of "feminine" qualities, but that it rigidly equates the feminine (a
social construct) with the female (a biological entity). For cultural feminism, biology is -
ideally - destiny, and the dualistic view of gender which upholds patriarchal views of
women is inverted but not in any other way substantially challenged: male and female
still exist at opposite poles, and the relationship between them is one of antagonism. In
other words, patriarchal dualism is rejected because it is patriarchal, but not because it is
dualism.
Poststructuralist Feminism and Relativism: A very different response to
patriarchy, and one which also challenges cultural feminism, is that which deconstructs
the opposition of male and female, and relativises sexual identity, taking to its logical
conclusion Simone de Beauvoir's famous observation that
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[o]ne is not born, but rather becomes, a woman....it is civilization as a whole that
produces this creature....which is described as feminine.21
This approach is referred to by Linda Alcoff as "poststructuralist" feminism, and it relies
on a strategy whereby "gender loses its position of significance"22 in feminist discourse.
The term "poststructuralist" refers to the use made by this type of feminism of the work
of (among others) Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, thinkers often
called "poststructuralist" simply because of their philosophical roots in structuralist
linguistics and anthropology, but who might also (according to Alcoff) be termed
"post-humanist" or "post-essentialist". The central premise of all poststructuralist
thought is
....that the self-contained, authentic subject conceived by humanism to be discoverable
below a veneer of cultural and ideological overlay is in reality a construct of that very
humanist discourse. The subject is not a locus of authorial intentions or natural attributes or
even a privileged, separate consciousness. Lacan uses psychoanalysis, Derrida uses grammar
and Foucault uses the history of discourses all to attack and "deconstruct" our concept of the
subject as having an essential identity and an authentic core that has been repressed by
society.23
The problem for cultural feminists here is obvious: poststructuralism holds that the
female "essence" or subject valorised by Daly, Rich and others is not only not anchored
in the unassailable fact of biological gender, but is actually a creation of cultural feminist
discourse, having no independent existence of its own. Just as classical humanism
speaks of a unique selfhood at the heart of the individual which constitutes who that
person is, so cultural feminism presupposes an essential "womanhood" at the heart of
the female individual which is definitive and fixed. Poststructuralism, on the other hand,
is committed to the concept of the subject as the site of conflict and change, and of
subjective experience as being determined by social discourses and practices (rather than
originating in the rational, self-aware "I"). And so for poststructuralist feminism,
"woman" or the female subject takes its meaning from the discursive context in which it
is located.
Discursive contexts are many and varied, as are the modes of experience available
within them. The discourse of traditional conservative Catholicism, for example, having
its own political interests and putting forward its own particular arguments for the
organisation of society, offers a limited range of subject positions for women to assume:
virgin, nun or mystic; wife or mother. In another discursive context, created by the
shared assumptions and commercial interests of a particular wing of the magazine
industry, "woman" is career-oriented, business-suited, expensively groomed and
(hetero-)sexually confident. Within separatist feminist discourse, traditional religion and
the family are seen as the key instruments of patriarchal oppression, monogamous
heterosexuality as a masochistic enslavement to male desire, and so "woman" is
earth-centred, creative, woman-identified, sexually diffuse. These discourses offer
different subject positions or identities to the individual, and the relationship between
them is unstable and contentious:
Discourses represent political interests and in consequence are constantly vying for status
and power. The site of this battle for power is the subjectivity of the individual.24
The theory of discourse and power has been most fully articulated by Foucault, whose
belief it is that meaning, experience and subjectivity are constructed entirely by social
discourses, and that the constant struggle for dominance between discourses results in
perceived fragmentations and contradictions within the self, and in the inability to make
final sense of experience. Foucault's cultural diagnosis is that "the least glimmer of truth
is conditioned by politics",25 and that we are "totally imprinted by history".26 Similarly,
Derrida has posited that subjectivity is constituted by the play of textuality - Derrida's
"text" is in many respects parallel to Foucault's "discourse" - and Lacan also sees the
subject as "socially, linguistically and libidinally constructed".27 Further discussion of
Lacan and Foucault lies outside the scope of this paper, and of Derrida more will be said
later: for the moment, it should be clear enough that poststructuralist feminist theories of
subjectivity have uncomfortable implications for any discourses, feminist or patriarchal,
concerned with questions of women's definitive selfhood and experience.
The poststructuralist emphasis on social discourse and practice, on the production of
subjectivity, offers an excellent perspective from which to analyse and challenge a key
premise of patriarchal oppression. Once the concept of predetermined gender identity is
seen as the product rather than the ground or authorisation of discourses concerning
women, the idea that women should conform "naturally" to a certain set of cultural
criteria is effectively done away with. Women can, in theory, become free to explore a
variety of subject positions, unencumbered with any social expectations pertaining to
their biological sex. Of course, female anatomy and the roles associated with it (such as
motherhood) cannot be relativised out of existence, but neither can the significance of
anatomy or biological nature be any longer fixed. The problem, however, lies in making
the shift from theory to practice: if "woman", or the female subject, is no longer
definable in terms of specific gender, and if "women's experience" is as indeterminate as
the subjectivity which underlies it, then how and where is feminist politics to be
grounded? Linda Alcoff s principal objection to poststructuralist feminism is centred
around this question, and it is with some anxiety that she quotes Derrida:
Perhaps...."woman" is not a determinable identity....Perhaps woman - a non-identity,
non-figure, a simulacrum - is distance's very chasm, the out-distancing of distance, the
interval's cadence, distance itself.28
Julia Kristeva, a French poststructuralist deeply influenced by Derrida and Lacan, is
cited as having a similar outlook:
A woman cannot be; it [.uc] is something which does not even belong in the order of
being. It follows that a feminist practice can only be negative, at odds with what already
exists, so that we may say "that's not it", and "that's still not it".29
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A welter of troublesome concerns arises here. Derrida and Kristeva do not, I believe,
seek somehow to erase the female: the realm of "identity" or the "order of being" to
which woman is said not to belong is that constituted by the oppositional discourse of
patriarchy, governed as it is by the dualistic split between male and female - woman,
defined as "non-man", indeed has no identity or being of her own here. But where, then,
does she exist? It seems that the price paid for freedom from gender expectations is a
kind of terminal invisibility, which would be agreeable enough if not for the fact that
women are, now and for the forseeable future, very much in need of a visible presence
and an audible voice within patriarchal culture, a recognised position from which to
challenge, fight and offer alternatives to oppression. Alcoff succinctly states the case:
If gender is simply a social construct, the need and even the possibility of a feminist
politics becomes immediately problematic. What can we demand in the name of women if
"women" do not exist and demands in their name simply reinforce the myth that they do? How
can we speak out against sexism as detrimental to the interests of women if the category is a
fiction? How can we demand legal abortions, adequate child care, or wages based on comparable
worth without invoking a concept of "woman"?30
Identity Politics: The solution is to develop a theory of subjectivity which steers
feminist political practice between the essentialism or "manichean ontology"31 of cultural
feminism and the all-pervasive relativism of poststructuralism's more extreme advocates.
It is a solution implied in Chris Weedon's comment on discourse and power - the idea
that the battle for status and influence between social discourses, a battle whose conflicts
and tensions constitute the unstable, shifting nature of the subject, is "a battle in which
the individual is an active but not sovereign protagonist".32 This leaves room both for the
recognition that our identity is constructed for us, and for the possibility of that identity
nevertheless being used as a point of departure for political action. Alcoff calls this
"identity politics", and cites by way of example "assimilated Jews who have chosen to
become Jewish-identified as a political tactic against anti-Semitism", and women who
choose to claim their identity as women in order to speak out against sexism and
misogyny.33
One advantage of identity politics in feminist theory is that it avoids the necessity of a
dualistic commitment either to cultural feminism or to hard-line poststructuralism:
"femaleness" or women's experience becomes nonessentialised and dependent on its
historical context, while at the same time the impulse to erase or deny the relevance of
women's experience is checked by the grounding of that experience in shared
understandings and practices which, while relative to their social location, nevertheless
provide a consensual platform for an identifiably feminist politics. The efficacy of
identity politics is apparent in such areas as the the struggle for fairer legislation
concerning rape and sexual violence. The patriarchal prejudices rife within Western legal
systems are never more visible than in rape cases; in an overwhelming number of
instances, the woman involved suffers under the assumption that she is, simply by virtue
of her femaleness, to some extent sexually available, and so the responsibility falls upon
her to prove that she neither invited, consented to nor enjoyed the attentions of her
assailant (the myth of sexual availability and provocation on the part of the woman is
further underlined by tabloid press reports which, while calling in aggrieved tones for
harsher police action and criminal penalties, still seldom fail to describe the rape victim as
"young" or "pretty"). But a feminist response to this situation need say neither that the
rapist is a male showing his true colours, nor that the experience of sexual violence is
only relatively outrageous or traumatic by social convention. Similarly, the sexual
vulnerability of women in Western society is a fact, and the experience of some kind of
sexual exploitation is common to most if not all women, yet this is not necessarily due to
any kind of innate male aggression, or sexual magnetism essential to the female nature:
rather, the situation is the result of a complex pattern of social assumptions and practices.
These assumptions and practices are being challenged and reshaped by the pressure of
such groups as legal reform and anti-rape activists; the political action of women who,
while choosing to speak from their experience of the reality of sexual violence, still
rightly refuse to be seen as victims or sexually passive by (female) nature. This is
identity politics in practice: the choosing of subject positions (albeit not completely
freely) which enables the individual
[to] say at one and the same time that gender is not natural, biological, universal,
ahistorical, or essential and yet still claim that gender is relevant because we are taking gender
as a position from which to act politically.34
Sexist ontologies of woman, based on gender-specific male/female dualism, are thus
undermined, just as the dualistic opposition that exists between woman-as-biological-
fact and woman-as-cultural-fiction is deconstructed, with each relying on the other for its
meaning. The significance of gender, or what it "means" to be a woman, becomes fluid
and dependent on the force of discursive influence, while the play of discourse is
constrained, and the meaning of gender provisionally held in place, by the limited range
of subject positions available to the individual at any one time.
The task now is to begin to translate this rather lengthy theoretical outline into the
language of feminist biblical hermeneutics. In what remains of this chapter I will look at
patriarchal dualism and essentialism in interpretation; poststructuralism will be
considered in greater detail in the following chapter, where the relevance of
deconstructive biblical criticism to feminist exegesis will be examined.
Criticism in Search of "Truth": The historical struggle for authority in biblical
interpretation has most often been carried out with competing exegetical voices claiming
to have divined the authentic, God-breathed meaning of scripture, and until fairly
recently those voices have spoken also in the interests of patriarchy. The bible is, for the
most part, a collection of texts which largely reflect the values of patriarchal cultures;
church and synagogue are, traditionally, patriarchal institutions; the canonical works of
both Christian and Jewish exegetes are regularly punctuated with prescriptions aimed at
subordinating women to male authority in political and liturgical practice; it should
therefore come as no great surprise to find that the dominant values and assumptions
behind traditional biblical hermeneutics are often the same values and assumptions which
uphold patriarchy. It should be noted at this point that I will later put forward Rabbinic
hermeneutics as a mode of interpretation which is, in some respects, at least
methodologically compatible with feminist hermeneutics; in the critical discussion which
follows, I will therefore be speaking mainly of the Christian exegetical tradition.
The differences between the Jewish and the Christian traditions are many and
profound; few would dispute that the differences exist, but any attempt to ground them
in a philosophical bifurcation of Hebrew and Greek thought results in sharp controversy.
This controversy will be examined in greater detail in chapter 4; for the purposes of the
present argument I am accepting simply that Christianity has inherited, to a large extent,
the Greek metaphysical tradition concerning matters of language, truth and interpretation.
From the early Gnostics to the moral theologians of the twentieth century, the
Platonic/Aristotelian concept of truth or ultimate Meaning as residing in a realm beyond
language or sensual apprehension has greatly influenced Christian scriptural
hermeneutics. Plato posits the existence of an unchanging realm of Ideas, immutable
forms which exist beyond the contingencies of language and the senses, for which
language in particular provides only a roughly imitative approximation;35 this is an idea
reproduced in the Pauline concept of a transcendent God in whom absolute truth rests,
but who in this life can only be apprehended as "through a glass darkly", and also more
significantly in Paul's warning that in matters of exegesis, truth lies behind the text ("the
written code kills, but the Spirit gives life" - 2 Cor. 3:6). Aristotle differs from Plato in
that he sees the ousia or primary essence of a thing as residing within the thing rather
than in an eternal realm of forms, but he nevertheless sees this essence as being
abstracted from its material properties, knowable only by means of a movement beyond
language and the senses; the paradigm of knowledge remains "the contemplation by a
rational mind of something inherently mind-like, freed of matter".36
Biblical interpretation carried out on the basis of this understanding of language and
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truth has too easily served the interests of hierarchical authority in general and of
patriarchy in particular. The idea that there is a realm beyond language where things
simply exist in a purely pre-verbal state means that the philosphical ideal is to
conceptualise, to think in the abstract and not to get bogged down in the distracting
particularities of words; the familiar androcentric virtues of rationality, logic and abstract
thought become valorised, and the male is held to be better-equipped than the more
emotional female for maintaining a good firm intellectual grip on the eternal verities.
According to this kind of exegetical practice, language needs to be disciplined, to be
made as stable as possible so that it mirrors as faithfully as possible the immutable realm
of pure Meaning: for Aristotle, the ideal speech act is that which has one meaning and
one meaning only, while similarly in Plato's dialogues we can see that self-contradiction,
or inconsistency in meaning, is the cardinal rhetorical sin. This results in interpretation
which is essentially monolithic and hierarchical, as well as patriarchal: an authentic
reading of scripture is ideally unambiguous as well as disinterested and apolitical; it is
that which seems most closely to approach the numinous, univocal truth behind the text,
and so it must be fixed and disseminated as orthodox exegesis over against other
readings which compete for the same status. Claims of disinterestedness, however, run
into significant problems when the "authentic" becomes the authoritative, and the forces
of power come into play - even a brief glance at the shortest chapter in Christian church
history will reveal that wherever issues of orthodoxy and heterodoxy arise, and
ecclesiastical or state power is brought in to settle them, what in fact becomes clearly
visible is the inextricability of politics and faith, of discourse and truth.37 But doctrinal
readings of scripture, including those which seek scriptural legitimation for the
patriarchal domination of women, continue to be predicated upon the denial or
marginalisation of politics in exegesis: biblical revelation is said to take place when the
plane of language and social discourse is transcended - a possibility more open to men
than to women by virtue of their superior rational faculties.
At the end of the previous chapter, I indicated that feminist biblical hermeneutics
should be wary of strict demarcation between what is intrinsic or "essential" to scripture
and what is not, and I hope now to have demonstrated at a more general level that
essentialism both in theory and in textual critical practice relies on a dualistic philosophy
which conceals its own mechanisms and is too neatly congruent with the workings of
sexist ideology. Indeed, any preoccupation with correct or authentic meaning in
interpretation has its explicitly patriarchal overtones, as Jonathan Culler has argued:
....if one tried to imagine the literary criticism of a patriarchal culture, one might predict
several likely concerns: (l)that the role of the author would be conceived as a paternal
one....(2)that much would be invested in paternal authors....(3)that there would be great
concern about which meanings were legitimate and which illegitimate (since the paternal
author's role in the generation of meanings can only be inferred); and that criticism would
expend great efforts to develop principles for, on the one hand, determining which meanings
were truly the author's own progeny, and on the other hand, controlling intercourse with texts
so as to prevent the proliferation of illegitimate interpretations.38
This anxiety is compounded in biblical interpretation, where the author of the text's
meaning is often held to be God - "legitimate" meaning becomes even more jealously
guarded, as well as constituting the object of a critical but never fully satisfied desire
which dooms the exegete to the multiplication of interpretations and reinterpretations in
the search for a final, stable one.
Culler's implicit metaphor of the text as the passive yet wanton bearer of meanings,
meanings which must variously be accepted or rejected as legitimate or illegitimate
according to their paternity, is neither accidental nor insignificant: essentialist
interpretation, dependent as it is on dualistic, oppositional logic, evinces a sexual politics
which renders the text "female" in the worst of ways. In biblical interpretation,
essentialism generally takes two forms: one is that of scripture as mysterious and
unapproachable, possessing an enigmatic soul which is yielded up to the apprehension
of the reader only by means of inspiration or a kind of mystical communion. This
approach stems from an understanding of the biblical text as absolutely sacred, a divine
Code whose deciphering is dependent upon special relevation. The other
commonly-encountered mode of essentialist exegesis is that which has been criticised in
the previous chapter: the search for "proper articulation of meaning" predicated on the
idea of the text as an object, as Phyllis Trible's "interlocking structure of words and
motifs" with an "intrinsic value and meaning" accessible to the interpreter with the right
hermeneutical tools and skills. Text-as-radically-Other, to be approached with holy dread
or at least reverent caution, or text-as-recognisably-other, still fascinating but accessible
by means of rational, analytical inquiry into its nature: seen in this light, the essentialist
approach should flash a clear warning to anyone familiar with the workings of
patriarchal social anthropology. Exegesis in pursuit of authentic meaning acts upon the
text in much the same way as that in which patriarchal institutions, from science to
religion, have traditionally acted upon women: the Female has been fetishised and
deemed to be worthy of a kind of mystified awe, while at the same time women have
been studied, scrutinised, analysed, categorised, weighed and measured across a range
of discourses, all in the search for their "nature". And just as women, in conforming to
the social expectations laid down for them by the results of such inquiry, take their place
in the natural order of things and earn the respect intrinsically due to their sex, so an
essentialist view of the bible sees "correct" hermeneutical assumptions and techniques as
the means of preserving the God-ordained veracity and sanctity of the text.
I do not wish to labour the parallel between woman and text; the point is that feminist
biblical critics should view essentialist approaches to meaning of any kind with particular
suspicion, recognising that essentialist arguments have been employed not only by
religious institutions in fixing biblical meaning, not only by patriarchal institutions in
formulating restrictive gender-deterministic models for women, but also as a means of
justifying institutionalised domination in too many historical instances - the witch, the
Jew, the black, the poor, the unemployed; all have been systematically stereotyped at
some point in the attempt by those who wield hostile power over them to explain, justify
and legitimise their oppression.
The main criticism of biblical hermeneutics in pursuit of intrinsic or essential
meaning, then, corresponds to the criticism offered earlier of cultural feminism: in both
cases, the methodology looks too much like patriarchy, and the result looks too much
like ideology, leaving no room for historical or cultural change or alternatives. While
feminist biblical hermeneutics must make the bible somehow meaningful and positive to
women by operating according to a recognisably feminist agenda, it must also remain
open to diversity across and within cultures. Similarly, feminist interpretation of
scripture must speak from and to women's experience, but we have already seen that to
ask, as we must, "which women's experience?" hardly delimits the field of inquiry:
poststructuralist theories of subjectivity show that experience is not tied to gender or to
any other putative ground of individuation, but rather constituted in a complex web of
discourses and varied subject positions. To make the bible relevant to the struggle
against patriarchal oppression, feminist exegesis must accommodate as many varieties of
women's experience as there are cultures, religions, classes, families, individuals; but at
the same time, it must avoid the kind of extreme historical determinism that relativises
immediate political issues out of focus. A hermeneutics which, in keeping with the
necessary criteria for feminist theory outlined above, is politically explicit, resistant to
essentialism or ideology, and open to pluralism in interpretation; which operates
according to the idea of meaning as a process rather than an ahistorical entity, and yet
which avoids marginalising either the role of concrete religious faith or the attendant need
to make some kind of practical sense out of existence. The preceding discussion could
perhaps be criticised for taking place chiefly in the abstract sphere, in the Platonic realm
of ideal feminist Forms: in what follows, I will attempt correctively to narrow the focus
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Chapter 3
Deconstruction and Feminism
It is interesting to see that increasingly in biblical studies, the gap between studying
the bible as the Word of God and studying it as literature is narrowing. The argument
seems to be gaining currency that the status of the bible as Sacred Literature is not
necessarily debased by placing equal importance on its small-"l"-literary characteristics,
or at least that to defend the bible against the creeping tide of secular (post)modernism
in literary studies, one must be able to argue with the heretics on their own terms.
Hence the emergence of lively discussion in most modern journals of biblical criticism
which deals both sympathetically and antagonistically with neo-historicism, Marxism,
structuralism, semiotics, reader-response criticism, speech act theory, deconstruction,
and so on. One by-product of all this can be a sense of "vertigo in the face of....endless
theoretical proposals";1 the exegete could perhaps do with a little more freedom from
choice, and indeed a rearguard offensive against pluralism in interpretation is constantly
being waged by those who say that some modes of criticism are by nature antithetical to
biblical hermeneutics. This is a revealing and significant assertion which will be
considered further on; for the time being I wish simply to indicate that feminist
interpretation of the bible currently has at its disposal a broad range and variety of
critical methodologies, reading strategies which were barely accessible twenty or even
ten years ago outside the discursive boundaries of literary and linguistic studies.
Feminist biblical hermeneutics, then, could be said to be coming into its own at a time
when the language of modern literary theory is being increasingly accepted as "legal
tender" in the field of biblical scholarship.
This statement presupposes, of couse, that feminist interpretation of the bible should
want to have anything to do with modern literary theory. A substantial portion of this
chapter will be devoted to arguing just such a case, concentrating in particular on
deconstructive criticism and the insights of Jacques Derrida as being best-suited to
feminist biblical hermeneutics.
Structuralism and Deconstruction: It is extremely difficult, for reasons which
will shortly become clear, to establish exactly what deconstruction "is"; one of the most
pressing questions asked by Derrida is whether or not anything, including
deconstruction, can be said to partake unproblematically of what our dominantWestern
philosophical tradition has identified as Being. For the time being, and for the sake of
convenience, we will label deconstruction as a practice (or set of practices), one which
has its roots as literary-critical practice in the structuralist linguistics of Ferdinand de
Saussure. The Course in General Linguistics, a reconstruction of Saussure's lectures at
the University of Geneva pieced together by some of his students after his death, was
first published in 1915, and in this text was developed explicitly for the first time the
structuralist axiom that language is a self-contained sign-system which has, essentially,
little to do with anything beyond itself, including what we might romantically call
meaning. Saussure's most important argument in the Course was that the linguistic sign
is basically arbitrary, having no essential link with the thing it is supposed to represent.
At the phonemic level, it can be seen that the word "cat", for example, is not somehow
ontologically connected to what it signifies, but rather takes its meaning from its place
in the language chain, and is recognised by virtue of its difference from other signifiers.
"Cat" is not meaningful because it conjures up, in and of itself, a four-footed feline
mammal, but because it is not "bat", "mat", "cap", or "cot". This is the fundamental
principle informing all structuralist and poststructuralist linguistics: it can be identified
in Chris Weedon's argument, for example, that the relationship between the word
"whore" and a woman who exchanges sex for money, is basically arbitrary; the English
language might well have used any other word to signify such a woman, and indeed
other languages do. There is "no natural connection" between the signifier and the
concept which it signifies, and the meaning of words is "not intrinsic but relational";
"whore" derives its meaning through its difference from "other signifiers of
womanhood such as 'virgin' or 'mother'".2
This key structuralist concept of language as a system which refers to nothing beyond
itself explains why we understand our own language when spoken with a heavy foreign
accent, as the context, the relationship between the word and other words, provides the
meaning - it is only in recognising the pattern of an utterance that we approach an
understanding of it. Signifier and signified can never share a common identity, having
as they do only a conventional or arbitrary connection to each other, and it is this
understanding which informs Saussure's much-quoted dictum that "in language, there
are only differences without positive terms"? In the chain of signifiers that is language,
....each [signifier] means what it does....through its difference from all the concrete
"signifiers" around it. The identity of each sign is determined by its distinction from all the
other signs - an identity which can never be separated from the system which the signs
together constitute.4
This basic article of structuralist faith (or scepticism) is crucial also to deconstruction,
and it implies that as far as final or "true" meaning is concerned, language is a radically
unstable phenomenon. Both Derrida and Saussure would, like most people,
acknowledge that if you go to a dictionary in search of the meaning of the word "cat",
what you find is neither a concrete signified (a cat pressed between the pages of the book
at "C"), nor an ideal Form or essence which the word represents (the ousia of cat), but
simply more words, whose meanings are defined by more words again, and so on ad
infinitum - or indeed ad nauseam if you are an existentialist. Signifiers lead only to other
signifiers, and the same applies to larger patterns of signification such as codes, idioms
and texts: ofmaking many books there can be no end, because ultimate or final meaning
is always deferred. This has profound implications for knowledge of all kinds,
particularly for those forms of knowledge such as philosophy and theology which have
long been committed both to reading and writing, and to a concept of truth. If a signifier
- which, usually understood as a single word, can also be a more complex verbal unit
such as a phrase, a paragraph, a page, a chapter, and so on - is by nature unstable and
refers to nothing outside a web of other equally unstable signifiers, then the activity of
reading, by means of which it is often assumed we can apprehend the meaning "behind"
a text, is an endeavour which in fact
cannot legitimately transgress the text toward something other than it....or toward a
signified outside the text whose content could take place, could have taken place outside of
language, that is to say, in the sense that we give here to that word, outside of writing in
general.5
Derrida's somewhat opaque style conveys a simple message: if there exists any pure,
objective truth, any "transcendental signified", it is not to be apprehended through
language. Whether speaking or writing, listening or reading, we cannot "transgress the
text" either to convey or to receive stable meaning which exists outside the differential
play of signifiers.
Logocentrism, Speech and Writing: This is the ground on which
deconstruction poses its most ominous threat to the dominant Western philosophical
tradition, a tradition rooted in classical Greek metaphysics and dependent very much
upon the Platonic/Aristotelian concepts of language and truth outlined in the previous
chapter. The concept of objective, stable truth (ousia, logos, reality, Being) as something
towards which language points, and to which rigorous reason and logic provide access,
is a concept which can be traced through the "canonical" texts ofWestern philosophy:
from the works of Plato and Aristotle, on to Descartes, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and
beyond, the dominant assumption has been that
Being can be known and experienced in its immediacy; language transfers meaning
neutrally without interfering in the underlying thoughts it "expresses"; knowledge
undistortedly reflects reality in truthful representations. These beliefs retain the concept as a
pure idea, existing independent of particular languages or forms of expression.6
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Derrida has said that the belief in unmediated Meaning which haunts Western
philosophy, along with "all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the
center" and the search for the Archimedian point of knowledge, have "always designated
an invariable presence",1 and Derrida accordingly coins the roughly-interchangeable
terms "metaphysics of presence" and "logocentrism" to denote this assumption of
transcendent and unassailable truth. It is this reliance on the metaphysics of presence,
this logocentric commitment to the existence of a unified conceptual order towards which
philosophy points the way, that has resulted in a certain self-privileging of philosophical
thought. In her discussion of Derrida, Elizabeth Grosz writes that philosophy, as the
study of knowledge itself, has strong vested interests in presenting itself as foundational
and non-contingent:
Philosophy cannot acknowledge its constitutive dependence on language, on textuality, on
the ambiguity and openness of all discourse....It cannot acknowledge its own (textual)
corporeality. It conceives of itself as fundamentally translatable, capable of being expressed,
ideally, in logical symbols to avoid any imprecisions or ambiguity, a language honed and
purified of all its materiality, resistant to intention.8
It should be noted, of course, that to speak of philosophy in this way is to gloss over the
ideas of a great many thinkers in the Western tradition - Nietzsche, for example - for
whom truth and the transparency of language have been by no means given or
self-evident. Still, it can be said that any philosophical discourse which does stem from
logocentric assumptions faces a substantial challenge from Derrida's appropriation of the
structuralist view of language as differential and indeterminate: if words refer only to
other words, even at the most basic level of recognition, then the attempt to anchor
concepts of transcendent truth and meaning in philosophical argument (or indeed in any
kind of argument) is, from the outset, greatly at odds with itself.
Derrida sees logocentric thought as depending very much upon a philosophical
commitment to binary oppositions. In its attempt to deal with stable, fundamental
principles, logocentrism posits stable norms or essences and discusses them in relation
to deviations or "subdeterminations".9 The tendency then to dichotomise the (dominant)
ideal and the (dependent) derivation in a hierarchical positive/negative structure
constitutes for Derrida the classic metaphysical manoeuvre:
....the enterprise of returning "strategically", ideally, to an origin or to a "priority" held to
be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order then to think in terms of
derivation, complication, deterioration, accident, etc....conceiving good to be before evil, the
positive before the negative, the pure before the impure, the simple before the complex, the
essential before the accidental.... [t]his is not just one metaphysical gesture among others; it is
the metaphysical exigency, that which has been the most constant, most profound and most
potent.10
One might well add male-before-female to the list and consider that patriarchy, with its
strategic return to a male norm, is clearly a social manifestation of the metaphysics of
presence. It is on the grounds of this question of dualism that deconstruction parts
company with structuralism, as the latter is held by Derrida to be governed to a great
extent by the logic of binary opposition, in spite of the valuable insights into language
which it offers.
Derrida locates, for example, in the work both of Saussure and of other structuralists
such as Roland Barthes, a privileging of speech over writing as the paradigmatic
linguistic act.11 The idea of writing as secondary, as the representation or imitation of
speech (made explicit in Saussure's statement that "spoken forms alone constitute the
object" of linguistic analysis12) is an idea which links structuralist linguistics to Western
metaphysics at a crucial point. Speech, according to the Platonic concept of the
relationship between language and meaning, is closer to pure, unmediated Meaning than
writing: in any speech act, speaker and utterance occupy the same place at the same time,
and so the listener has access to sound and sense simultaneously. If the meaning is
unclear, its author (the speaker) can be questioned or engaged in some kind of
expository dialogue, and so meaning is closer to being "present" than in the case of
writing. Writing is seen as derivative and even treacherous: practised in the absence of a
reader, and read in the absence of its author, its original context is often difficult to
determine, and a difficult written text remains obstinate and inscrutable in the face of any
attempt to make it clarify its "correct" sense. Writing, therefore, is said to inhabit the
"promiscuous public realm"13 of interpretation, where signification is never certain or
fixed, while speech involves a use of language which is more intimate, more immediate,
and closer to the meaning behind words, by virtue of its close proximity to the speaker
or producer of meaning.
Derrida's response to this seems at first absurd: he posits the primacy of the inscribed
or written sign, and indicates that speech is actually a form of writing. But this is not
done in a way which preserves the dichotomous opposition between writing and speech
(i.e. by elevating writing over speech and maintaining that there is a qualitative difference
between the two); rather, Derrida stretches the sense of "writing" to make it a designation
which covers all linguistic practice including speech.14 There are certain qualities or
characteristics of writing which have conventionally been stressed in the attempt to
attribute secondarity or derivation to the written word. They have to do with "absence
and misunderstanding":15 the written word, it is argued, can function - usually does
function - in the absence of any putative guarantor of meaning (i.e. its author); it can be
reproduced infinitely and read without any knowledge of its author at all; it is not bound
to the context of its inscription and so is open to widely varying interpretations which
deviate from its "original" sense - in all this, writing is a slippery phenomenon. But
Derrida, while not denying the truth of these accusations, questions whether speech is
any more capable than writing of transparently yielding up its meaning. The
deconstructive view of all language, spoken or written, as a system of signifiers which
relate differentially to each other, and never to any fixed Presence beyond the system,
implies that the things which make writing seem a debased form of speech are actually
just as true of speech itself. Speech is, in fact, infinitely reproduceable by
word-of-mouth and so can function in the absence both of an original speaker and a
context, and the speaker as the "author" of his or her own utterance has no absolute or
final control over the utterance's meaning, even in dialogue with an interlocutor.16 It is
only according to the logocentric view of language as a window onto unmediated truth
that the "writtenness" or textuality of speech is denied or ignored:
logocentrism....has always placed in parenthesis, suspended, and suppressed for essential
reasons, all free reflection on the origin and status of writing,17
but the metaphysical (if not the historical) priority of speech over writing is profoundly
disrupted when language itself comes to be seen as "inscribed" or secondary, as
always-already divorced from any stable referent:
The thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign....must forbid a radical distinction between the
linguistic and the graphic sign....If "writing" signifies inscription and especially the durable
institution of a sign....[then] writing in general covers the entire field of linguistic signs.18
"Trace", Differance and Textuality: The dualistic positioning of speech and
writing at hierarchical odds with each other is thus countered by showing how the
distinction between them is essentially a false one. In general, it could be said that if "the
metaphysical exigency" is to perpetuate conceptual dichotomies, then the questioning of
all binary oppositions is deconstruction's corresponding primary impulse, and Derrida
comes up with a range of terms and manoeuvres which serve this purpose. Probably the
best-known of these are "trace" and differance, neologisms (or, more accurately,
neographisms) employed to deconstruct the fundamental metaphysical opposition of
presence/absence by indicating the simultaneous condition of both. It is difficult to try to
explain exactly what either "trace" or dijferance is, as by definition neither belongs fully
to the realm of presence or "is"-ness. They are examples of a number of terms which
Derrida is constantly at pains to point out are in fact "nonterms, nonconcepts, nonrealms,
nonprinciples - were they otherwise....they would become newly masked ontological
terms for full presence".19 Where dualism posits the existence of stable or present
Concepts and sets each in opposition to its derived Other (cf. note 8 to the previous
chapter), "trace" and diffdrance occupy the space between the two, with a foot, as it
were, in each camp, and thus they have been described as "hinge" terms, existing
beyond the binary pair, confounding binary logic by participating in both terms....They
signal the "origin" of these metaphysical [i.e. dualistic] terms and reveal a kind of space of free
play not captured in the web of binary categories.20
"Trace", for example, is what disrupts the possibility of anything being fully present or
possessing a complete identity in and of itself. It suggests that identity is, paradoxically,
fundamentally bound to what it is not. To take for example the male/female opposition:
as a male, I do unarguably possess biological characteristics which determine my
gender. But that gender is not self-identical: equally essential to the attribution of my
biological traits to maleness is the fact that they are not those traits which determine
femaleness. In other words, my maleness is determined by, as much as anything else,
the absence of those characteristics which would make me female - or to put it still
another way: if there were no such thing as female gender, then the concept of male
gender would be meaningless. So the "trace" of Other in defining Self is the necessary
condition of selfhood, just as the "trace" of Self is essential to the recognition of the
Other as such. Male and female, black and white, identity and difference, good and evil,
life and death, being and nothingness - the "trace" of each term in its binary opposite
means that rather than being radically opposed, each is in fact bound up in the other's
identity at the deepest level:
The structure of the sign is determined by the trace or track of that other which is forever
absent....[trace] is the mark of the absence of a presence, an always already absent present, of
the lack at the origin that is the condition of thought and experience.21
The trace, or the "present absence" of otherness in identity, is coexistent with the play
of diffdrance. Diffdrance is a characteristically Derridean pun which picks up on the twin
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meaning (in French) of difference as the state of "difference" and the movement of
"deferral" (the change from "e" to "a" in the final syllable of differance nicely illustrates
Derrida's points both about writing and speech, and about absence and presence: the
substituted vowel "a" can be read but not heard, and it only functions at all by virtue of
its not being "e" - the force of the pun, therefore, lies very much in the absence of "e"
and in the fact that the pun is recognised as a written mark, not as a spoken word22).
Differance has a double sense. As "difference", it describes much the same condition of
alterity-in-identity as "trace": Derrida in fact writes that "the (pure) trace is differance"P
and so differance can be seen, like "trace", as
that which threatens to interrupt the normal, unquestioned use of dichotomous terms, for it
indicates the impossibility of the privileged term's self-representation.24
"Male", for example, differs from "female", but this is as much a statement of common
identity as it is of difference, since the part played by the radically other in defining each
term is essential - "male" is only "male" because it differs from "female", and this trace
or perceived absence of female in male is essential to the condition of maleness. The
difference between the two terms is critical to the identity of each, and there is a
paradoxical sameness at work where each term is ontologically bound to its opposite:
In the one case "to differ" signifies nonidentity; in the other case it signifies the order of
the same....We provisionally give the name differance to this sameness which is not
identicalP
But differance also carries the sense of "deferral", a kind ofmovement; so if self-present
identity is a static condition, then the "sameness which is not identical" of differance can
be understood as the flickering back and forth, or "play" (to use a key Derridean term) of
differences within and between signifiers and concepts. Indeed, Saussure and Derrida
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both indicate that in the linguistic system there is nothing but this movement, and so
diffirance describes the fundamental dynamic of language itself, involving
....syntheses and referrals which forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple
element be present in and of itself, referring only to itself....no element can function as a sign
without referring to another element which itself is not simply present. This interweaving
results in each "element"....being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other
elements in the chain or system...Differance is the systematic play of differences, of the traces
of differences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other.26
The play of diffirance, then, shows that stability of meaning in language is an
illusory or incomplete notion. Rather like the subatomic particle, the meaning of a
signifier can be provisionally located and fixed, but only at the expense of considering its
"motion" or quality of endless deferral: this is the epistemological strategy favoured by
logocentrism. Deconstruction, on the other hand, focuses on the differential nature of
language, and yet seeks not so much to wipe logocentrism and Western metaphysics off
the philosophical map - Derrida's own reliance on logocentric presuppositions is freely
admitted and will be discussed in the next chapter - as to indicate the kinds of repressions
and biases on which the "metaphysics of presence" must rely to argue its case for the
transparency of language and the existence of a unified conceptual order beyond it So it
is hardly surprising that deconstruction has been met in traditional philosophical,
theological, literary and biblical-critical circles with something less than rapturous
acclaim: wherever a self-evident concept or truth is invoked, deconstructive criticism
ushers in the "trace" of its negative (and negating) Other, sets in motion the play of
differance and thus generally vexes the order of Being:
The ontology of presence is the ontology of beings and beingness. Everywhere, the
dominance of beings is solicited by differance - in the sense that sollicitare means, in old
Latin, to shake all over, to make the whole tremble. What is questioned by the thought of
differance, therefore, is the determination of being in presence, or in beingness....diff6rance is
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even the subversion of every realm. This is obviously what makes it threatening and
necessarily dreaded by everything in us that desires a realm, the past or future presence of a
realm.27
In this respect deconstruction is profoundly anti-humanist, very much a
"poststructuralist" discourse as defined in the previous chapter. If all determinations of
self-certain truth are disrupted by showing that the "transcendental signified" (i.e. any
stable guarantee of meaning beyond language) is in fact "never absolutely present outside
a system of differences",28 then we are bound to conclude that the rational, self-aware
"I" which constitutes the humanist subject, along with the experience of that subject, is
in some way also a part of that system. Appeals to experience or rational consciousness
as the source or still point of meaning cannot be justified if that consciousness is itself
determined by signifiers and traces of signifiers across a range of discourses. And so
"language" in its broadest sense - denoting the complex interplay of signifier/trace and
patterns of signification - creates and constitutes "textuality", which Derrida sees as the
fabric of all thought and experience. Deconstruction offers a perspective from which
"textuality", the system of traces, becomes the most global term, encompassing all that is
and that which exceeds it,29
a statement expressed even more succinctly in Derrida's maxim il n'y a pas de hors-texte
[there is nothing outside the text].30
It becomes clearly apparent here that deconstruction aspires to something beyond
purely literary theory; nevertheless, Derrida's fascination with language, the fact that his
own work consists largely of readings of (mostly philosophical) texts, and his emphasis
throughout on such concepts as writing and textuality, all combine to make literary
criticism the discipline to which deconstructive practice is perhaps most obviously
suited. Literary criticism of the more traditional kind (in which I include much biblical
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criticism) is also precisely the field in which deconstruction tends to meet its most fervent
opposition. For those to whom the tradition of "great literature" embodies nothing less
than the living tissue of civilised culture itself, and to whom criticism is, in Matthew
Arnold's phrase, the endeavour "to know the best that is known and thought in the
world",31 the role of criticism as reverent handmaid-to-literature is unquestionable. For
those who take a more formalist approach, to whom literary works exist in a state of
"organic completeness",32 unaffected by historical or cultural change, the ultimate aim of
the critic is dispassionately to process and explain a text's rhetorical workings by means
of strict objective analysis. In both cases, the meaning of any piece of literature is the
truth which exists "behind", or is enclosed "within", the language of the text, and
criticism seeks to give that meaning full presence by teasing it out of its formal structures
and displaying it in unambiguous, transparent terms. Deconstruction, however, in
establishing language as a system of differences and shifting "traces" of meaning which
can never be fully present, cuts meaning loose from the old mainstays of "authorial
intention" and "the words on the page", displacing it somewhere, it would seem, in the
direction of the reader. But the authority of subjectivity in determining meaning is also
undermined by the fact that a reader can never be disinterested or fully self-aware; the
"textuality" of consciousness or the subject means that no critic is a blank page devoid of
prejudices or presuppositions, and so while the thrust of any reading is determined to a
great extent by who and what the reader is, and why he or she picked up the text in the
first place, meaning does not stop here. It does not stop anywhere; rather, it is a dynamic
function of the relationship between text and reader. This means that to read is not to
approach the still centre of a text's meaning, but effectively to rewrite the text; meaning is
not located or discovered like a seam of gold in the earth, but produced, multiplied,
always recreated.
One important consequence of this insight is that essential or qualitative differences
between the activities of author, poet, editor and critic become difficult to ground.
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Reading generates new texts as it seeks to elucidate the primary one, and every
"primary" text is in some way a commentary on pre-existent texts or on the discourses
which produce them, since interpretation and literary criticism "both inhabit a host-text of
pre-existent language which itself parasitically feeds on their host-like willingness to
receive it".33 In short,
[b]y replacing the rhetoric of consciousness with a rhetoric of textuality,
deconstruction....obliterates the line between text and interpretation.34
It is at this point that deconstructive critics really begin to provoke their more
traditionalist colleagues: the idea of the Critic-as-Artist is no more popular now, in many
circles, than it was when Oscar Wilde first mischievously introduced the idea into
modern critical consciousness, as it involves the transgression of a kind of sacred
boundary, and makes literature vulnerable to becoming taught and written about by
acolytes who deliberately and systematically mistake themselves for priests. In addition
to this, much deconstructive criticism is open to the charge of wilful or even perverse
obscurity: certainly Derrida's work is labyrinthine and tortuous to say the least; his
French is "full of wordplay, allusion and the tactic of announcing straightfacedly
propositions he then overturns or satirises",35 and translation muddies the water even
further. The stylistic excess (Jouissance is the more positive term) of deconstructive
"play" similarly characterises the work of Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Helene Cixous,
Geoffrey Hartman, J. Hillis Miller, and a number of other Derrida-influenced thinkers
who seek directly to illustrate the dynamic character of meaning and its ambiguous,
undecideable quality in their own writing:36 to their theoretical opponents, these critics
are presumptuous and derisory in their attitude towards the texts they deal with.37 And
such objections cannot be passed off simply as aesthetic distaste or the shock of the new
- although there is a certain amount of that about. Built on the deconstructive axiom that
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every signifier carries within it the trace of its "other" is the more confrontational claim
that every pattern of signifiers, every text, is in some way similarly divided against itself,
and so "deconstructing" a text involves showing how its ruling rhetorical or logical
structure relies on suppressed gaps or contradictions which undermine that structure -
and to those who hold that literature means self-evidently what it says, or what its author
wanted it to say, this amounts to a kind of harassment or interpretative violence which is
suitable enough for, say, Surrealist poetry (which nobody understands anyway), but an
outrage when brought to bear on the more well-bred texts of Shakepeare, Jane Austen or
the bible. Even worse: if we are to accept Derrida's pronouncement that "there is nothing
outside the text", that textuality encompasses all structures of meaning, then all the
metaphysical guarantees of truth (ousia, rational consciousness, God, whatever) are in
fact textual processes, caught up in a web of ambiguity and contradiction. In other
words, we have no access to any kind of "transcendental signified", and its effective
absence "extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely".38
It is here, poised on the brink of interpretative chaos or anarchy, that I wish to leave
deconstruction in its "pure" form (and it should by now be apparent just how
troublesome a term that is): the next chapter will take up the issue of whether or not
deconstruction is in fact nihilistic, and whether or not deconstructive biblical criticism,
with its denial of a transcendental signified, can be practiced without a necessary denial
of the conventional tenets of biblical faith - that is, whether or not a reader can be
"religious" and deconstructive at the same time. For the remainder of this chapter, I wish
to turn to an examination of deconstruction and Derridean thought in the light of feminist
hermeneutics, and to assess the degree to which the latter might profit from a theoretical
alliance with the former.
"Resexualised" Discourse: Derrida and the Female: Much has already been
made of the implications of deconstruction for feminism. This is largely due to the
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emphasis which Derrida, in a number of instances, places on issues of sexual difference
and on the question ofWoman - what she is, where she stands, what she represents in
the symbolic order of logocentrism. Derrida also, provocatively, uses terms such as
"hymen" and "invagination" as metaphors to illustrate key strategies in deconstructive
practice. In the first case, Derrida's discussions of gender and sexual difference stem
from the understanding that logocentrism, reliant as it is on dualistic hierarchical
thinking, has unmistakeably patriarchal overtones: Derrida's suspicion of fundamentals
would keep him from stating - as I have - that sexist oppression is the essential or most
basic form of oppression in any society governed by binary-oppositional logic, but
nevertheless his close equation of logocentrism with sexism is apparent in his coining of
the term phallogocentrism to indicate "the complicity of Western metaphysics with a
notion of male firstness".39 Accordingly, the project of deconstructing and providing
alternatives to the "metaphysics of presence" is seen as a project which is in some sense
marked "female":
The concept of the concept, along with the entire system that attends it, belongs to a
prescriptive order. It is that order that a problematics of woman and a problematics of
difference, as sexual difference, should disrupt along the way.40
In the second case, Derrida's careful choice of such terms as "hymen" and
"invagination" in his writing forms part of a strategy whereby the claims of
philosophical/theoretical discourse to pure abstraction and sexual neutrality are disrupted.
We have already seen that Western philosophy has tended to present itself as a
disinterested, neutral discourse, carried out at the level of pure reason, while in fact its
values of logic, rationality and dispassionate analysis have operated according to a
"male" norm: it is this situation that Derrida refers to when he says that "according to a
surreptitious operation that must be flushed out, one insures phallocentric mastery under
the cover of neutralization".41 His use of terms which denote, in their most commonly
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recognised senses, the most sexually-marked area of the female body indicates a reversal
of this tendency, a deliberate emphasis on "resexualising" philosophy and theory.42
"Hymen", for example, indicates the moment at which two diametrically-opposed
"beings" achieve a mutually-recognised fusion or identity, and in this respect it has a
similar function to "trace" and differance. The dualism inherent in such concepts as
inside/outside, or desire/satisfaction, ceases to operate as such where a consummation of
both terms is achieved, and "hymen" represents this point of consummation - the two
terms do not merge to form one unified, self-identical concept, but rather "it is the
difference between the two terms that is no longer functional".43 Each regards the other
as its necessary condition for identity - and, paradoxically, the immediate consequence of
this consummation (as of all consummations) is that the hymen itself as a present,
tangible entity no longer exists. The genius of "hymen", then, is that it illustrates a
critical movement in Derrida's anti-dualistic project without coming to be seen itself as a
stable fundamental or ground:
....the hymen, the confusion between the present and the nonpresent, along with all the
indifferences it entails within the whole series of oppositions....produces the effect of a
medium (a medium as element enveloping both terms at once; a medium located between the
two terms). It is an operation that both sows confusion between opposites and stands between
the opposites "at once"....The hymen "takes place" in the "inter-", in the spacing between
desire and fulfilment, between perpetration and its recollection. But this medium of the entre
has nothing to do with a center.44
"Invagination" is more enigmatic, partly because Derrida's definition of it is less
generously elucidated. In "Living On: Border Lines", the term weaves itself through a
complex reading of two short stories by Maurice Blanchot and Shelley's poem The
Triumph ofLife, a reading in which the narratives of the French author are presented as
reworkings or representations of Shelley's poem, and thus in which the boundaries
between individual texts are seen as shifting and indeterminate. "Invagination" is
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described as
the inward refolding of la gaine [sheath, girdle], the inverted reapplication of the outer edge
to the inside of a form where the outside then opens a pocket. Such an invagination is possible
from the first trace on,45
and it illustrates the way in which deconstruction questions the notion of a text's margin
or edge. Any attempt to delineate a text's meaning or reiterability does so by setting a
limit, a margin beyond which the interpreter cannot legitimately travel, and by relegating
the text's inconsistencies and paradoxes out to that marginal space, away from the
"central" meaning. "Invagination" describes the deconstructive manoeuvre of folding the
edge back in towards the "centre", of showing that the text's marginal inconsistencies
and paradoxes are as fundamental to meaning as its coherences. No reading is final or
determinate, and so this deconstructive process is repeatable any number of times and in
various ways: Derrida thus can speak of "double invagination", "crisscross double
invagination", and so on.
The outline of these terms offered so far is necessarily simplistic. Neither term can
satisfactorily be removed from its context: further discussion of "invagination" would
necessitate closer examination of Derrida's reading of Blanchot and Shelley, just as
"hymen" is not completely to be understood outside the discussion of Mallarme and
Plato in which it appears. What should be apparent here is simply that Derrida's
linguistic environment is a deliberately sexualised one, and one in which the feminist
reader (or any reader seeking to venture beyond the limits of patriarchal discourse) might
find landmarks which provide better orientation than those encountered in
"phallogocentric" interpretation and philosophy.
But at this point it may be asked why Derrida, in his disavowal of philosophical
neutrality, and in the space for greater subjectivity which deconstruction opens up,
should choose as a male writer to render his discursive practice "female". The answer to
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this has been briefly hinted at above, where I indicated that deconstruction's challenge to
Western metaphysics and logocentrism, given that logocentrism and patriarchy are
inseparably meshed, must therefore also be anti-patriarchal - "feminist" in the broadest
sense of the word, "female" by a further (and riskier) metaphorical leap. In the
discussion of Nietzsche's The Gay Science offered in Spurs, Derrida locates in the
German philosopher's notorious misogyny a kind of affirmation-by-implication of
feminism and the Female as providing an alternative "truth" to the dualism and logical
closure ofmetaphysics. Traditionally situated on the negative side of the truth/falsehood
opposition, woman has long been seen as deceitful and untrustworthy. But "truth" in the
Western philosophical tradition is univocal, an unassailable singularity of pure meaning:
having nothing to do with this chimera is of course the Derridean theoretical imperative,
and so Derrida is able to invert the patriarchal philosophical hierarchy by presenting
Woman as non-(metaphysical)-Truth in a positive light, not as liar/deceiver but as "a
dissimulatress, an artist, a dionysiac".46 Woman comes to represent the impossibility of
stable signification, as "she engulfs and distorts all vestige of essentiality, of identity, of
property".47 But deconstruction involves more than just the inversion of hierarchies, and
Derrida accordingly goes on to erase the opposition he has created between
Woman-as-dissembled-Truth and the now-problematised metaphysical Truth by means
of a paradox which recalls that of the Cretan liar - the "truth" or essence ofWoman lies
in the deconstruction of truth or essences which is fundamental to her; that is, she is
centred around a non-centre:
There is no such thing as the truth of a woman, but it is because of that abyssal divergence
of the truth, because that untruth is "truth".48
The result of this paradox is a kind of simultaneous affirming and erasing of the essential
Female, and this constitutes a movement or dynamic similar to that which operates
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between the essentialism of radical feminism and the relativism of poststructuralist
feminism, the dynamic of "identity politics" discussed in the previous chapter. Derrida is
not explicit on this point in Spurs, but he does indicate elsewhere that both the
affirmation of and resistance to the "truth" of what it means to be a woman are equally
important in feminist practice, just as they are in deconstructive theory. Of the idea of a
"woman's place", for example, he has said that
I would be wary of such a description. Do you not fear that having once become commiued
to the path of this topography, we would inevitably find ourselves back "at home" or "in the
kitchen" [the pun at work here in "at home" is significant: Derrida also uses chez soi to denote
selfhood or self-identity]?....Why must there be a place for women? And why only one, a
single, completely essential place?....It is without a doubt risky to say that there is no place
for woman, but this idea is not antifeminist, far from it; true, it is not feminist either. But it
appears to me to be faithful in its way both to a certain assertion of women and to what is
most affirmative and "dancing"....in the displacement of women.49
In Derridean theory, then, woman is both located and displaced; located in that she
represents a politically identifiable alternative to the logocentric order of patriarchy,
displaced in that this alternative cannot be reduced to a female essence, topos or mode of
Being - once again, Derrida invokes the play of differance, this time between the
opposite poles of "a certain assertion" of the Female and her elusive, undecideable
character.
Up until this point I have confined my discussion of deconstruction to its Derridean
formulation, in fact it may be noticed that over the last page or so the focus has explicitly
shifted from "deconstruction" to "Derridean theory". The distinction is important because
deconstructive criticism could only be of limited use to feminist hermeneutics if it were to
be understood as what Jacques Derrida alone had to say about language and reality.
Derrida's "sexualising" terminologies, his interest in sexual difference and the
importance he gives to the place (or displacement) ofWoman in logocentric discourse all
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contribute to making his work highly relevant to feminist theory of all kinds, but this is
not to say that the relationship between Derrida and feminism is unambivalent or
uniformly comfortable. For a start, "Woman" could be said these days to be a rather
over-used metaphor: employed as she has been throughout patriarchal literature and
philosophy to represent life, death, truth, falsity, earth, heaven, creative inspiration, and
so on; to see Woman now held up by a male French philosopher for close scrutiny as an
emblem of textuality raises suspicions which subsequent talk of hymens, invaginations,
desire and consummation does little to allay. Furthermore - and perhaps more
importantly - to assert that all good feminists must be deconstructionists, by which is
meant card-carrying Derrideans, is to subordinate feminism to somebody else's
pre-existent agenda and deprive it of a large measure of autonomy, implying that
feminists had been rather ineffectual and dithering in the wilderness until Of
Grammatology arrived to disseminate systematic philosophical rigor among them.
The irony, then, of Derrida coming to be seen as the father of modem feminist
criticism must be sidestepped at all costs, and this can best be achieved by considering
his work as prototypical rather than archetypal, as one form of deconstruction among
many, illustrative of but not necessarily fundamental to various kinds of deconstructive
practice. And indeed this must be the case: a critical programme like deconstruction
which involves such scepticism regarding authorship and which works from such an
anti-hierarchical imperative can hardly range itself into more or less "authoritative"
formulations, and it is as well therefore to resist the temptation to evaluate any piece of
deconstructive criticism according to whether or not we feel Derrida, de Man, Kristeva,
Irigaray or anybody else would give or have given it official sanction.50 Even
terminology or jargon, that mainstay of systematic discourses, holds less sway within
deconstruction than the foregoing terminologically-slanted analysis of Derrida might
suggest: the "conceptual master-word"51 is actually a dispensable or changeable entity
throughout Derrida's work, provisionally defined and redefined according to context,
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sometimes abandoned altogether - even with the name "deconstruction" itself Derrida has
expressed a bemused dissatisfaction:
....the word "deconstruction" has always bothered me....this word which I had written only
once or twice (I don't even remember where exactly) all of a sudden jumped out of the text and
was seized by others who have since determined its fate.52
The point is not that deconstruction is some kind of radical anti-theory, an intellectual
abyss without a name, a structure, a lexicon or even an authorial signature; but rather that
all of these notions are provisional, and none provides a fixed ground or legitimising
paradigm for deconstructive criticism. This lack at the centre, concomitant with a denial
of all centres or metaphysical anchors, should ultimately lead us from a theoretical
preoccupation with what deconstruction is to the more practical consideration of what it
does. It is more useful to think of deconstruction (like differance, trace, invagination and
so on) as a dynamic than as a stable concept, and thus understood, deconstruction
provides a set of critical strategies or movements which are highly appropriate to what
might be called a "hermeneutics of change" - the kind of hermeneutics best suited to
feminist criticism.
Deconstruction, Feminism and Power: Perhaps the most significant thing, in
the light of feminist hermeneutics, that deconstruction does is that it conceives of the
world as being textually constructed. Derrida's insistence that "there is nothing outside
the text" appears at first glance to court nihilism (there is nothing outside the text), or at
least to indicate a bad case of philosophical megalomania, but to stop there is to read him
only at face value. Literary critics who denounce Derrida as a terroristic Continental
cynic often appear to think that he is trying to present reality as nothing but a mocking
tissue of words; in fact, it is more accurate to paraphrase him as saying that reality is
perceivable only through discourses or "processes of signification".53 Nothing is known
or experienced, in other words, that is not constructed by means of some kind of
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language or sign-system. This extension of textuality to include not just words on pages
but all meaning and experience admittedly takes some getting used to, for those of us
schooled (as we all are) in the metaphysical philosophical tradition, but its implications
for feminist theory and critical practice are, I believe, largely positive. For a start, the
notion of reality as textually or discursively structured provides a good base from which
to analyse and begin to dismantle patriarchal determinations of female nature. That
women are "essentially" mothers, wives, irrational, unable to drive cars, dissembling,
promiscuous, in love with their fathers, and so on is often asserted in the name of
"common sense" or "the way things are"; these statements never appear, however,
outside an identifiably constructed set of ideological presuppositions - a text, in one
broad sense of the word. And texts which rely on stable fundamentals (e.g. the passivity
of women) can be challenged and reworked deconstructively to show that these univocal
Truths are in fact fragmented, held in place only by marginalising the significance of
deviations from the set norm (e.g. an independent, assertive woman is seen as somehow
anomalous or unnatural), and really wield power "without any justification outside of the
axioms operative in the [patriarchal] culture".54
The most immediate value, then, in a theory of radical textuality is that it undermines
all claims of patriarchal ideology to its own self-evident, natural authority. It also steers
feminist theory and criticism away from the essentialising impulse of cultural or radical
feminism criticised in the previous chapter: with the significance of the female body or
"women's experience" made relative and the concept of Woman seen as a provisional,
historically-constructed notion - another "text" - feminism loses its fixed ideological
centre, and thus women on the margins inevitably created by any notion of a centre
(married women, uneducated women, working class women), whose access to the
cultural feminist Logos has been denied, are re-situated and their experience is accorded
full validity. Furthermore, a non-fundamental or textualised understanding of feminism
enables feminist criticism to be re-read/re-written by other groups whose interpretative
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focus lies outside of gender issues but whose experience of oppressive hierarchical
domination is just as urgently in need of attention as that of women. If we take into
account the textuality of feminist theology, for example, we can read it both as
issue-specific and as part of a wider range of liberation theologies, so that the feminist
theological call for an end to the religious legitimation of patriarchal oppression can
provide insights and strategies which serve the needs not just of women alone but of all
oppressed groups.
If textuality encompasses not just black marks on white pages, but also the
subjectivity of the person who deciphers them, then reading is a process of interaction
whereby the text interrogates or "reads" the reader just as closely as the reader reads the
text. That is to say, reading calls attention to who and what the reader is, and it does not
serve exclusively to locate stable meaning in texts any more than writing serves to
produce it: in both cases, "meaning" reflects to a great extent the shifting, discursive
constitution of the reading/writing subject. The signified always has a historical moment
and a social function, and so deconstructive criticism, which operates according to this
understanding, thus "breaches the bounds of the 'literary' altogether, in a 'political'
direction",55 since it conceives of meaning not as neutral but always as biased, or
representing the interests of a particular group or individual. The deconstructive critic
sees that
[mjeaning is not created and does not exist for meaning's sake, but exists to create and
shape a world which benefits one class, race or gender over another,56
and in bringing politics back into interpretation, or rather in acknowledging that it never
really went away, deconstruction again constitutes a useful hermeneutical matrix for
feminist criticism, which of course has its own explicitly political program, and which
seeks to expose the political or ideological interests at work in so-called objective
patriarchal discourse. In the first chapter of this study, I argued that the "rhetorical
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criticism" of Phyllis Trible was of limited value precisely because it denied the function
of history, sociology or ideology in the texts it dealt with, and claimed instead to
articulate the meaning of "literature in terms of itself: Trible employed what she called
"proper analysis of form" to extract a "proper" reading of Genesis 2:4b-3:24 which was
supposedly as concrete, self-evident and politically disinterested as a rabbit pulled from a
hat, and yet which was at the same time supposed to reflect and further the political
interests of a historically-specific group. This naive rupture between means and ends is
avoided by deconstruction, which eschews notions of the-text-itself in favour of a more
complex approach. Rhetoric is, after all, a means of persuasion, and accordingly
deconstruction is not just a neutral divining-rod for the locating of some putative
"proper" signified, but
....an ultimately political practice, an attempt to dismantle the logic by which a particular
system of thought, and behind that a whole system of political structures and social
institutions, maintains its force. [Derrida] is not seeking, absurdly, to deny the existence of
relatively determinate truths, meanings, identities, intentions, historical continuities; he is
seeking rather to see such things as the effects of a wider and deeper history - of language, of
the unconscious, of social institutions and practices.57
The deconstructive tactic of questioning binary oppositions, for example, is particularly
relevant to cases where the always- (but not always admittedly)-political issue of
legitimacy/illegitimacy in interpretation surfaces. Where a conservative Protestant
Christian reading of Gen. 2:4b-3:24 may assert itself as valid and authoritative over
against a Marxist or feminist reading on the grounds ofwhat the text undisputedly "says"
(and a Marxist or feminist reading may ill-advisedly respond likewise), deconstruction
redirects the argument towards a questioning of the binary distinction between the
normal and the deviant both in the text's discursive framework and in its readings. The
deconstructive reader does not look for some unambiguous kernel of authorising
significance in the text, but instead focuses on its logical gaps and inconsistencies,
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considering the forces which suppress these inconsistencies as supposedly insignificant
or marginal to the text's dominant rhetorical structure, and thus in a parallel fashion
being led to interpret the "text" of his or her culture in a similar manner,
to consider what are the processes of legitimation, validation or authorization that produce
differences among readings and enable one reading to expose another as a misreading.58
"Meaning" is not thereby sent spiralling off into oblivion, nor is it now possible to read
the Garden of Eden story confidently as being about nostrils or figs - which is not, all
the same, to dismiss out of hand the possibility that the cultural circumstances may one
day arise which do permit such a reading. Rather, meaning becomes situated in the
contentious realm of conflicting discourses or reading communities, and the authority of
any reading of any text becomes no more than a function of the persuasive ideological
force with which it is held in place by the readers who produce it. For feminist readers,
this means that their critical practice can no longer be seen as a violation of authorial
intention or common sense, or in any other way relegated to the disreputable side of the
orthodox/heterodox dichotomy - nor, for that matter, can one kind of feminist reading
assert primacy over another: deconstruction seeks not to fix new guidelines or
parameters for interpretation, but to focus attention on the political or discursive forces at
work both within the text, and in the relationship between text and reader. The
significance of a group of texts such as the bible, then, is freed from the constraints of
patriarchal religious dogma, and a deconstructive feminist hermeneutics has the critical
advantage of keeping biblical meaning open to change and reappraisal within and across
cultures, working on the understanding that
what is crucial to the function of texts is not some fictive "real meaning", but the
discursivity of "communities" in which women read them.59
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Another important advantage which deconstruction holds for feminist hermeneutics is
that it operates according to a strongly anti-dualistic impulse. We have already seen that
patriarchal literature and criticism relies heavily on dualistic thinking, often labelling
readings of texts as valid or invalid on the strength of the objective/subjective argument:
if a text has one central meaning, then that meaning can be located either by appeals to
rational sense, or (in the case of difficult texts) by the use of critical techniques which are
themselves disinterested and scientifically functional; objective means to objective ends.
Conflicting hermeneutical modes are regarded suspiciously as being contaminated with a
high degree of subjectivity; psychoanalysis and feminism, for example, are relegated to
the fringes of critical respectability (or beyond) because they represent the messy
ideological pleadings of "special interest" groups and have little to do with the neat,
clinical discipline of dissecting and analysing literature. The objective/subjective
dichotomy (with the male positioned squarely in the former camp) is crucial to patriarchal
interpretation, as it serves both to validate one reading of any text (i.e. the
objectively-perceived one), and to mask the political imperative at work behind such a
judgement:
....if patriarchy can continue the fiction of the singularity of meaning, it can also continue
the fiction that patriarchal ideology is not a world view, in fact, not an ideology at all, but
simply the way things really are.60
Deconstruction, on the other hand, offers a perspective from which text, critic and
criticism alike, far from being objective or neutral, are all seen as "inscribed" with
presuppositions and traces of presuppositions which, like the culture that inscribes them,
are neither stable nor able to be neatly sectioned-off from the business of interpretation.
Any feminist criticism which likewise openly fuses the literary and the political can thus
be seen not as "an attempt to force the text into a predetermined mold",61 but simply as
the explicit practice of what patriarchal criticism really does under cover of objectivity:
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deconstruction validates, indeed demands, a healthy measure of self-consciousness in
critical debate, and this is because it disrupts the objective/subjective opposition along
whose lines political concerns have traditionally been deemed irrelevant to interpretation.
The undermining or dismantling of dualistic structures is particularly important in
feminist biblical criticism. It is not enough simply to indicate that much of the bible, and
most biblical criticism, is governed by hierarchical oppositions which favour (for
example) the male/spiritual over the female/sexual: this proves a good tactical point for
those who wish to denounce biblical religion once and for all as oppressive and sexist to
the core, but it has limited use for those to whom the religious faith and practices based
on the bible, whether Jewish or Christian, are still ofmajor importance. A deconstructive
approach to biblical texts does take account of the fact that these texts are governed in
many ways by binary-oppositional thinking - the male/female opposition in particular is
an inescapable legacy of the patriarchal order in which the bible has its roots - but it goes
a critical step further in focusing on ways in which the text actually undermines dualisms
and subverts the self-contained stability of its own ideological (in this case
patriarchal-ideological) structure.
Every text has some kind of organising system, some kind of dominant logical order
to which we refer when we speak of what the text is "about". But this structure, rather
like the Ego in Freudian psychoanalysis, is dependent for its stability on the repression
of those elements which contradict or threaten to undermine it: meaning is never unitary,
and systems ofmeaning never exist in texts without such contradictory elements, but the
text's ruling rhetorical structure is usually designed to marginalise these elements or keep
them at the level of the text's "unconscious". Deconstruction sees these gaps and
paradoxes as essential to any meaning, just as it sees any self-identical concept as in fact
radically dependent on its Other, and part of the deconstructive challenge to logocentric
reading is the way in which it directs its critical practice at the text's logical limits,
showing that these limits are marginal in the same way that the text's "central" meaning
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is central - i.e. as the result of an internal power-structure of discursive coercion and
repression, not as a given or transcendent truth (cf. the discussion of "invagination"
above). Gayatri Spivak refers to "the moment in the text that seems to transgress its own
system of values" as the starting-point for deconstructive criticism, and shows how
deconstruction counters the logocentric impulse to pin meaning down:
The desire for unity and order compels the author and the reader to balance the equation that
is the text's system. The deconstructive reader exposes the grammatological structure of the
text [i.e. the text's "writtenness"], that its "origin" and its "end" are given over to language in
general....by locating the moment in the text which harbours the unbalancing of the equation,
the sleight of hand at the limit of a text which cannot be dismissed simply as a
contradiction.6^
In other words, the socio-political structure within which interpretations of texts accepted
or dismissed as valid/invalid is reflected (or better, generated) in the structures of texts
themselves: in both cases, the indeterminacy of linguistic practice ultimately necessitates
the exercise of power or persuasion in asserting the central and repressing the marginal,
and the veiling of this strategy under cover of unquestionable reason is seen as the most
powerful ruse of logocentrism and patriarchy alike. Deconstruction first reverses the
hierarchy, by presenting the margin as the necessary condition of the centre (the centre of
the centre), and then takes the further step of similarly dismantling the "winning" or
newly-dominant term's conceptual autonomy, dissolving the central/marginal opposition
altogether.63
For feminist criticism, this means that no text is essentially sexist, and for feminist
biblical criticism, it means that those texts whose meanings are held to be fixed and
prescriptive of the God-given natural order of things - texts in which the interests of
women are often ignored or attacked - carry within themselves the seeds of interpretation
which in fact takes account of political struggle and cultural change. Authorial intention,
for example, becomes properly situated within its discursive context: what the author
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(the Yahwist, the Elohist, Isaiah, Matthew, Paul) "meant" can be seen as
not something prior to the text that determines its meaning, but [as] an important
organizing structure identified in readings that distinguish an explicit line of argumentation
from its subversive other.64
This approach, of course, has its advantages and its dangers. All deconstructive
criticism sooner or later concerns itself with questions of power; the deconstructive critic
is eventually made aware that "power tends to totalize itself in a 'center', and to prevent
the accumulation of power elsewhere than the center".65 Derrida is clear on this point:
[t]he function of this center [is] not only to orient, balance and organize the structure....but
above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we
might call the play of the structure.66
What deconstruction ultimately deconstructs, however, is "the accumulation of power in
discourse",67 targeting the strategies by which the margin is marginalised and the centre
centralised, and thus opening up new possibilities for interpretation both within the text
and within the larger "texts" of academic/religious institutional discourse where each
interpretation is required to plead its case. With attention focused on the marginal, and
the power of the centre to retain its unquestionable centrality undermined, the
inevitability of slippage or "play" in interpretation is recognised, and hard and fast rules
for discursive analysis come to be seen as operative only within specific discursive
contexts. Hermeneutical possibilities, therefore, are not foreclosed, and this has the
advantage for feminist criticism of allowing room for experimentation: along with the
need for the recognition of "women's space" in patriarchal culture goes the attendant
need for the recognition of non-patriarchal space in interpretation where the limits of
logocentrism are explored and transgressed. In biblical criticism this allows for a mode
of exegesis which can be appropriated by oppressed groups of various kinds, as the
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equation of logocentrism with patriarchy here need not imply that anti-logocentrism
equals only feminism; indeed
....the list of those who can claim deconstruction as their ally is endless....anything that
has been cast to the underside of the good/bad configuration can now assert its rights.68
But asserting your rights and enabling increased plurality in "legitimate" interpretation
is no more innocent an enterprise than closing off interpretation and oppressing the
marginalised; it would be naive to imagine that deconstructing "the accumulation of
power in discourse" was an undertaking which could be carried out without a certain
amount of power accumulating around the deconstructor. Critics of Derrida have not
been slow to realise this, and it has been asserted that deconstruction ceremoniously
ushers metaphysics out the front door while smuggling it in again at the back - with
Meaning identified as unarguably and without a doubt flowing through the text's
"structure" of traces and deferrals, deconstruction can now be seen as the archetypal
criticism and the deconstructive critic apotheosised as the Platonic model of the ideal
reader. Derrida to some extent deflates the argument by admitting that deconstruction
does indeed partake of the same language of reference and logic as logocentrism; the
complicity of deconstruction with metaphysics cannot be ignored and will shortly be
examined in detail. But similarly, with regard to the question of power, it could be
argued that deconstruction involves, for all its suave evasions, a process of
domination/submission, with the reader acting on "a desire to reappropriate the text
actively through mastery, to show the text 'what it does not know'".69 A deconstructive
awareness of the discursive power-play at work in reading, writing and interpretation
(which involves the awareness that these three activities are at the root one and the same)
carries with it its own potential for the kind of critical guerrilla tactics which are only
interested in dispersing the power of legitimate meaning out from the centre to the margin
because the margin happens to be where the deconstructive reader situates him/herself.
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Deconstruction "politicises" reader and text by seeing both as related species of a larger
family of "texts", but this does not always result in a balanced or harmonious
relationship:
....the politicized reader can still gain the upper hand over the text in the power game that
reading has now become, can turn (as in Aikido) the text's force against itself, can rough it up,
so to speak, until it says what is ideologically required by the interpreter's community. For
whatever the text's apparent politics, it can always be made over....into the mouthpiece for the
reader's own politics.70
This is a fair comment, but perhaps one made with more wit than insight: it does seem
(as I hope to demonstrate) that the more polarised a text's apparent political position is,
the more vulnerable the text becomes to subversion by the ideological "other" lurking
below its rhetorical surface - but to imply that a text can signify in some sense or another
anything the reader wants it to is to err on the side of transcendent jouissance and forget
that textual indeterminacy is - like all linguistic phenomena - only relative. Still, in a
general sense it is true that "the domain and play of signification" are infinitely extended
by deconstruction: meaning, while it can never just go anywhere it likes, never stops
moving, and can never be closed off. And the knowledge of this, as we have seen,
confers a certain power - but keeping power likewise on the move within the larger
cultural "texts" of society should be the ruling imperative of feminist hermeneutics, as of
any hermeneutics of liberation, and this should be reflected in the way we read.
There seems to be no way around the paradoxical desire of deconstruction both to
"reappropriate the text actively through mastery" and to displace or decentre interpretative
mastery as soon as it is achieved, but then it should be clear by now that deconstruction
rarely if ever serves to point the way out of a logical impasse. I believe that the root of
the problem lies in the question of what kind of "mastery" the interpreter is exercising -
Gayatri Spivak has to some extent defused the deconstructive will-to-power by pointing
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out that if a text possesses no intrinsic authority of its own, if a critic has no control over
the text's meaning or that of her own interpretation, and if the primacy of meaning itself
is thrown into doubt, then "the possession of [the deconstructive] formula does not
amount to much"71 in the political/hierarchical scheme of things. Spivak goes on to
indicate more positively that if the deconstructive critic is inevitably subject to her own
hermeneutical practice, if "her own text is necessarily self-deconstructed, always already
a palimpsest", then what results is not mastery over the text, from a point somehow
above the abyss of textuality and infinite deferral, but a certain freedom within it:
By inaugurating the open-ended indefiniteness of textuality....[deconstruction] shows us the
lure of the abyss as freedom. The fall into the abyss of deconstruction inspires us with as
much pleasure as fear. We are intoxicated with the prospect of never hitting bottom.72
Some would no doubt say that intoxication is only too evident in the work of some of
Derrida's more mandarin disciples, but this does not mean that all deconstructive
criticism must abandon all the constraints of rational thought and language at once or in
every instance. David Jobling, in his study of deconstruction and liberation theologies,
follows a number of commentators in likening deconstructive "play" to the positive
subversion of "carnival", an iconoclastic expression of political freedom which inverts,
mimics, ironises and generally exploits to the full incoherences within the structures of
social order or oppression, while still recognisably inhabiting those structures.73 To
deconstruct a text is to recognise from the outset that you enter and work within the text
partly on its own terms; that is to say, you are partly bound by the order you subvert,
particularly as far as the logocentric project of establishing and fixing meaning is
concerned:
....as she deconstructs, all protestations to the contrary, the critic necessarily assumes that
she at least, and for the time being, means what she says. Even the declaration of her
vulnerability must come, after all, in the controlling language of demonstration and
97
reference.74
In the same way, the "play" of carnival is not an attempt by revolutionaries completely to
demolish the social order and set themselves up as nouveaux dictateurs, but rather the
reversal and confusion within the system of dominant/subordinate roles where
"individual identities dissolve and social oppositions break down".75 Such a procedure
recognises - springs directly from - political struggle and injustice, and yet it undermines
hierarchical power without appropriating that power for itself. Translated into
deconstructive-critical terms, a "carnivalesque" hermeneutics alows the interpreter
freedom to acknowledge, celebrate, and exploit indeterminacy in meaning, employing a
diffuse and experimental style which flickers elusively back and forth across a number of
logocentrism's sacred boundaries - between the serious and the comic, the academic and
the poetic, the self-evident and the ambiguous, and so on - but which is both grounded
in the (seriously) political and itself open to further deconstruction. From the perspective
of logocentrism, as from that of any autocratic social class, the carnivalesque inhabits a
world governed by "the thinking of the utterly other":
we might think of this "other" world as one where power does not accumulate but flows -
and deconstruction as play is precisely a pre-enactment of such a world.76
In summary: I hope to have established by this stage that any hermeneutics of
liberation, in that it relies on the existence of a social order to liberate from, must in a
broad sense be deconstructive, since deconstruction ultimately brings us back again and
again to the political, to the consideration of how power is claimed, denied, suppressed
and directed within and between texts. But this inevitably brings with it the need for the
critic to learn to accomodate herself to undecideability and deferral, to realise that one's
own political position is provisionally constructed, occupying a point in history which
has no necessary correlative in the realm of the Immutable. In the practice of feminist
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deconstruction, then, the interpreter claims the power to "mean" or signify while
simultaneously relinquishing that power in the knowledge that the desired attribution of
centrality or authority to her "egalitarian" discourse will serve only to marginalise
somebody else's; she speaks explicitly for women in the knowledge that Woman, as a
determinate concept, belongs to the prescriptive order of Being ruled by "phallogo-
centrism" and must itself be deconstructed; as a feminist she exposes and deconstructs
patriarchal dualism in the knowledge that feminism too relies on its Other for existence
and has no self-identical essence of its own. This should result in a criticism which
fulfils the requirements for feminist hermeneutics oudined above: a criticism which is not
committed to excessive rationalising, which can work with contradictions without
necessarily trying to resolve them, which celebrates difference, leaving interpretation
open to creativity and pluralism, and which resists ideological closure, not confining
feminism to fixed categories but allowing the formation of "temporary alliances and
coalitions"77 relative to specific political intention and context.
Neutrality, Politics and the Politics of Neutrality: Up to this point I have
dealt principally with the case for deconstruction, doubtless at the expense of giving fair
consideration to the arguments against. It is time to redress the balance, and this is an
appropriate point at which to begin, since we have arrived once again at the issue of
politics in interpretation. If the return to the political which deconstruction effects is
advantageous to feminist hermeneutics, as to any hermeneutics of liberation, it should be
kept in mind that this tendency is precisely what gives ammunition to some of
deconstruction's most vocal opponents. Arguments against politics in interpretation
range from the polemical and hostile through to the subtle and apparently-reasonable,
and an interesting example of the latter approach can be found in the General
Introduction to Robert Alter and Frank Kermode's Literary Guide to the Bible (1987).
The Guide offers an ambitious book-by-book discussion of the literary qualities of both
Old and New Testaments, an endeavour shared among twenty-six contributors, and the
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editors' defence of their choice of contributors is illuminating. They write:
We have not imposed uniformity of method on our contributors, but all involved in this
project share a broad consensus of purpose as literary critics....the critic [is] someone who
helps make possible fuller readings of the text, with a particular emphasis on the complex
integration of diverse means of communication encountered in most works of
literature....Certain varieties of contemporary criticism are not represented here because we
think they are not really concerned with reading in the sense we have proposed....Given our
aim to provide illumination, we have not included critics who use the text as a springboard for
cultural or metaphysical ruminations, nor those like the Deconstructionists and some feminist
critics who seek to demonstrate that the text is necessarily divided against itself. The general
validity of such aproaches is not at issue here, only their inapplicability to our project as we
have defined it.78
This falls somewhere short of being a tirade against "political" criticism, but here and
elsewhere in the editors' Introduction can be found covert assumptions which relegate
politics, or ideology, not just to the margins of their own programme but to those of
critical orthodoxy altogether. Alter and Kermode are provisionally willing to accept the
"general validity" of the modes of criticism they sideline, but state that deconstruction,
feminism and "cultural or metaphysical ruminations" have little to do with reading as
they define it. And to read, we are told, is "to parse the language of literature" an
operation which involves close and expert attention to such properties as "syntax,
grammar....genre, convention, technique, contexts of allusion, style, structure, thematic
organization" and so on.79 There is no doubt that reading which focuses on these kinds
of literary characteristics is important, even essential for a well-rounded understanding of
biblical texts (it is also integral to the approach to literature adopted by many
structuralists, deconstructionists, feminists, Marxists etc.). But the kind of privilege
which Alter and Kermode claim for "their" style of reading is perhaps not so
self-evident. The editors make this privilege-claim when they speak of recent shifts in
biblical criticism; the emergence of biblical studies out from under the influence of
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nineteenth-century source-criticism has, we are told, constituted a return to a less
fragmented (i.e. more literary) kind of commentary, and "the interpretation of the texts as
they actually exist has been revalidated".80 The bible can, in other words, be approached
to an extent objectively; to focus on its formal literary properties is to deal with the
"actual" text, and accordingly the editors of the Guide have in mind an "actual" reader to
whom their efforts are directed:
We are writing to serve the interests of the educated general reader rather than those of some
critical party.81
On one hand, therefore, we have the biblical texts "as they actually exist" and a
disinterested general readership; on the other, the texts against themselves, read as
"springboard[s] for cultural or metaphysical ruminations" by the members of various
critical sects. The problem with this view is not that it unfairly taxes deconstructionists,
feminists and others with the stigma of vested interest; culture, ideology and subjectivity
are inevitably and openly on the agenda in any discussion whose participants include
critics of these persuasions. But what about the interests of Alter and Kermode? The
editors of the Guide implicitly claim that they have none, that their editorial politics are
not politics as such, but simply objective guidelines for distinguishing between
ideological and non-ideological modes of criticism, the latter being concerned rightly and
properly with the text-itself. "Evidently we are to infer", one critic has noted, "that the
somewhat modified 'new criticism' [Alter and Kermode] promote is not a critical party
vested in publication, position and normativity".82 Similarly, we are asked to accept the
unproblematic existence of "the educated general reader", an entity spinning calmly in a
serene orbit of Platonic reasonableness, untouched by ideology and yet instilled, one
strongly suspects, with a literary sensibility congruent at all points with that of the critics
who invoke him/her.
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It is little wonder, then, that the editors of The Literary Guide to the Bible relegate
deconstruction, with maximum dispatch, to the sidelines of critical debate, as
deconstruction seeks to unbalance their objectivist stance and calls their "educated
general reader" a fabulous beast. One does not, of course, have to be a deconstructionist
to see that education is by no means a value-free or apolitical enterprise, or that
objectivity is never in practice what it claims to be in theory, but we have seen that
deconstruction is one approach to reading which foregrounds these objections from the
outset, and Alter's and Kermode's stated aim in the Guide is to close off debate before
such objections can be raised. Indeed, a perspective from which one's own critical
stance is seen as dealing with "the texts as they actually exist", as not being the posture
of "some critical party", can only be adopted and maintained by keeping the likes of
deconstructionists and feminists at bay, by seeing ideology as something which infects
and obsesses commentators "out there" on the fashionably anarchic fringes of literary
theory. In a more recent publication, Robert Alter performs this exclusionary manoeuvre
in a way which invites close attention. The introduction to his The Pleasures ofReading
in an Ideological Age is subtitled "The Disappearance of Reading", and in it Alter
deplores an emerging state of affairs in literary-critical debate; more and more often, he
says,
[o]ne can read article after article, hear lecture after lecture, in which no literary work is ever
quoted, and no real reading experience is registered....I strongly suspect that many young
people now earning undergraduate degrees in English or French at our most prestigious
institutions have read two or three pages of Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, and Kristeva for every
page ofGeorge Eliot or Stendhal.83
Once again, Alter raises the banner of "real reading" in a way which suggests that
whatever concessions may be granted to current critical trends, there still exists an
approach to texts which is self-evidently normative and primarily legitimate. That this
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approach is purportedly untainted by ideology is implied in the title of his book, with its
connotations of a return to reading-for-pleasure amid the modern clamour of faddish
"discourse"; that the desired aproach is Alter's own becomes evident as his discussion
unfolds.
The shift away from "real reading" is said by Alter to adopt two forms: one is a desire
to blur the boundaries not only between literature and criticism, but between literature
and other kinds of "non-literary" writing. The other is "a disquieting tendency to pitch
critical discussion at one or two removes of abstraction from what actually addresses
readers in the literary text".84 This self-absorbed critical abstraction is identifiable chiefly
by its vocabulary; technical terminology has its uses, Alter allows, but
The promiscuous use of intellectual jargon all too frequently introduces real imprecision or
serves as a cover for the lack of original thought, as one may readily see by scanning the
current academic journals, whose pages are clotted with "discourse," "discursive strategy,"
"erotics of textuality," "diagesis," "foregrounding," "signifieds," "aporia," and much more of
the same.85
Alter goes on to offer three examples of this kind of criticism, each one a short passage
which "for reasons of simple decency" he leaves anonymous, but each of which is said
to bear the unmistakeable hallmarks of an "addiction to sectarian cant".86 It does not
seem necessary to cite his examples here; suffice it to say that they are indeed notable for
their terminological density, and very much characteristic of a certain style of
poststructuralist literary-critical discussion. Alter's view is to be respected, and his
dislike of the "bristling conceptuality"87 ofmuch contemporary theory does not, in itself,
brand him an irredeemable reactionary. But what he seeks to prove by pillorying the
excesses of the new theorists is less defensible.
His point is, basically, that the ground of literary criticism has shifted "from literature
to some form of politics or metaphysics or politics and metaphysics combined",88 that
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whatever the disciples of Derrida, Foucault et al are now doing, it does not come under
the category of "real reading". What Alter conceives of as real reading, however, is
perhaps no more easily comprehended than the grand but vague gestures of the theorists
he denounces. Where Alter castigates the sectarians for their enslavement to "jargon and
voguish imprecisions",89 his own vocabulary when it comes to literary activity could be
a good deal tighter. Real reading is said to constitute, among other things, "passionate
engagement in literary works"; "a sense of deep pleasure" in this engagement; intimate
participation in "the imaginative life of the text",90 and so on. Why these types of
engagement and affinity are necessarily unthinkable in "politicised" criticism is unclear to
me, almost as unclear as precisely what it is they involve. Alter has a clear idea of what
they involve: close attention to "modalities of literary expression",91 to the intricate
configurations of semantics, syntax and orders of textual organisation; to the rhetorical
interplay of metre, alliteration, zeugma, mnemonics, linearity, congeries, the tension
between structural narrative complexity and mimetic plausibility, and so on. All these
terms are drawn from the pages of Alter's discussion of real reading; none of them, I
wish to argue, is intrinsically less baffling in its technical specifity than discourse,
diagesis, aporia, or the like. The difference is principally one of currency or familiarity,
but Alter wishes to dignify only one set of criteria with the appellation "reading", while
the possibility that "what actually addresses the reader in the literary text" might be
discursive strategy or a-signification is vehementally disallowed.
Again, I believe it is irrelevant here to take issue with Alter's aesthetic distaste for
"sectarian cant"; what concerns me is that his exclusion of certain approaches to reading
from the inner sanctum of critical orthodoxy can only be achieved at the expense of a
measure of self-scrutiny. Alter cannot acknowledge that there may well be a legitimate
reading perspective from which his own terms appear arcane and rarefied, or from
which, as we have seen suggested, his methodology appears to serve the professional
interests of an established academic class. This lends an aspect of irony to his enterprise;
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for all his denunciations of politics and metaphysics in criticism, Alter's idealisation of
"true" reading carries decidedly metaphysical force, while his attempts to prescribe the
field of legitimate literary enquiry are, by his own admission, inspired to a large extent
by his experiences within the academy - generated, that is, within "the messiness of the
social order"92 and thus inextricable from political interests and influences. The
Dictionary ofBiblical Interpretation gives several lengthy paragraphs to its discussion of
"Ideology", during the course of which it cites Ideologiekritik as a kind of meta-criticism
which attempts to ensure that political consciousness maintains a prominent function in
the business of interpreting texts. According to the Ideologiekritik enterprise,
the ethics of reading and the sociology of scholarship as well as the reception of texts and
the modes of their production are all part of the ideological scrutiny required of alert scholars.
Methods of appropriating texts may reveal or conceal ideological factors which should be part
of the debate about the meaning and function of texts.93
What Alter singularly fails to do in The Pleasures ofReading in an Ideological Age is to
open the debate wide enough for such considerations, to bring his own ideological
presuppositions (which may be theological, professional-academic, ethical, etc.) into any
clearer view than that afforded by the rather opaque insistence that his favoured approach
to reading is the one which, above all others, reflects "real reading experience". Just as
he rejects "voguish imprecisions" only to make room for his own more traditional
abstractions, Alter decries ideology and politics in contemporary criticism without
apparently realising the extent to which his own interpretative stance evinces an earlier
set of cultural criteria, a network of assumptions which owe much to the insights of the
early twentieth-century Leavisites (who drafted the canon of English literature as it is
studied today, and spoke of such qualities as "life", "vitality", "moral seriousness",
"sensibility" and so on as definitive of literature in the Great Tradition) and to the later
New Critics of the 40's and 50's (who conceived of the literary work as an organic
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unity, capable of being grasped objectively and exhaustively by rigorous scrutiny of its
formal characteristics94) - critical parties denounced in their day as sectarian, and whose
approaches to reading were as closely-informed by ideology as those of any
contemporary feminists or deconstructionists.
It should be noted at this point that Alter nowhere takes issue specifically or at any
length with deconstruction per se, but this is partly what gives his argument its force - in
conflating deconstruction with feminism, Marxism and other unspecified critical
heresies, Alter erects an indistinct but huge target which he is then able to hit with
unerring accuracy, and yet whose ultimate significance is dwarfed by the equally murky
but even more massive spectre of the "educated general reader" for whom he speaks. It
can be seen, however, that the ideological age whose dawn Alter witnesses with such
dismay is undoubtedly that ushered in by the critical climate which has enabled the work
of Derrida to be received and developed. We have seen that a key strategy of
deconstructive reading is to trace the workings of power; power to signify or "mean"
within the structure of the text under discussion, power to legitimise meaning within the
broader context of the interpretative community, power to determine where meaning
within the text ends and interpretation begins. Considerations of ideology, of the political
interests at work in the activities of reading and writing, are unavoidably part of such an
approach to literature. Robert Alter is correct when he remarks that criticism of this kind
has important and immediate bearing upon the way in which literature is conceived of
and taught within the academic institution;95 his analysis of the situation falters,
however, when he suggests that the way to resolve the inevitable confrontations is to
return to what he sees as a disinterested, apolitical understanding of texts and textuality.
To adopt such a solution is merely to veil the political beneath appeals to objectivity and
reason, and thus to engender the kind of fixed, false consciousness that surely
constitutes the worst kind of ideology.
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In the above paragraphs, I have opened the case against deconstruction on what might
be called typological grounds, principally with reference to the kind of reading that
deconstruction involves. This is a somewhat specious move, or at least an incongruous
one, as I have also suggested in this chapter that generalisations or abstractions run
counter to deconstructive criticism, that deconstruction is less a matter of theory than of
practice. Talking "about" deconstruction unavoidably involves a fair degree of
misrepresentation; one can, in the final analysis, only deconstruct. This opens directly on
to the contradiction which lies at the heart of this thesis, the contradiction which lies at
the heart of any theoretical approach to such a subject. It is a contradiction which I
cannot hope to resolve, but which I do intend to examine - and the following discussion
should accordingly have the advantage of bringing us back to specifics, as in the next
chapter I will focus on the problematic application and activity of deconstructive gestures
in biblical interpretation, particularly with reference to their implications for interpretative
communities whose interests in reading the bible are primarily religious.
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The problem with reason today is that it has become an instrument of discipline, not a
mark of freedom, and that, when it is put to work, it is taken out of play.1
The present status of deconstruction in literary and biblical studies is far from
settled. In the previous chapter, I left the elucidation of Derrida's work at the point where
meaning came to be seen as fundamentally indeterminate, or at least fundamentally
non-fundamental, and I indicated that many traditionalist literary critics have responded
to this by denouncing deconstruction as an interpretative approach which outrageously
and cynically violates the integrity or "meaningfulness" of the texts it deals with. Words
like "outrage" do not exaggerate the pitch at which the debate over deconstruction has
been conducted among academics in literary studies; one report has it that some scholars
see Derrida as "immoral", corrupting young minds with nihilism, etc.: some phrases used
are "the current critical scandal", "the failure of criticism", "literature against itself, and so
forth....the rancour has infected a number of prominent universities, notably Yale and Johns
Hopkins. A noted classicist now at the latter found a work of Derrida in his mailroom; so
incensed that he failed to note that the mailbox wasn't his own, he seized the book and tore it
to pieces on the spot.2
This passage, however, which reads rather like a news dispatch radioed from the middle
of a war zone, was written over a decade ago, and it is true that the literary-critical
establishment has, in some quarters, since then relaxed its stance against deconstruction.
The "routinisation" or domestication of what was initially reviled as a subversive,
irresponsible practice has become apparent in the rise to mainstream power and
acceptance of such "deconstructive establishment"-figures as Hartman, Miller and the
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late Paul de Man; Derrida himself received his honourary doctorate from Cambridge
University in 1992. One critic has described this process with reference to Kafka's
parable of the leopards in the temple - leopards break into a temple and drink the water
from the sacrificial vessels; they persist in this profane act until it becomes predictable,
then sacralised and finally incorporated into the temple ritual.3 So there is now a
consensus of tolerant opinion which holds that deconstruction has its rightful and proper
place in the history of literary criticism; the academic "assimilation of potentially
destructive agents"4 is well under way, even while those agents threaten and harass the
institution which assimilates them.5
Overall, however, there is no shortage of academics whose opposition to
deconstruction is both bitter and influential; it should not be forgotten that Derrida's
nomination for a Cambridge doctorate caused such a degree of controversy that the
University was obliged to vote on the fitness of the award - the first vote on an honorary
degree at Cambridge in nearly thirty years.6 The nature and gravity of the accusations
held against deconstruction vary - some objections reveal little more than a keen and
profound ignorance on the part of the antagonist - but there is one complaint which is
perhaps heard more often than any other: namely, that deconstruction is part of a
perverse and derisory trend in criticism, one which fails to respect either the structural or
the aesthetic integrity of the literary text, and which transforms the activity of reading
into a kind of wanton iconoclasm. It is much the same objection as that which we have
just seen levelled by Robert Alter at modem literary criticism in general. No reader
worthy of the name, it is often argued, having seriously engaged with the subtle textures
of, say, Mrs. Dalloway, or the rhetorical elegance of Ecclesiastes, or the sheer brutal
power of King Lear, can justifiably subordinate the study of how those effects are
achieved to the desire to pull the text apart and demonstrate that, in the final analysis, one
rearrangement of the pieces is as good as any other - or worse, that any one text is as
good as any other. The "new wave" critics have, with a kind of totalitarian Communist
zeal, interrogated the privileging of meaning in texts, and texts in culture, to the point
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where privilege itself is no longer permitted, and thus they have forgotten what it is to
practise the open-minded study of literature on literature's own terms. Exactly what
those terms are, what it is that makes literature Literature, provides the subject for a good
deal of lively debate;7 suffice it to say here that for those who have made a career out of
explicating the intrinsically Literary, structuralism and its hybrids amount to little more
than a joyless sociology-of-ideas which would be more appropriately brought to bear on
such phenomena as television, advertising, "bureaucratese" and pop culture - all species
of a pernicious new "literature" which only too richly deserves the baleful attention of the
deconstructive mafiosi.
The discussion which this controversy opens up is an important one, and a great deal
more could be said here; I have introduced it, however, more or less by way of
introduction to the issue to which the greater part of this chapter will be devoted: the
issue of deconstruction in biblical interpretation and its implications for the "religious"
reader. It could be argued that little of the above debate poses any significant problem for
those who believe that literary criticism is ultimately a kind of marketplace for
interpretative methodologies where various permutations swing in and out of fashion and
where deconstruction has, for the moment, ousted whatever came before it as the latest
in radical chic. Shakespeare has, in the past, been variously put forward as a humanist, a
formalist, a modernist, a feminist and a Marxist-historicist; to say now that his works
self-deconstructively defer meaning in favour of dijferance and polysemy is merely to
continue a time-honoured tradition of hermeneutical innovation and affirm that the great
classics of literature eternally defy our attempts to explicate them exhaustively. When
deconstruction turns its attention to the bible, however, matters tend to become more
serious. This is because the bible, for many of us, is not "simply" literature but the one
text above all others which does point to unassailable truth, and in this hope we invest a
great deal of spiritual and emotional commitment which is a lot less flexible than our
intellectual curiosity. For a religious Jew or Christian, the bible is in some sense the
word ofGod. According to the tenets of deconstruction, the very idea of a transcendental
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Signified, of a source of meaning which is stable and resistant to the vagaries of
language, is an outmoded presupposition of classical Greek metaphysics - which can of
course be a roundabout way of saying that there is no God. Carl A. Raschke has
enthusiastically articulated this unsettling aspect of deconstruction in terms whose glow
borders on the satanic:
deconstruction is the death of God put into writing....Deconstruction is the descensus in
infernus, the venture into the underworld of limitless writing, the dismembering of all names
and concepts....the dance of death upon the tomb of God....a kind of Bacchic fascination with
the metaphysics of decomposition and death,8
and so on. Regardless of whether or not we feel Raschke overstates the case a little, his
point is impossible to miss: the deconstructive exegete's first move must necessarily be
to jettison all notions of a God who speaks from a single point somewhere behind,
above or beyond the biblical text, because the hors-texte (along with any unitary
guarantor ofMeaning who might be said to inhabit it) simply does not exist as such. It is
not to be wondered at, then, that deconstruction is not popular in those
theological-exegetical circles where the bible is held to be the repository of truths which
are essentially transhistorical: not only, it is said, does deconstruction undermine biblical
faith and the sacredness of scripture, but it does so with the kind of self-justifying
circularity that raises the same sceptical questions over and over again without perceiving
any need to provide constructive answers. The realisation that any concept of determinate
truth is a product of discourse or culture rather than something extraneous to it provides
the rather attractive temptation of pulling the rug out from under all
metaphysical/religious claims, and then walking away leaving somebody else to clean up
the mess - a fruitless kind of exercise, and one which forestalls objection to this by
making fruitlessness something of a philosophical inevitability.9 One could hardly
conceive of a mode of criticism more antithetical to biblical scholarship, or quite simply
more tedious: Frank Kermode has taxed deconstruction with the charge that "it is entirely
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absorbed in demonstrating its own validity"10 and elsewhere Terry Eagleton states that
much deconstructive criticism emerging from the universities of Britain and the United
States bears witness to a kind of competitive macho ethic; everybody deconstructing
everybody else's work and ridiculing determinations ofmeaning wherever they may be
found, in a bid to see who can stare most resolutely into the abyss of non-signification
and still come up smiling:
[s]uch deconstruction is a power-game, a mirror-image of orthodox academic competition.
It is just that now, in a religious twist to the old ideology, victory is achieved by kenosis or
self-emptying: the winner is the one who has managed to get rid of all his cards and sit with
empty hands.11
Of course Kermode and Eagleton are not primarily biblical critics, and it would be
wrong to make a radical distinction between biblical interpretation and "secular" literary
criticism, suggesting that deconstruction precipitates anguished existential wranglings in
the former camp and differences merely of aesthetic opinion or academic politics in the
latter. The truth is that there are markedly similar issues at stake in both fields, and in any
case, it should be noted that just as there remain those scholars of literature who stand in
passionate opposition to all things Derridean, so there exist biblical critics who make free
and imaginative use of deconstructive manoeuvres in exegesis. For the time being,
however, I wish to separate the two fields and look specifically at biblical criticism, not
because I believe that exegesis is an activity far removed from other kinds of criticism,
but because the main issue I wish first to deal with is one which lies closer to the surface
of biblical-critical discussion: the issue of religious belief and whether, or how seriously,
it is threatened by a hermeneutical strategy which questions all determinations of
Presence and stable truth. As I indicated in the previous chapter, feminists who reject the
bible and biblical faith out of hand as being irredeemably patriarchal may be only too
happy to perform Raschke's "dance of death upon the tomb of God", given that the God
underfoot is the God of the patriarchs of Israel, of Jephthah, of Ezekiel, of Hosea, of
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Paul, of Origen, Tertullian, Augustine and Aquinas. But for those who see the bible as
revelatory of a God who is something more, or other, than the sum of a sexist tradition,
deconstructive reading may leave too little to work with once it has inverted all
hierarchies, blurred all distinctions and dethroned all metaphysical presuppositions. The
question is: is deconstruction inevitably tied to a death-of-God theology, and thus only
of limited use in biblical interpretation?
Some questions, it has been said, "beget not so much answers as different ways of
phrasing themselves".12 Certainly, the question of whether or not deconstruction delivers
the coup de grage to all theological determinations necessitates reformulation, inquiring
further into what God "is", what the "death" of such a Being might be said to entail, and
other such speculations. I hope to avoid becoming too perilously involved in such
discussion here, partly because I am no theologian, but partly also because I believe that
deconstruction, at least in its Derridean formulation(s), is not at all readily articulated in
the language of classical theological discourse. Derrida's maxim il n'y a pas de
hors-texte appears to invite a directly theological translation: nothing exists beyond
textuality, all is subsumed in discourse, there is no ground of meaning or existence
outside the web of deferral and change woven by language and history, ergo there is no
God. But Derrida is well aware that "there is no God" is a manifestly theological
statement, an assertion of metaphysical-religious truth, and he stresses on a number of
occasions that his overarching claims for textuality are not to be misconstrued as
triumphalistmetaphysics-in-disguise:
I try to keep myself at the limit of philosophical discourse. I say limit and not death, for I
do not at all believe in what today is so easily called the death of philosophy (nor, moreover,
in the simple death of whatever - the book, man, or god, especially since, as we all know,
what is dead wields a very specific power).13
Derrida's deconstruction can be seen thus as neither onto-theological ("onto-theology"
being the Heideggerean term appropriated by Derrida to denote the notional originary
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self-presence of anything, whether it be God, Being, Logos, soul, rational
consciousness, philosophy or any master-discourse), nor as "a linguistically crafty
existentialism which poises writing, in [Edward] Said's phrase, 'just a hair beyond utter
blankness"'.14 Neither can such deconstructive movements as differance be said to
operate according to the logic of "negative" theology, if Derrida is correct in seeing
negative theology as the other side of the onto-theological coin:
....what is....denoted as differance is not theological, not even in the most negative order of
negative theology. The latter, as we know, is always occupied with letting a supraessential
reality go beyond the finite categories of essence and existence, that is, of presence, and always
hastens to remind us that, if we deny the predicate of existence to God, it is in order to
recognise him as a superior, inconceivable and ineffable mode of being. Here there is no
question of such a move....15
Whether or not Derrida's assessment of negative theology actually does justice to the
complexity of the tradition,16 the above comments taken as a whole sound the general
warning that the ominous theological implications of Derrida's work are not as clear or
direct as they might at first appear.
Deconstruction and Metaphysics: In assessing the viability of deconstruction
within religious discourse, it is probably best to begin by widening or shifting the focus
of inquiry from theology to metaphysics, assuming for the time being (in defiance of our
moratorium on conceptual hierarchies) that one is a species or sub-genre of the other.
"Metaphysics" as it is generally understood, refers broadly to that aspect of philosophy
which deals with first principles: the decisive claim of all metaphysical discourses is that
there exists a sphere of primary being where knowledge, existence and meaning are
originary and non-contingent. The metaphysical realm is, as its etymology suggests, that
in which the sensual/linguistic/temporal apprehension of things is transcended; likewise,
metaphysical realities consist of those certainties which are beyond empirical inquiry,
both posterior and anterior to the shifting constructs of culture and history. It should be
necessary below only to summarise briefly one or two particular forms in which the
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encounter between deconstruction and metaphysics has taken place, the general reminder
being that where the dominant branches of Western philosophy, with their roots in
Platonic/Aristotelian thought, have long taken metaphysics and metaphysical
assumptions for granted, deconstruction's first move is invariably to question and
disturb such assumptions. In "White Mythology", Derrida's extended essay on
metaphor, a much-quoted passage from Nietzsche is offered which illustrates with
characteristic Nietzschean force the kind of perspective adopted:
What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in
short, a sum of human relations which become poetically and rhetorically intensified, meta¬
morphosed, adorned, and after long usage, seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths
are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions....coins which have their
obverse effaced and now are no longer of account as coins but merely as metal.17
In Nietzsche's figure of truths as effaced coins, we are presented with the idea that
eternal verities, or metaphysical assurances, whether religious, scientific or
philosophical, are really no more than commonly-held understandings which have
felicitously (but speciously) transcended communality. As a coin, stamped with its
particular numerical value, is recognised as a token of exchange only within the
economic community where it circulates, so truths start out as propositions whose
validity is constrained by culture and history. Rub the face off a coin, and its value (in
the absence of social determinants) becomes a question of "essential" worth, just as a
communal belief whose existence as a cultural inscription is forgotten or denied may
readily be put forward as Truth. Derrida sees the cultural/historical origins ofWestern
metaphysics as having been erased in this manner, part of a philosophical strategy which
seeks to elevate metaphysical certainties to the status of ground-and-object of all
discourses:
Metaphysics - the white mythology which reassembles and reflects the culture of the West:
the white man takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own logos, that is,
the mythos of his idiom, for the universal form of that [which] he must still wish to call
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Reason. Which does not go uncontested....metaphysics has erased within itself the fabulous
scene that has produced it, the scene that nevertheless remains active and stirring, inscribed in
white ink, an invisible design covered over in the palimpsest.18
Metaphysics, in other words, by no means constitutes an unshakeable structure, as it
bears within itself the "active and stirring" traces of its own fabrication, traces which are
"invisible" to philosophical self-scrutiny, but no less operative for that. We have
examined, in the previous two chapters, various ways in which deconstruction questions
metaphysical certainties and enables the making-visible of covert cultural imprints; one
approach is that mapped out in the course of Derrida's sundry critiques of logocentrism.
Metaphysical discourses, we have seen, tend to structure reality in terms of binary
oppositions (meaning/form, soul/body, etc.), elevating one term as a fundamental
grounding entity or principle over and above its conceptual opposite, which is held to be
derivative or inferior. Logocentrism, or the "metaphysics of presence" (by which is
meant any system of thought or behaviour predicated upon this "hierarchical
axiology"19), is recurrent throughout the dominant Western philosophical tradition,
"from Plato to Rousseau, Descartes to Husserl",20 and can even be identified in the work
of such apparent anti-metaphysicians as Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger. It is this
all-pervasiveness that makes the metaphysics of presence "invisible", as Jonathan Culler
has cogently argued: knowledge itself, the making of logical sense from disordered
sensation, is effected by establishing fundamental conceptual yardsticks against which
we measure variations, complications and perversions, and
[t]he difficulty of imagining and practising different procedures is an indication of the
ubiquity of logocentrism.21
Culler goes on to list some of the more familiar concepts whose elevation to the status of
"fundamentals" relies on the notion of self-certain presence, or metaphysical priority:
....the immediacy of sensation, the presence of ultimate truths to a divine consciousness,
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the effective presence of an origin in a historical development, a spontaneous or unmediated
intuition, the transumption of thesis and antithesis in a dialectical synthesis, the presence in
speech of logical and grammatical structures, truth as what subsists behind appearances, and
the effective presence of a goal in the steps that lead to it The authority of presence, its power
of valorization, structures all our thinking. The notions of "making clear", "grasping",
"demonstrating", "revealing", and "showing what is the case" all invoke presence. To claim, as
in the Cartesian cogito, that the "I" resists radical doubt because it is present to itself in the act
of thinking or doubting is one sort of appeal to presence. Another is the notion that the
meaning of an utterance is what is present to the consciousness of the speaker, what he or she
"has in mind" at the moment of utterance.22
Another, we might add, is the idea germane to this thesis that the male, with his
"masculine" attributes of rationality and objectivity, and his capacity for dispassionate
analysis, provides the model for humanity, stands in the image of God, has intellectual
access to Truth, and generally sets the standard against which the female and "feminine"
modes of experience must be evaluated.
The problem is, of course, that none of these fundamental, determinate concepts has
fallen from the sky, or from any other notional realm of pure Being. Each logocentric
"first principle" can only function as such by virtue of its relationship to its binary
opposite and to other "derived" concepts, and therefore each self-identical Presence can
be shown to exist only as part of a system of differences and absences. Whatever is put
forward as an instance of metaphysical Presence is in fact a product or construction,
itself "dependent or derived in ways that deprive it of the authority of simple or pure
presence".23 We have seen that "cat" is meaningful not in and of itself, but as a
recognisable variation on similar-sounding arrangements of phonemes; likewise, what is
signified by the term "Caucasian male" is sedimented with traces of everything that is
neither Caucasian nor male - female, Asiatic, Negroid, even the genderless and
non-human, each leaves its "trace", a trace which marks absence but yet which is
definitive, in much the same way as the absence of heat determines the nature and degree
of cold. Seen in this light, what gives definition to concepts and signifiers is not fixed
identity, but the play of differences between them, the undecideable dynamic of
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differance which
no more allows the opposition between [for example] activity and passivity than that
between cause and effect or in-determination and determination, etc.24
If there are no such oppositions, if Presence is in fact a construct of all that is absent,
then the metaphysical granting of originary status to anything at all involves
inconsistencies and paradoxes which philosophy can suppress or rework but never
ultimately avoid. The elevation of Nature, for example, to ontological or moral primacy
over and against culture, can never be fixed or secure because philosophical
determinations of Nature are themselves effects which have historical/cultural causes.
Similarly, I have outlined Derrida's argument above that the privileging of speech as
being somehow closer to meaning than writing is dependent upon the attribution of
certain unsavoury characteristics to writing which can, on close inspection, be shown in
fact to characterise speech just as profoundly. Similarly again, patriarchal religion
establishes God in terms of maleness and vice versa, but maleness can be seen as a
concept inscribed with traces of all that it must exclude to claim independent identity;
indeed it can only function as a concept "insofar as it consists of such traces".25 The
repressions and exclusions necessary to establish Presence become, as it were, all the
more conspicuous to the deconstructive mind by their absence: who says Nature says
culture; who says Self says other; and so metaphysical determinations of all kinds can be
read as evocative of what they seek to exclude, as operating "according to the vocabulary
of that very thing to be de-limited".26
There is another significant way in which Derrida deconstructs metaphysics, or
shows how metaphysics deconstructs itself according to its own principles. In the
introductory paragraphs to "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human
Sciences",27 Derrida examines the history of the "centred structure", first establishing
that all structures traditionally have a centre, an organising locus or principle which
controls "the play of its elements inside the total form....even today, the notion of a
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structure lacking any center represents the unthinkable itself".28 The centre is the
metaphysical "still point" of the structure, that which grounds and situates everything
else in the structure:
....it is the point at which the substitution of contents, elements, or terms is no longer
possible. At the center, the permutation or the transformation of elements (which may of
course be structures enclosed within a structure) is forbidden. At least this permutation has
always remained interdicted,...29
The centre, then, could be said (in linguistic terms) to be "untranslatable". But the
history of philosophy, the very fact that there is a history of philosophy, shows that
translating and substituting one determination of the "centre" for another has been
precisely the business of those most devoutly committed to its stability. In its restless
desire for metaphysical certitude, for a point of "fundamental immobility....which is
itself beyond the reach of play", Western philosophy has amounted to nothing so much
as a play of substitutions:
....the entire history of the concept of structure....must be thought of as a series of
substitutions of center for center, as a linked chain of determinations of the center.
Successively, and in a regulated fashion, the center receives different forms or names. The
history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these metaphors and
metonymies.-^0
Even as it strives for fixity, in other words, metaphysics in its striving inevitably
participates in indeterminacy and flux. But it is at this point that Derrida introduces an
idea which is crucial to his discussion, crucial to deconstructive thought in general, and
yet crucially ignored by a number of deconstruction's fiercest critics. The idea begins
with Derrida writing of a "rupture" in the history ofWestern philosophy, the evolution
of a kind of anti-metaphysical school of thought which sees the putative structural
"centre", the determination of Being-in-presence, as "not a fixed locus but a function, a
sort of nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions [come] into play". In
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this "rupture" meaning is transformed from being something which exists behind the
words we use to describe it into a function of those words; historically, this is seen as
the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the
absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse....that is to say, a system in which
the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside
a system of differences.31
Derrida traces this "rupture" through the Nietzschean critique of Truth, through Freud's
work on the fragmentation of consciousness and the rational subject, through
Heidegger's dismantling of Being and onto-theology, and on. He goes on to assert,
however, that each one of these thinkers can be shown to be caught in a philosophical
double-bind; that is, that each and every attempt to dismantle metaphysical structures
must necessarily, owing to the demands of philosophical argument, set up its own
centred discursive structure and establish its own determinate principles of reference and
demonstration - principles which we are persuaded to believe are fixed and binding, and
which therefore have the unmistakeable smell of notional Presence about them:
....all these destructive discourses and all their analogues are trapped in a kind of circle. The
circle is unique. It describes the form of the relation between the history of metaphysics and
the destruction of the history of metaphysics. There is no sense in doing without the concepts
of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language - no syntax and no
lexicon - which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive
proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit
postulations of....what it seeks to contest.32
Derrida's terminology is precise: there is "no sense" in doing without metaphysics
because all the most natural and immediate ways in which we make "sense" to each other
involve appeals to Presence, invocations of stable, commonly-understood meanings to
which our words direct the listener or reader. Any systematic refutation of Presence,
insofar as it relies on a system, must make its own claims to truth and certitude, and
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these claims are of course "borrowings" from the proscribed field ofmetaphysics. Thus
are the anti-philosophers incorporated into the history of philosophy:
....every particular borrowing brings along with it the whole of metaphysics. This is what
allows these destroyers to destroy each other reciprocally - for example, Heidegger regarding
Nietzsche, with as much lucidity and rigor as bad faith and misconstruction, as the last
metaphysician, the last "Platonist". One could do the same for Heidegger himself, for Freud, or
for a number of others.33
It seems that the death of metaphysics, then, can only be heralded in terms which
paradoxically secure its future good health, and which leave even the most scrupulous
destroyer of Presence open to charges of negligent Platonism. And this of course has
particular relevance not just to the work of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Freud, but to that
of Derrida and all other deconstructive thinkers. What are we to make of a discourse
whose practitioners assert that meaning is undecideable, that language defers truth, that
metaphysics is the "white mythology" of the West, and yet who nevertheless continue to
disseminate texts in the expectation that the language of those texts will be "properly" or
at least adequately understood?34 In communicating structured ideas of any kind, we
inevitably adopt to some degree the article of Platonic faith that there are such things as
ideas, and that they can be communicated with relative success through language: where,
then, does that leave deconstruction with all its anti-metaphysical subtleties?
In the answer to this question lies the answer also to the charge that deconstruction is
a species of nihilism or interpretative anarchy. For the philosophical double-bind, the
inevitable complicity between metaphysics and anti-metaphysics that "ruptures" the logic
of Nietzschean thought, is a double-bind in which deconstruction is no less inextricably
caught; indeed, Derrida states that "we cannot give up this metaphysical complicity
without also giving up the critique we are directing against this complicity".35 One
significant outworking of this is that deconstruction should (according to Derrida) be a
practice which, in acknowledging its reliance on "the form, the logic, and the implicit
postulations" of metaphysics, accordingly "recognize[s] and respect[s]" the requirements
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of traditional criticism:
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not
possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures.
Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one always inhabits, and all the more when one does
not suspect it....Without this recognition and this respect, critical production would risk
developing in any direction at all and authorize itself to say almost anything.36
For all Derrida's restless questioning, dismantling and subverting the metaphysics of
Presence, nowhere does he claim to do away with metaphysical presuppositions
altogether, and this is why Derrida situates his work at the "limit" of philosophical
discourse and not beyond it. Deconstruction in its most radically experimental forms may
redefine the boundaries of conventional structures of meaning, but this is not the same
thing as transcending structure and signification completely - the preceding pages would
be rather fewer (or perhaps vastly greater) in number if Derrida's texts did not possess
their own internal logic, or make appeals to certain (provisional) fundamentals which
could be discussed in some communicable form or other. Ideas and general principles,
reason and logic; the bulwarks ofmetaphysics are the foundations ofWestern thought,
and we can no more "escape" them than we can escape culture or language itself. It is the
necessity of language that keeps deconstruction on this side of "the threshold of sense";37
words may defer meaning but their "reasonable orders" are "just about all that we have,
and are likely to have"38 with which to signify anything at all - a realisation which is as
crucial to an understanding of deconstruction as is the awareness of undecideability and
"play":
Derrida has argued....that our signifiers do not communicate being, but distance it and
postpone its advent indefinitely. They are not the sacraments of presence, but the marks of an
infinitely iterated absence. However, with equal clarity and vigor Derrida makes the
point....that the presumption of presence is inescapable....We cannot speak a word that delivers
the presence of the signified. But neither can we speak a word that does not claim to. The
utterance of the word defers presence; the word uttered dissembles that deferment39
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So Derrida, far from relegating meaning in texts to some warehouse of obsolete critical
interests and establishing "a new transcendental signified called the abyss",40
acknowledges the necessity of relatively determinate truths even as he relativises them.
These unstable "truths", of course, include the insights of deconstructive
criticism-in-practice wherever they appear: the simple necessity of being read and
understood (to say nothing of the desire to be employed and published) means that
deconstructive readings of texts must at some point, and in some form, adopt the
language and logic ofmetaphysics and traditional criticism, and this in turn means that
deconstruction is never a final, annihilating gesture, but a mode of interpretation whose
structures are shakeable from within - i.e. "deconstructable" - and whose logical closures
are secured not with Truth but with rhetoric:
Deconstruction is a perpetually self-deconstructing movement that is inhabited by
differance. No text is ever fully deconstructing or deconstructed. Yet the critic provisionally
musters the metaphysical resources of criticism and performs what declares itself to be one
(unitary) act of deconstruction.41
A deconstructive reading of a text, in other words, may make certain conventional claims
to finality and "correct" interpretation, but these claims are themselves textually
constituted, embodying their own indeterminacies and contradictions, and are able to be
deconstructed in their turn. Just as deconstruction operates to a significant extent from
inside metaphysics, just as the practice of deconstructive criticism borrows the "strategic
and economic resources of subversion from the old structure" of the text under scrutiny,
so every critique of logocentrism unavoidably makes its own appeals to Meaning, and
deconstruction "always in a certain way falls prey to its own work".42
Deconstruction and Theology: The relationship between deconstruction and
metaphysics, then, is not one of competitive opposition, but a relationship in which each
carries the trace of the other: metaphysical formulations embody their own deconstructive
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aporia, deconstruction relies on metaphysics to the extent that it must be "thinkable" or
able to be constructed as intelligible discourse - and it is at this point that the parallel
between the metaphysical problematic and the theological becomes perhaps most
obvious. God, as the transcendental Signified par excellence, is never fully present, and
so our determinations of what God is, whether they be grounded subjectively (in
religious experience) or objectively (in rational thought), always-already defer the
Presence they invoke; even the deepest spiritual awareness of God requires interpretation
if it is to be anything other than disordered sensation. At the same time, however, any
attempt to "deconstruct" God in a final and negating sense will always be frustrated, in
that to assert the absolute non-being of God is to invoke metaphysical Truth, and to
invoke metaphysical Truth in the name of even a non-existent God is to appeal to a
supremely high authority - as Louis Mackey puts it: "the proposition that closed down
theology would have to be a theological proposition".43 So while deconstruction gives
serious consideration to Nietzsche's claim that God is dead, it cannot fairly be said that
deconstruction "does away with" God, any more than it does away with metaphysics. A
deconstructive theology need not be atheistic or nihilistic; what it necessitates is a
particular configuration of the notions of Being and Presence, a bearing-in-mind of
certain understandings which are perhaps not as hostile, or even as alien, to theological
discourse as has been in the past suggested.
The theology which deconstruction deconstructs is that of a Platonic divinity who
exists as "a transcendent, a sovereign and an impassive God....an eternal and unmoving
Being".44 As we have seen, deconstruction holds that all such concepts are cultural
constructs, metaphors inscribed in a chain of linguistic signifiers which defer the
presence of the Signified interminably:
Derrida reminds us that if Being can be said in different senses (i.e. analogically), it is
because being is not a unified origin, a proper and univocal name, and because analogy affects
it from within. In effect, the "as-structure" is anterior to and makes possible this idealization,
the concept of Being....God did not choose to "withdraw" in order to "represent" the world, but,
rather, the anterior movement of analogy inaugurated the very universality of God as source
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concept. Like Being, God is a derived origin derived from metaphoricity 45
In the beginning, to put it another way, is interpretation; the movement of analogy
precedes its referent. Deconstructive theology asserts that there is not, never has been,
never could be a hors-texte: our experience of God is, like the rational subject which
experiences it, fragmented and contradictory, requiring interpretation; the awareness of
Divinity always needs to be "read". Our sacred texts do not yield up Presence, but
disseminate it across and through the epochs of history; readers of the bible are in
dialogue not with God but with God-as-read by the Yahwist, the prophets, Qohelet, the
Gospel writers, Paul, the Church Fathers, the Reformationists, the Counter-
reformationists, and so on. Sacred texts themselves are written and read by those whose
concern is "the explication of the significance of events and not the events themselves",46
and, as Robert Detweiler has demonstrated, the very sacredness of such texts lies partly
in their encoded or enigmatic nature, conveying "the incomprehensible otherness of the
gods"47 and requiring the hermeneutical approach. Louis Mackey has argued that even
Being-in-presence, the visible, tangible manifestation of Divine otherness which
underpins Christian theology, is a text to be read. Orthodox Christology holds that in
Christ, the gap between signifier and Signified has been bridged; the transcendental
Logos has taken on earthly form and thus effected the perfect literalisation of all our
metaphors for the Divine. Mackey drily remarks that "[wjhat Nabokov said of the word
'reality' should also be said of a word like 'Incarnation'....it should never be used
except in scare-quotes" 48 He reasons that even the Incarnation is a sign, that if we were
somehow able to transport ourselves back to first-century Palestine and witness at first
hand the birth, teachings, miracles, transfiguration, death and resurrrection of Jesus,
bypassing the theological filters of the Gospel writers, our experience would still fall
short of immediacy and certitude:
Suppose we had been there, what would we have heard? Words which, like any other
words, require interpretation, and which therefore do not by themselves deliver the intended
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meaning of their speaker. How often in the Gospels does Jesus feel that he has been
misunderstood!....Suppose we had been contemporaries of Jesus, what would we have seen?
Some very strange goings-on. Overwhelming proofs of the presence of God in this man? The
presence itself? No. Just signs and wonders: signs calling for interpretation and wonders
resisting it. If his deeds had been proofs of his divinity, the Christ could not have been
rejected, and Jesus would not have appended to a list of his miracles the admonition: "Blessed
is he that is not offended in me".49
What deconstruction necessitates, then, is a theology "without nostalgia for theological
presence"50 (and it is important here to distinguish nostalgia from desire: nostalgia, with
its connotations of yearning for the recovery of a Golden Age, implies that there was
once a time when we had what we now lack; desire, on the other hand, can be nameless,
unimagineable, and need not be rooted in any past experience, real or illusory). The
scope of this paper, however, does not allow for much more than a glance in the
direction of deconstructive theology, and accordingly it is my aim only to look as closely
at deconstructive theology as is necessary to indicate one or two of the directions in
which it might develop - and, more pertinently, to show how such a theology might
inform feminist biblical hermeneutics.
If we accept that there has always been a complicity between metaphysics and
deconstruction, then it is not impossible that movements or ideas now called
"deconstructive" can be read, at certain points, without any violent degree of
misrepresentation into the existing Western theological tradition. In a recent paper
published in Christianity and Literature, David Thomson examines the relationship
between various medieval mystical texts and deconstructive criticism; he does not go so
far as to say that the likes of Teresa of Avila, John of the Cross and Julian of Norwich
were "actually" deconstructionists avant la lettre, but he indicates nevertheless that these
and other mystics were keenly aware of the shortcomings of language in determining
Being-in-presence, and that they had a sense of the inevitability of deferral and
interpretation which informed even their most immediate experience of the Divine.
Thomson explores "this near paradox that those most involved in primary experience,
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the mystics, are the ones most likely to insist on the primacy of interpretation over
experience", and in so doing he makes the decidedly Derridean-sounding claim that
[i]t is not simply that words about God fall short of the glory of God and ought to be
jettisoned to attain real presence, but that even the real presence, what Christians might call
"very God", is itself merely another notion about God. God does not exist, for people, save as
interpretation.51
Thomson sees this idea as a kind of theme which can be identified again and again at key
points in the texts of the Christian mystics. From the writing of the twelfth-century
theologian Richard of St. Victor, for example, we are presented with the following
surprising admonition:
....if you already believe that you see Christ transfigured, you should not easily believe
whatever you see....or whatever you hear from Him - unless Moses and Elijah appear with
Him. For we know that every testimony stands firm on the word of two or three....[I do not]
accept Christ in His glorification ifMoses and Elijah do not stand beside Him.52
Here, even the direct evidence of the senses in apprehending Presence is to be rejected
unless that evidence is accompanied by the interpretative "signs" of Moses and Elijah:
Being cannot be guaranteed as such without commentary, and even before the gaze of
the devout mystic, "[ijncarnation and interpretation arise together".53 Similarly, Julian of
Norwich can be found at many points throughout the Revelations ofDivine Love to
assert that the meanings of her powerful visions are determined by what she considers to
be authoritative commentary: "I shall always believe what is held, preached and taught
by Holy Church".54 St. John of the Cross presents an even stronger apologetic for
interpretative discourse, affirming an absence-in-Presence which relativises the
significance of mystical experience and even renders such experience spiritually
dangerous to those who take its meaning as given:
They think that, because of their awareness of the genuineness and divine origin of these
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visions, it is advantageous to admit and trust them. They do not reflect that, as with worldly
goods, failure to deny them can be a hindrance, and cause attachment and possessiveness
concerning them.55
Here, the recognition of the necessity to deny or contextualise even the most convincing
determinations of Presence is made explicit: mystical experience is, like worldly wealth,
no more than a sign of Divine grace, and we must be at least prepared or willing to
account it as nothing, as a trace, the repository of absence that signifies Presence without
delivering it. Thomson's paper is exploratory and falls short of comprehensive analysis,
and he does not claim that the texts of the medieval Christian mystics cited are in fact
congruent at all points with deconstruction. He does, however, demonstrate (at least to a
degree of satisfaction which invites further study) that the theology of the mystics points
the believer in much the same direction as might a deconstructive theology: towards a
faith predicated upon (indeed, necessitated by) a displaced, deferred God; a God who is
not "nonexistent" but absent, the desire for whom generates discourse, interpretation, the
play of signs. Logocentrism, the "tradition which esteems the self-presence of meaning
in specific units of signification",56 is what both Derrida (explicitly and exhaustively) and
the Christian mystics (more suggestively) warn us against: it is the temptation to locate
meaning in the signifiers we use to construct it,
....the tendency, endemic to religion, to mistake words for presence. And "words are
presence" only in the essentially contradictory sense that words are the only presence there is.
All is conceived in interpretation, even the Christ of Christocentrism. God is found by faith,57
and faith is groping in near-darkness, following and interpreting the tracks and traces of
God which both point to and endlessly defer the object of the search.
A more "politicised" reading of deconstruction into theology is that outlined by James
Evans in "Deconstructing the Tradition: Narrative Strategies in Nascent Black
Theology". Evans' thesis is that the early texts of black theology "called into question the
intellectual hegemony of the white, male, Western theological tradition"58 in a way which
132
was both iconoclastic (questioning and rejecting the racial/cultural assumptions
underlying the dominant theological tradition) and affirmative (forging a new theology
and a corresponding biblical-hermeneutical matrix based on the shared experience of
oppression), and which thus employed to great effect the twin deconstructive gestures of
"destruction and construction, mantling and dismantling."59 Evans' analysis has
considerable relevance to the projects of feminist theology and feminist biblical
hermeneutics, as it underlies the importance of experience in articulating a theology of
the marginalised - experience not as an interpretative be-all and end-all, but as an
indispensable means both of validating one's own hermeneutical stance and of
demythologising fixed, prevailing ideologies. Evans argues that the experience of what it
was to be black and oppressed provided a grounding "subtext....an expressive and
interpretative framework"60 for subsequent theological/hermeneutical activity and
discourse, while the same awareness of subjectivity or political interest in all texts
provided a lever with which to deconstruct the "Divine" authority of dominant white
religion:
....the [prevailing] theological tradition was de-mystified by showing that black people are
not "a people without a text", the Bible is not "a text without an author", and that European-
American theology is not "a text without a point of view".61
Evans sees this demystification as an essentially deconstructive strategy, an example of
how deconstruction's all-textualising tendencies can have positive as well as negative
potential: while the so-called objective authority of biblical and theological texts is
undermined by showing that all writing is politically interested, subjective experience can
be seen as a legitimate "text" demanding critical attention and commentary:
In a society where black people are considered to be "unproductive", i.e., unemployed or on
welfare, black theology is built on the assumption that black people are the producers and the
agents in their own histories. "Black power" was the name given to the self-validating force in
black experience which undergirds that assumption.62
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The parallel here between the "self-validating force" of black experience and that of
women under patriarchy is clear. The roles, work and even the presence of women in
patriarchal religious texts and teaching have long been devalued and sidelined; to read
that experience of oppression now as itself a text, both as subversive commentary on
patriarchal discourse and as primary narrative to be read and interpreted, is to adopt a
hermeneutical approach which is usefully deconstructive not just in (feminist) theory, but
also in that it is rooted in the particularities of women's lives. Experience is not thereby
raised to the status of fundamental principle, but it is nevertheless justified provisionally
as a necessary a priori from which to proceed. The danger of absolutising the validity of
experience is indicated by Evans to have been realised at an early stage in the
development of black theology:
The question "Why a black theology?" is answered with the assertion that there is an
infinite qualitative distinction between black and white theology. Initially, this aspect of black
theology was criticized because it appeared to claim a kind of infallible privilege for black
people, but it should be noted that this position was a necessary starting point for black
theology because of the devaluation of black life and culture, and not the conclusion of the
black theological task.63
The same attendant danger lurks on the margins of feminist theology: in both cases, a
deconstructive awareness of the fragmented, textual nature of subjectivity and experience
guards against the starting-point of the discourse in question becoming mistaken for its
inviolate essence. Derrida's remarks, outlined above, on the necessity of a stable
discursive "centre" which is nevertheless subject to the rule of diffirance are pertinent
here - the need to establish relatively determinate principles of thought and experience
does not accord "infallible privilege" to those principles; but, just as importantly for
black and feminist discourses, the reverse also holds true:
To deny the absoluteness of any given "center" is not to deny the possibility that it can
function as a center.64
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A deconstructive theology or biblical hermeneutics can thus accommodate the kind of
creative self-definition and redefinition that allows for changes in what it means to be
black or to be a woman in a changing society. In operating as a dynamic or gesture rather
than as an explicitly partisan hermeneutics, deconstruction follows (or anticipates) the
logic of "identity politics" which, as we have seen, is itself a kind of deconstruction of
the opposition between essentialism and relativism, and which thus provides a stable yet
flexible set of criteria for an identifiably black or feminist (or homosexual, or working
class, or Latin American) theology or hermeneutics.65 The texts in which such a theology
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or hermeneutics might find itself formulated should be creative and fluid rather than
systematic or rigorously objective. In defining itself partly against an oppressive
tradition, any theology of liberation should feel itself free of much of the weight of
conformity to traditional modes of discourse, and in feminist terms this should mean that
patriarchal dogma gives way to experimentation; abstract, analytical scrutiny to a more
experience-based approach to truth. In the context of early black theology, Evans writes
that
....the black theologian is a type of "bricoleur", an ingenious folk artist, whose work does
not fit the mold of classical theological discourse because it is drawn from the cultural well-
spring of African-American experience. This is a kind of creativity founded on the "stuff of
black life, its joy and pain, its victories and disappointments.66
Nascent African-American theology is thus understood as having been an open-ended
discourse within which all who participated in "the stuff of black life" could be heard,
and the black theologian as one who pieced together various aspects of that experience
into a model of God which would be intelligible and relevant to all participants in the
culture. The credentials of the theologian-as-folk-artist were not established by
education, gender or any criterion other than that he or she wished to give some form or
utterance to the experience of God in his or her particular cultural context. This portrayal
135
is perhaps a historically generous one, sketching as it does a profoundly egalitarian
community based on mutual respect and concern, and it does not take into account the
reality of exploitation, oppression and power imbalances within black culture. But what
Evans wishes to demonstrate is simply that there is much creative power and potential to
be found in writing from perceived religious experience rather than from received
theological tradition; more importantly, it is the only way forward for those whose
received tradition is one of bondage and humiliation. Once again, the parallel between
African-American theology and feminist theology does not need to be spelled out in
detail: nascent black theology, like emergent feminist theologies in patriarchal contexts,
provides a positive example of strategies which are integral to deconstructive criticism -
strategies of questioning dominant ideologies, and of textualising both ideology and
experience; ways of formulating discourse which is not purely subversive of the old
structure, but which also affirms the possibility of innovation and positive alternatives.
Midrash: a Deconstructive Hermeneutics? If deconstruction, in questioning
determinations of being and presence, has direct relevance to theology, then the equal
emphasis it places on such concepts as "writing" and "text" make it equally relevant to
biblical hermeneutics, if not more so. While it may be reductive to pigeonhole
deconstruction as a subgenre within literary criticism, it remains true all the same that
deconstruction is most often discussed in literary-theoretical circles, and that a large
proportion both of Derrida's published writing and of other deconstructive texts consists
of critical readings of literary and philosophical works. It is difficult, therefore, not to
harbour a certain tendency to see deconstruction, in religious terms, as a practice which
has more natural and immediate bearing upon exegesis than it does upon theology -
although once again, to present these as separate or opposed fields masks the fact that
exegesis is never devoid of some kind of theology, and that theology in turn is a form of
"reading" or interpretation. One arguable point of contact between the two is that as with
theology, so with biblical hermeneutics there exist significant strands within the existing
tradition which can be shown to have suggestive parallels with key deconstructive
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strategies, and which indicate therefore that deconstruction is not so much a new and
disruptive development in religious discourse as a radical reformulation of certain
historically-identifiable principles or approaches to understanding. The area of biblical
interpretation with which the closest ties to poststructuralist literary theory have been
established, and thus the tradition I wish to examine here, is that which arose in codified
or "official" form out of post-70 C.E. Judaism: the tradition of Rabbinic midrash.
In midrash, we have one form of biblical commentary whose close relationship with
modern criticism has been both asserted and refuted with equal degrees of enthusiasm.
The arguments are complex on both sides, and accordingly on both sides a good deal of
creative scholarship and imagination has been evident; indeed, the controversy over
Rabbinic and poststructuralist hermeneutics is to be welcomed if for no other reason than
that it focuses attention precisely on such issues as creativity and imagination in
exegesis. The main points of the debate can be summarised as follows: on one hand,
there is a growing body of opinion which holds that Rabbinic midrash in many ways
anticipated the insights of poststructuralist criticism, or that "what modern literary
theorists are now discovering about textual exegesis was already practiced by the rabbis
close to two millenia ago".67 This is essentially the argument put forward by Susan
Handelman in The Slayers of Moses (1982), a study which provides an ambitious
step-by-step guide to exactly how and why the Rabbis were the hermeneutical forebears
of such modern literary theorists as Derrida and Harold Bloom. Handelman begins by
positing a radical division between Hebrew thought and Greek philosophy, and goes on
to argue that from each of these matrices has evolved a distinct and particular kind of
hermeneutics. The philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, with its suspicion of language as
opposed to Form or Idea, is a philosophy of transcendence, designed
to make the word suspect and to steer the seeker of truth away from language towards a
silent ontology, or towards a purely rational system of signs, an artificially constructed ideal
language such as mathematics.68
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This, according to Handelman, has given rise to an essentially metaphysical
hermeneutics, a mode of interpretation which rests on the belief that "the central act of
knowing is a movement beyond discourse",69 a movement beyond signs and in the
direction of an unambiguous Reality behind them. This hermeneutics finds religious
expression primarily in Christianity, a faith whose sacred text, the New Testament, is
both regularly punctuated with Hellenistic exhortations to distinguish between letter and
spirit, and is itself enshrined as the one true and authoritative commentary on the Hebrew
Bible - the final "reality" or fulfilment of the Old Testament's signs and prophecies. The
miracle of Christ himself is that he embodies both sign and Spirit, signifier (in human
form, the image of God) and transcendental Signified (God-in-Presence), a Platonic
miracle if ever there was one:
Behind the aspiration to the invisible, nonsensible world was the Greek desire to see, a
concept of thought in terms of the image (idea, from the Greek eidos, image)....Hence, when
the Christian deity was born in the cradle of the pagan world, he was, inevitably, a physical
image of God, a mediator, and a substitution. He mediated the gap between sensible and
nonsensible, thought and thing, by becoming both at once....the metaphysical transfer, which
depended on the recognition of the tension between categories, the recognition that the
metaphorical simultaneously "was" and "was not" what it "stood for", became itself literalized.
As the first chapter of the Gospel of John puts it, "The Word became flesh and dwelt among
us".70
Hebrew thought, however, is said by Handelman to operate according to an entirely
different logic. In contrast to the oppositional binary logic of language and idea, signifier
and signified (a tension which Christianity attempts to resolve in the doctrine of the
Incarnation), Hebrew implicitly postulates an "original unity of word and thing, speech
and thought, discourse and truth",71 a unity expressed in dabhar. Where the Greek word
for "word", onoma, also means "name" and thus resonates with the metaphysical notion
that words are "names" for immutable Forms, the Hebrew dabhar means not only
"word" but also "thing", "matter" and "affair"72 (in addition to a host of related concepts
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such as advice, promise and decree73). Meaning, or reality, then, in the Hebrew tradition
is very much coincident with the language in which it is thought, expressed,
communicated and disputed: discourse and interpretation are not simply ways of
accessing truth; to put it perhaps over-simply, they are the truth. This is the kind of
epistemology which Handelman sees as having been inherited by the Rabbis and
developed in Rabbinic midrash; an approach to knowledge which seeks always to
generate interpretation rather than to transcend it or close it off - "[f]or the Greeks,
following Aristotle, things are not exhausted by discourse; for the Rabbis, discourse is
not exhausted by things".74 Where Christianity has long celebrated the final and
substantial manifestation of the Word, subordinating discourse to one "decisive act of
presence",75 Rabbinic Judaism is said to have celebrated dabhar itself, and to have
developed a hermeneutics conspicuous for its lack of any commitment to transcending
the linguistic order:
For the Rabbis....the primary reality was linguistic; true being was a God who speaks and
creates texts, and imitatio deus [sic] was not silent suffering, but speaking and interpreting
....the infinity of meaning and plurality of interpretation [were] as much the cardinal virtues,
even divine imperatives, for Rabbinic thought as they [were] the cardinal sins for Greek
thought. The movement of Rabbinic interpretation [was] not from one opposing sphere to
another, from the sensible to the nonsensible, but rather "from sense to sense", a movement
into the text, not out of it76
Rabbinic hermeneutics, therefore, is an interpretative mode which pulls many and varied
meanings out of the biblical text: the Torah, as the Word of God, is perfect and all
creation is contained therein, yet at the same time it is "perpetually incomplete",77 full of
gaps and lacunae which require elucidation. But it is not only the gaps which call for
interpretation: the very sacredness of Torah, its status as not just the product but the
manifestation of a Divine intelligence, means that no aspect of it can be accidental or
contingent; meanings are thus to be found in individual words, in the numerical values of
their letters, in the crowns at the tips of the letters, in repetitions, omissions, even in
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aberrations of spelling and orthography. Nothing is irrelevant to the Rabbis'
hermeneutical program, nothing lies outside the concerns of reading and interpretation;
there is nothing, to use a now-familiar phrase, outside the text.78 This means, ultimately,
that commentary itself comes to receive the same authoritative sanction as primary text
According to Rabbinic tradition, not only the written but also the oral Torah was given
by God to Israel; the principles for interpreting the Word and applying interpretation to
everyday life were as essential to the Rabbis as was the Word itself, and so the tradition
of interpretation of the Law was declared as holy as the Law itself: "all that a faithful
disciple will expound in the future in front of his master was already disclosed to Moses
at Sinai".79 Commentary thus becomes retrospectively validated by the highest possible
authority: that of direct revelation from God to Moses. This results, of course, in a
certain blurring of any qualitative distinctions between text and commentary, between
written and oral Torah. From the Rabbinic perspective, scripture exists less as a static,
time-bound document than as a process, a ceaseless and sometimes cataclysmic
unfurling ofmeanings,
applicable not only to Biblical time and place, but to all time and place. Through proper
interpretation, then, the application and meaning appropriate for any contingency is revealed.
Thus interpretation is not essentially separate from the text itself - an external act intruded
upon it - but rather the extension of the text, the uncovering of the connective network of
relations, a part of the continuous revelation of the text itself: at bottom, another aspect of the
text80
The broad parallels between Handelman's view of Rabbinic hermeneutics and
contemporary literary criticism may by now be apparent, and indeed Handelman's
program as a whole is to make those parallels explicit and consistent. From a detailed
account of Rabbinic thought and interpretative methodology, she proceeds to draw up a
map ofmodem literary theory whose main thoroughfare leads directly from the Rabbis,
through Freud and Lacan, and on to Derrida and Harold Bloom: her thesis is that these
latter theorists (all, with the exception of Lacan, Jewish) have inherited from the Rabbis
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and continued to develop a "complicated interweaving of tradition, revision, and
heresy"81 in their approach to texts. Freud, in his psychoanalytic science and his
interpretation of dreams, is presented as a kind of post-Enlightenment Talmudist, reading
the unconscious not in search of Platonic truth/falsity, but with a view to uncovering
more and deeper meanings.82 Every apparently arbitrary detail of the unconscious,
whether manifest in dreams, behavioural oddities, neuroses, slips of the tongue and so
on, condenses a "wilderness" of significance, a polysemous wilderness in which Freud,
like the Rabbis before him, is said to have wandered; and this wandering is presented as
a kind of exile from the realm of rational, empiricist (read: Hellenistic) science. To the
Freudian mind,
[i]nterpretation is not, in the Aristotelian sense, the distinguishing of truth from falsehood,
but the relationship of hidden to shown: not appearance to reality, but manifest to latent
....Everything that logical consciousness rejects as nonsensical, useless, disconnected,
contradictory and impossible has, in fact, a meaning; and to say that dreams indeed have a
meaning, Freud recognized, put him in opposition to every ruling theory....Freud was the
"exegete who rediscovers the logic of the illogical kingdom".83
Jacques Lacan, the intellectual who in the 1950's and 60's reread psychoanalysis in
terms of poetics and linguistics, and announced that "the unconscious is structured like a
language", is said by Handelman to have played Joshua to Freud's Moses. It was Lacan
who first perceived the connection between Freud and Rabbinic thought, and he saw the
Jews overall as
the interpretative people par excellence, developing their hermeneutic skills particularly in
the crush of exile: "....ever since the return from Babylon, the Jew is he who knows how to
read. This means he withdraws from his literal utterance so as to find an interval which then
allows for the game of interpretation".84
Freud and Lacan are, in turn, shown by Handelman to have been read and appropriated
by Derrida, "another in the line of Jewish prodigal sons",85 whose deconstructive
141
strategies involve
an interpretative process in which attention is paid to the minute details of a text, to
syntax, to the shapes of words - the dream's treatment of words as things. This is in effect a
species of midrashic play.86
Handelman sees deconstruction-as-midrash as searching for meaning in much the same
way as the Rabbis sought after God in Torah: the Signified is absent, deferred,
perceivable only through the process of interpretation which yields up not Presence but
further interpretation, the play of signs. As the prodigal son, Derrida is "unrepentant,
enjoying his escapade",87 affirming interpretation, a life of exile in the abyss of
textuality, not as the curse or predicament portrayed in the Christian doctrine of a "fallen"
world, but as the power and privilege of human existence:
Let the commentary, then, says Derrida, the writing developed in the endless delay of exile,
be all, and be playful. Let exile subvert being and logos entirely.88
Finally, Handelman turns her attention to Harold Bloom, a literary critic whose concept
of hermeneutics as a kind of Oedipal power struggle relates back to the Rabbis insofar as
Rabbinic interpretation, with its claim to the status of Torah itself, operates under
Bloom's "anxiety of influence", the desire of the critic for mastery over the primary text,
the will to wrest canonical privilege from the author under discussion. Also examined is
Bloom's interest in kabbalah, his notion that kabbalah is a kind of deconstruction of
representational concepts ofGod, a "radical definition of God's absence and withdrawal
as his presence".89 In summary, Handelman reiterates that Bloom, Derrida, Freud and
related theorists have all, in various ways, continued in the tradition of the "heretic
hermeneutic" codified by the Rabbis in midrash. The tradition is manifestly Jewish rather
than Christian, in much the same way as it is Hebraic rather than Hellenistic: exile, in
many ways the definitive experience of the people of Israel,
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is resolved by making "exile" the precise metaphor for the act of creation and
interpretation. This is a resolution in the Jewish mode, not as fulfilment of signs in the
incarnate word, but as the raising of the Jewish historical condition into a paradigm of
existence: to be is to be in exile; to create is to endure catastrophe; to make texts is already to
interpret; absence is presence.90
Needless to say, the idea of Rabbinic hermeneutics as the precursory model for
contemporary literary theory has not gone uncontested. To begin with, the underlying
notion that there exists a fundamental antipathy between Hebrew/Rabbinic and
Greek/Platonic systems of thought has been challenged by such scholars as David Daube
and (more recently) Philip Alexander. Daube asserts explicitly that "Rabbinic methods of
interpretation derive from Hellenistic rhetoric",91 arguing that Hillel, the "great Pharisee"
whose middot, or rules for interpretation of scripture, provided the technical framework
for all subsequent halakhah, developed his hermeneutical laws from existing
Graeco-Roman systems of rhetoric and jurisprudence. A "common Hellenistic
background",92 an irresistably Greek culture in which Hillel and Cicero were
contemporaries, is put forward as having made it inevitable that the Rabbis would
borrow heavily from Greek philosophical thought. Daube sees Rabbinic interpretation as
part of
a science the beginnings of which may be traced back to Plato, Aristotle and their
contemporaries. It recurs in Cicero, Hillel and Philo - with enormous differences in detail, yet
au fond the same. Cicero did not sit at the feet of Hillel, nor Hillel at the feet of Cicero....[but
philosophical instruction was very similar in outline whether given at Rome, Jerusalem or
Alexandria.93
Philip Alexander shares Daube's extreme scepticism regarding the validity of
categorising Rabbinic interpretation as a peculiarly Hebraic hermeneutics. Like Daube,
Alexander is unqualified in his insistence that "the hermeneutics of the Rabbis can be
paralleled in all essentials from the hermeneutics of the Graeco-Roman world", and that
having arisen from a strongly Hellenistic and Hellenising society, "Rabbinic
hermeneutics is thoroughly of its time and place".94 He goes on to argue that the
"fundamental and all pervasive form of midrash"95 - lemma, or quote from the primary
text, followed by commentary - corresponds to the characteristic structure of Greek
hypomnemata or commentaries on Homer, and that in both cases, a key function of
interpretation was to preserve the original text from corruption. Like the Rabbis, the
Greek commentators on Homer held an overriding "respect for the received text", and
tended "to leave the standard text intact, and to confine their suggested improvements to
the accompanying notes".96 Alexander also presents the gradual institutionahsation of the
Rabbinate within Jewish society as having been directly influenced by the
institutionalisation of the Roman legal system: issues of influence and authority were
markedly similar in both contexts, and the structure of the Rabbinic legal system is said
to have corresponded at significant points to that of the Imperial jurists.97 The style of
Rabbinic legal interpretation is similarly put forward as showing traces of
Graeco-Roman influence; overall, Alexander says, "Rabbinic halakhah [was] thoroughly
at home in the legal world of late antiquity".98
Thus is the tradition of the "heretic hermeneutic" rerouted from the start: the challenge
which deconstruction presents to logocentrism, which poststructuralist criticism in
general presents to stability and univocity of meaning, is argued as having its genesis
elsewhere than in some putative antithesis between Rabbinic thought and Graeco-Roman
philosophy. The connection between Rabbinic hermeneutics and modem literary theory
has been questioned on other grounds: David Stem, in his review of The Slayers of
Moses, takes issue with several aspects of Handelman's analysis, questioning the
intrinsic and inescapable "Jewishness" of the work of Freud, Lacan and Derrida,99 and
suggesting that Handelman, in projecting the concerns of latter-day critical theorists back
onto the Rabbis (e.g. where the Rabbis are said to harbour Oedipal resentment against
the authority of Torah), is guilty of forcing one or two "general correspondences" into
the mould of systematic point-for-point parallels. Stem wonders whether, in the final
analysis, Rabbinic hermeneutics can be said to bear more than a kind of coincidental
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generic resemblance to contemporary critical theory:
....the question remains whether these [general correspondences] reflect the revival of
rabbinic hermeneutics in contemporary criticism, or whether they are simply functions of the
fact that both midrash and criticism are species of commentary.100
Elsewhere, Stern addresses the issue of indeterminacy, and argues that the interpretative
"play" of such flamboyant bricoleurs as Lacan and Derrida has no necessary relation to
the polysemous exegesis of the Rabbis. While indeterminacy, Stem reasons, "may still
remain a significant category for understanding our own reading of midrashic
discourse",101 it is nevertheless a concept which was fundamentally alien to the
midrashists' interpretative concerns. Stem sees indeterminacy of meaning in modem
literary theory as a notion which stems from the sound poststructuralist premise that
there is no stable or "correct" perspective from which to interpret language, experience or
history; no objective hermeneutical methodology guaranteeing reading rinsed clean of
ideology; no possibility of a transparent or universally understandable language.102
Midrash, on the other hand, according to Stem is "predicated precisely on the existence
of such a perspective",103 i.e. a perspective from which all meanings coalesce into One.
This is, of course, the Divine perspective:
In contemporary criticism, textual meaning is often described spatially in terms of its
position either "behind" the text (the traditional logocentric view) or "in front" of it (from the
perspective of deconstruction). In the case of Rabbinic Judaism, the divine guarantee of
meaning in Scripture might be described more accurately as coming from above, not in the
sense of divine effluence or emanation, but literally from on high, from the top of Mount
Sinai, from which, the Rabbis claimed, God gave to Moses not only Scripture....but also an
"oral Torah", passed on by mouth from generation to generation.104
This "divine guarantee of meaning" effectively authorises the hermeneutical freedom of
midrash by second-guessing it, and thus provides a preordained limit to the excesses of
interpretation, no matter how apparently unrestrained they may become. To reverse
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Rabbi Akiva's famous dictum,105 "all is open, and yet all is determined", and the
paradox of building a fence around the Torah lies in the fact that this operation is
designed both to multiply meanings and to forestall (unauthorised) indeterminacy.
The discussion over Rabbinic hermeneutics and modern literary theory deals with
areas of intersection between two enormously complex fields, and requires much fuller
treatment than the foregoing broad analysis has allowed: I hope no more than to have
outlined some of the important issues arising on both sides of a tangled and often
rancorous debate.106 We can, at the very least, now see that to present the Rabbis as
nascent poststructuralists, or poststructuralist critics as modern-day Rabbis, is a
decidedly problematic undertaking, and Stern's observation in particular should be kept
in mind that "specialists in midrash too often find literary theorizing about midrash - even
when most insightful - not adequately supported by the requisite familiarity with the
material under discussion, that is, more wishful that knowledgeable".107 At the same
time, however, I believe that useful parallels can be established between midrash and
modern literary theory (in particular deconstruction), parallels whose significance
depends to a great extent upon the conclusions drawn from them. The critical success or
failure of such an ambitious project as Susan Handelman's is a function of how skilfully
and persuasively she can take certain similarities between two distantly-related
hermeneutical fields, and build up those similarities into a detailed hermeneutical
pedigree. To question or deny the success of her enterprise is not necessarily to deny that
these suggestive similarities exist, or that they might yet prove in some other way
enlightening.
David Stem complains that literary theorists who enthusiastically embrace midrash as
the harbinger of poststructuralist criticism tend to base their arguments on insufficient
knowledge of Rabbinic literature. I believe this is a fair objection: if "midrash" is to be
understood broadly as codified Rabbinic commentary on important religious and legal
texts, then it covers a huge corpus of lengthy volumes, and to draw hard and fast
conclusions concerning midrash's overall aims and purposes requires some close
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acquaintance with the history and texts of the Talmuds, the Targums and a proliferation
of halakhic and haggadic commentaries on individual biblical texts - a body of literature
so vast, spanning such long periods of time and shaped by such varied historical/cultural
circumstances that it becomes risky, to say the least, to generalise too confidently about
what "the Rabbis" thought (Susan Handelman's argument, for example, that midrash
affirms the essential inseparability of text and commentary leads her to place allegory -
the idea of a single "higher" meaning within the shell of a literal narrative - in the
Hellenistic/Christian interpretative tradition.108 This, however, is an overly-polarised
view which implicitly - and wrongly - denies the significance of such midrashim as the
Song of Songs Rabbah, which indulges freely in allegorical interpretation at points
where the literal sense of the biblical text appears to offend religious or moral
sensibilities109). But by the same token - and this is a point seldom raised - it should be
considered whether or not Handelman, Stern and other participants in the debate have
arrived at a sufficiently nuanced understanding of modern literary theory. Like
"midrash", "modern literary theory" is a rubric which implies a greater degree of
homogeneity than in fact exists, and yet the generalisation goes largely uncontested, as if
the likes of Derrida, Kristeva, Bloom, Roland Barthes, Geoffrey Hartman and Mieke
Bal (all "modern" literary theorists and, historically speaking, poststructuralists) were
not as divided by difference as they are linked by similarity. Even at the piecemeal level,
misapprehension abounds. Stern's comment, quoted above, on the "spatial" location of
meaning in modern criticism, is a case in point. He presents the idea of meaning
"behind" the text as "the traditional logocentric view", and opposes it to "the perspective
of deconstruction", from which we are told meaning exists "in front" of the text - i.e.
where the reader sits. But this behind/in front dualism, baldly opposing deconstruction
to logocentrism is, we have seen, simplistic; it fails to take into account the important and
inevitable degree of complicity between deconstruction and what it deconstructs.
Handelman is similarly reductive:
As psychoanalysis was a species of parricide and giving of a new law, so Derridean
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deconstructionism will murder the father-founders of philosophy and disseminate a new writing
....Derrida's specific form of Jewish heresy is not metonymy become metaphor but metonymy
run amuck, metonymy declaring itself to be independent of all foundations and yet claiming to
be the origin and law of everything.110
Again, we have seen that "Derridean deconstructionism" in fact explicitly disclaims the
"death" of philosophy and declares itself not as "the origin and law of everything" but as
the hermeneutical Other to logocentrism which, like any other Other, is in part defined by
its binary opposite, and which thus must question the primacy of all origins including its
own.
It is when we consider deconstruction as consisting of interpretative gestures,
movements or strategies - rather than as one systematic methodological programme with
its central thesis and its stable philosophical principles - that we can best begin to assess
its relationship to such forms of hermeneutics as midrash. It should perhaps be restated
at this point that my aim in investigating this relationship is not to show that midrash
somehow "is" deconstruction (or vice versa), but to identify some hermeneutical
characteristics of midrash which parallel certain deconstructive movements and provide
examples of how these movements in exegesis need not preclude religious commitment
or faith on the part of the interpreter. One commonly-encountered objection to
deconstruction in biblical interpretation is that it is too cynical and derisory a
hermeneutics for the faithful to bring to bear on a sacred text; particularly in its
commitment to "play", deconstruction amounts to a hermeneutics ofmockery, of having
"the last laugh" on the text. Michael Edwards recently lamented the paucity of biblical
criticism "written in love and humility, severe and disciplined, unconcerned for self and
devoted to understanding",111 and suggested that if the bible itself is not enough for the
community of faith, if we do in fact need secondary literature in addition to scripture,
then the practice of writing and reading should be kept "thoroughly serious".112 If this is
to be taken to mean that homo religiosus and homo ludens cannot be one and the same
species, and that a hermeneutics predicated upon interpretative "play" has no place in
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exegetical discourse, then it finds a sympathetic echo in this more pointed denunciation:
A poem or prose narrative belongs first to its creator, and so it remains. Accordingly,
deconstructionist "play" is incredibly presumptuous. If written criticism, belonging of course
to its author, proposes to illumine another's work, how can it do so while denying the
personal origin/authorship of the text under consideration? If ignoring the authority of source
is legitimate, no deconstructionist has an ontological basis for defending her own critique.113
There are a number of fundamental misunderstandings here which lie outside our
immediate area of concern: it could be said in passing that a critic who conceives of
deconstructive reading as "ignoring the authority of source", or who holds that
deconstructive criticism seeks legitimation on "ontological" grounds, is a reader whose
encounters with deconstruction have been brief and unfortunate. The notions of "play"
and "seriousness" at work here, however, are worth a closer look. Michael Edwards'
concept of serious exegesis is linked to a pessimistic view of interpretation in general: we
should interpret, he argues, in the realisation that hermeneutics is the grim necessity of a
fallen existence. Exegesis should be a serious undertaking because it confirms the
Adamic curse of exile from the presence of God: "theology and criticism, for the same
reason, are a necessary evil; they belong to our vanity".114 Deconstruction, on the other
hand, operates according to a view of interpretation as jouissance, as pleasure in the
endless flux of textuality. The deferral of meaning, the movement from sense to sense is
to be understood not as the result of an expulsion from Eden, but - quite the opposite - as
liberation, "a way out of the closure of knowledge".115
There seems to have been a similar view of interpretation at work in midrash. The
ceaseless activity of reading, the wandering in the wilderness of interpretation, was not,
in Rabbinic Judaism, the unhappy consequence of primal disobedience116 but a means of
continuous revelation which had its genesis at Sinai. In the aftermath of the destruction
of the second Temple and the subsequent scattering of Palestinian Jewry, the Torah
became the centre of Jewish religious life, and as such it was called upon to answer the
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needs of small communities in various cultural contexts. Interpretation became an
intensely practical concern, dominated not by abstract theorising about Meaning but by
immediate questions of behaviour and social practice. It is hardly surprising, then, that
the compilations of biblical commentary which make up "oral Torah" are notable for their
diversity: the pages of the Talmuds consist of biblical text surrounded by a confusing
juxtapposition of interpretative voices from various places and times, in what amounts to
a discussion between Rabbis from different points in history, and the student of Talmud
is expected to survey the various interpretations and draw his or her own conclusions.
Similarly, in other midrashim such as the Rabbinic commentary on Genesis, what the
reader finds is not doctrinal closure, not the meaning of scripture, but a seemingly
endless series of interpretations which sit side by side in often contradictory attitudes,
carried forward at various points by the formulaic introduction dabhar 'acher, "another
interpretation".
This is exegetical play at work, "play" in several senses of the word. There is play in
midrash in a kind of mechanical sense; meanings are not fixed or static, but are allowed a
certain looseness, the licence to range over various texts and issues in a manner which
redefines the rules of interpretative logic. In expounding Genesis 2:16, for example,
where God commands ha-'adam to keep away from the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil, R. Levi draws six commandments out of the one prohibition under scrutiny,
each commandment being triggered by verbal association with other scriptural verses.117
The meaning of the Edenic prohibition is thus not concretised but made diffuse, existing
in the various relationships which R. Levi establishes between the lemma and other
pieces of scripture. Furthermore, these relationships are established not through rational
argument or dialectical reasoning, but by means of a kind of word-game: Gen. 2:16 is
linked to Exod. 22:27 by the presence of the word 'elohim in both verses, the word
le'mor connects Gen. 2:16 with Jer. 3:1, and so on. Calling such patterning "playful"
does not deny the seriousness of the Rabbis' hermeneutical task, nor does it call into
question their respect for the biblical text, but it does serve to indicate that their style of
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interpretation operates according to an approach which traditional logocentric exegesis
has relegated to the margins of "serious" criticism.
At one significant point in midrash, the notion of play is quite literal. The Rabbinic
commentary on the first words in the Torah, bere'shit bara' 'elohim ("in the beginning
[when] God created...." Gen. 1:1), links this phrase to a passage in Proverbs where
another genesis is related. In Proverbs 8:22, chokhmah, the personification of Wisdom,
speaks of having been created at the beginning of all things (YHWH qanani re'shit
dareko, "the LORD created me as the outset of his work"), and so the Rabbis quote
chokhmah here in Bere'shit Rabbah as having been present with God at the creation of
the world.118 And at this unutterably solemn moment, chokhmah, according to Rabbinic
exegesis, plays. The intersecting verse in Bere'shit Rabbah is Prov. 8:30:
And I was beside him, a little child
And I was [his] delight, playing before him always.
The Hebrewmesacheqet, (playing/rejoicing) is from sachaq, to laugh, rejoice, exult; and
this is what the midrash presents hypostatised Wisdom as having done at the moment of
creation. Midrash thus, in this instance, "not only plays with words; it points to the idea
of such play at the beginning of the discussion".119
It can be seen, then, that midrash, being part of a tradition which esteems the activity
of interpretation as a Divine sanction (as opposed to one which conceives of it as exile
from Presence, the result of a curse) provides many examples of how exegetical "play"
need not signal a departure from rigorous reading or from "serious" or devotional respect
for the text. For the Rabbis, Torah was so holy it defiled the hands, and yet this holiness
stemmed not from the fact that it enshrined one unitary meaning or system of
signification, but from the infinity of ways in which it spoke to its readers. But can we
today call the Rabbis' exegetical "play" deconstructive? On one hand, the freedom with
which midrash takes its interpretative cues from puns, word-associations and apparent
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intertextual coincidences looks very much like the hermeneutical licence which
characterises deconstructive criticism. Like deconstruction, midrash is also constrained
by the text it interprets; it works from within scripture120 and thus cannot say simply
whatever it likes:
Noah in his ark, Joseph in the pit, Ezekiel lying on his side for three hundred and ninety
days, Jeremiah in prison, Jonah in the belly of the fish - all these are images of hermeneutic
constraint...what we have...in midrash is the recognition of unlimited possibilities but also of
the unlimited authority inhering in a prime text121
On the other hand, however, midrash is fundamentally committed to the concept of a
transcendental Signified, of God the divine Guarantor of meaning, and so in this respect
it is perhaps not as deconstructive as it appears. When Moses, according to Rabbinic
legend, ascended into heaven and found God tying crowns to the letters of scripture for
Rabbi Akiva later to untie,122 he witnessed a securing of control over meaning which
implied that the Author (blessed be He) fully anticipated every one of His readers - not
by any stretch of the imagination a Derridean vision of the Almighty. But the way in
which the story continues is revealing. Moses is transported forward in time to R.
Akiva's academy, where he is dismayed to find he cannot understand a word of what
Akiva is teaching to his students. And yet one of the students, upon asking the Rabbi to
explain a particular teaching, receives the reply: "it is a halakhah ofMoses from Sinai".
Moses, in other words, finds his own halakhah incomprehensible when expounded in an
unfamiliar historical context; this is because the practical meaning of the halakhah is
determined by that context and not by any timeless kernel of significance.
What we seem to have in Rabbinic Judaism is a God who, as we have just seen,
instigates and anticipates interpretation, but who is at the same time subject to his own
hermeneutical laws. This kind of interpretative circle or paradox appears in the midrash
on Genesis 1, where the phrase "in the beginning [when] God created" is expounded.
The first verse of the Torah, relating the beginning of creation in the past tense, could be
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said logically to have been written some time after the event; it is a commentary on the
Divine fiat. But in the midrash we find that commentary also somehow precedes and
determines the event: "the Holy One, blessed be He, consulted the Torah when He
created the world".123 So too, in another well-known Rabbinic legend, it is Torah rather
than God who can never be caught napping. Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages are disputing
the ritual cleanness of an oven:124 R. Eliezer, in support of his argument, invokes a host
of signs and wonders - a tree uproots itself, a stream flows backwards, a building leans
sideways - all to defend his assertion that the oven in question is clean. The Sages
stubbornly reject these phenomenal displays of proof and insist that the oven is unclean.
Finally, a heavenly voice intercedes in R. Eliezer's defence, but even this is rejected as
evidence by the Sages on the strength of their reading ofDeut. 30:12: "it [i.e. the Torah]
is not in heaven" - that is to say, the Law has already been given once and for all time at
Mount Sinai, and so even a voice from heaven may be disputed with if the received text
can be interpreted to support the disputation. God's response to this is neither the wrath
of an outwitted tyrant nor a blast of irrefutable counter-doctrine, but good-humoured
acknowledgement - perhaps even celebration - of the infinite divisibility of the Word.
The Torah is one book which might be expected to instil some respect in the devoted
reader for the authority of signs, wonders and the heavenly voice, but the Sages in this
case are determined to read the "text against itself', insisting on the equal status of (their)
interpretation with direct audible revelation and thus making a claim for the
inscribed/written sign over against the notional immediacy of the spoken word. God,
who after all created Derrida, can only take pleasure in the manoeuvre: "God laughed and
said: my children have defeated me, my children have defeated me!"
In the former of these two stories, God is presented as the Creator both of Torah and
of all its readings, but as Moses is led to realise, these readings rely on the unfolding of
cultural/historical circumstance to become apparent, and later interpretations may
contradict or reconfigure earlier ones to the extent that little common sense can be
established between them. The second tale depicts a God who, having delivered Torah to
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Israel and set the process of interpretation in motion, happily finds himself challenged by
a group of canny critics and responds not with anger but with laughter. In both these
stories, deferral of meaning is affirmed as the chief characteristic of Holy Writ, and in
the second tale God is a God who cheerfully, playfully, relinquishes his privilege to
have the final word, because there is no final word. Or rather, the Word is a text which,
in embracing all history, is in one sense final and determinate, but which within the
continuum of time and mutability contains many truths, dependent on many contexts. It
is this realisation that leads the Rabbis to allow meaning in midrash to be plural and
ambiguous, to allow truth to be "principally discursive",125 and to proclaim, in the case
of contradictory readings or rulings, that "both these and these are the words of the
living God".126
Midrash and Feminism: To draw clear parallels between midrash and
deconstruction, therefore, necessitates a certain selectivity of emphasis on both sides: the
playful, discursive aspects of midrash must be (and certainly can be) foregrounded,
while the kind of "deconstruction" spoken ofmust be that which accords the respect of
close, rigorous reading and constant return to one primary text, rather than the more
pathologically eclectic style which makes commentary a harlequinade of dazzling
intertextuality - serious, or devoted "play" rather than its more iconoclastic variety. Also,
an important point to which little or no attention has been paid is that reading midrash as
deconstruction involves, in a critical sense, deconstructing midrash. The Rabbis may
have tolerated interpretative freedom amongst themselves, but the complexity and
importance of the middot, and the way in which the Rabbis claimed authority for their
own hermeneutical program, all indicate that they certainly distinguished in a broader
sense between proper and improper articulation of meaning, and that the difference
between the two was a matter both of reading competence and of a certain fidelity to
method127 - the first step in reading midrash as deconstruction must surely be to identify
and exploit moments in the text which undermine this correct/incorrect dualism.128
If midrash must be deconstructed to appear as deconstruction, then this operation is
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even more important if we are to make useful connections between Rabbinic
hermeneutics and feminist deconstruction. The exegete wishing to put together a feminist
reading of Genesis 2-3 and consulting the midrash for hermeneutical tips may well be
dismayed to find that the Rabbis at several points cite the biblical text in support of
nakedly misogynistic claims; even as apparently disinterested a scholar as Jacob Neusner
cannot help drawing attention, in his translation of Bere'shit Rabbah, to "[t]he powerful
and unrelieved anti-feminist bias of the document's framers".129 I have already argued
that there is no such thing as pure or exemplary deconstruction; there are, rather,
particular instances informed by different historical/cultural contexts and political
intentions, and so perhaps it is not surprising that Rabbinic "deconstruction" of the bible
(insofar as it can be labelled thus) shares little ground in its codified or canonised form
with whatever the results of feminist deconstructive exegesis might be - the exegetical
aims in either case are completely different. It is not my intention here to deconstruct
midrash with the aim of reading it as a feminist document: such an undertaking would be
both too difficult - the corpus of literature is so huge and diverse that no manage¬
ably-sized piece could be said to be truly representative - and too (deceptively) simple, in
that the logical gaps and textual aporia from which deconstruction works are legion
throughout midrash; the invitation to deconstruct is bewilderingly open, and one would
be hard pressed - pace Neusner - to find a systematic logical order to subvert (indeed, I
believe that part of the reason midrash has been so enthusiastically appropriated by some
poststructuralist critics and so fiercely defended by more traditional scholars of Judaism
is that it is supremely tractable, able to be read convincingly in contradictory ways).
Rather, I am interested in demonstrating that the Rabbis' approach to reading arose out
of a set of cultural circumstances which had significant correspondences with the
position of women in patriarchal societies - and that ultimately, feminist deconstruction
of biblical texts carried out in a communal setting could take a similar form to that of
Rabbinic midrash.
I have concluded each of the previous three chapters with a comment on the kind of
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hermeneutics that feminist exegesis necessitates: a politically explicit hermeneutics which
resists ideological closure and the imposition of orthodoxy; which embraces polysemy
and conceives ofmeaning as a process rather than as an ahistorical entity; which accords
integrity to subjectivity and imagination in interpretation, maintaining an awareness of
the limitations of rational logic and "scientific" reading. At a glance, midrash appears to
embody these characteristics to a significant extent. We have seen that in its discursive
style it celebrates the multivocal nature of interpretation, and conceives of commentary
itself, the process of reading and expounding, as primary religious experience, liberating
"the life ofmeaning from that of historical-geographical contingency".130 Midrash also
defers closure in interpretation and avoids the "authoritarian imposition" of final
significance131 within its own textual boundaries; it foregrounds hermeneutical means
rather than ends, being concerned less with fixed doctrine than with "an interpretative
stance, a way of reading the sacred text".132 Midrash's commitment to the "omni-
significance" of the biblical text means that the creative imagination of the interpreter is
called upon to explain "the unique significance of each and every linguistic element";133 a
rich variety of parables, fables and linguistic games weaves itself through such haggadic
midrashim as the commentary on Genesis, and the arrangement of this material tends on
the whole to defy our expectations of editorial logic:
Similar arguments are often attributed to different authorities, and the textual evidence
adduced in support of an argument is seldom arranged according to Western logical or
chronological standards. This is not to say that the Midrash ignores logic, but to say that it
employs logic, in such a way as to foreground its limitations.134
Midrash also in a sense foregrounds its own political stance. If, on one hand, the
Rabbis' claim that their interpretation was given by God at Sinai can be seen as a claim to
objective truth, it is apparent all the same that a high degree of subjective interest was at
work, and this is partly what gives midrash its distinctive character. The Rabbis' broad
political concern was to keep Israel holy or distinct among the various nations
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throughout which its people were scattered, and in the absence of a Temple cult, this
meant making Israel a Torah-centred nation - which meant overall that a large amount of
interpretative energy went into finding biblical proof to support the notion that Israel's
(and more specifically the Rabbis') increasingly diverse concerns were still the particular
business of one God and one all-embracing sacred text. Throughout both haggadic and
halakhic midrash, the reader finds explicitly Rabbinic preoccupations read back into the
biblical text: the serpent in Eden is judged not just by God but by a full Sanhedrin,135
Cain and Abel engage in learned Pharisaic dispute over the afterlife,136 the binding of
Isaac is ascribed to the same calendar date as the future coming of the Messiah,137 God
rewards the study of scripture more richly than any other good work and Himself
consults the Torah when creating the world.138 The reader of midrash is never for a
moment unaware that this is Rabbinic exegesis, and this is because the urgent practical
and political demands which fuelled the midrashists' literary activity take precedence in
the text over the impulse towards abstraction and scholarly neutrality.
It is clear enough that these surface similarities between Rabbinic and feminist modes
of exegesis exist; what is less obvious is their significance, or the depth to which they
may be pursued. If a model of correspondences were to be made, it would be structured
around the affinity, which we have observed, between patriarchy and logocentrism
(Derrida's phallogocentrism) and the inevitably Hellenistic-philosophical tenor of this
relationship, as opposed to the alternatively anti-patriarchal, anti-logocentric stances of
feminism and midrash respectively. But such a model could only stand, or be centred,
on the relegation to marginal significance of such troublesome details as the Hellenistic
influences at work in midrash, the inextricability of logocentrism and anti-logocentric
discourses, the patriarchal nature of Rabbinic Judaism and so on. The problem is
essentially one of identity: systematic equations and models such as the one outlined
above rely on identifying the definitive characteristics of their constituent elements, but
we have seen that resistance to definition is an important strategy both for feminism and
deconstruction; even logocentrism and metaphysics are not, as deconstruction shows,
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entirely what they claim to be, and the current conflict over midrash and modem critical
theory is, for the greater part, an unresolved debate on what Rabbinic interpretation
"really is".
This constant questioning of ontologies gets in the way of argument, and this is
probably why it is often dismissed as a bad habit, a kind of poststructuralist itch. But it
could be that this same restlessness is what provides the most important link between
midrash and feminism. Issues of identity and difference have always been crucial both to
Judaism and to feminism, and in both cases this has had much to do with the experience
of marginality. In discussions of Jewish identity, it is not uncommon to encounter the
argument that to be Jewish is to be an outsider. Statements to this effect range from the
direct:
[t]wo thousand years of living as a minority people under the power structures of other
societies and religions have helped form many of the characteristics seen as Jewish139
to the hyperbolic:
[i]t is axiomatic for a Jew that it is better to suffer in hell as a member of a persecuted
minority than to enjoy the pleasures of heaven as a member of a persecuting majority,140
and they rest on the underlying assumption that the "Jewish condition" has traditionally
been that ofmarginality, often at the cost of freedom and life. Herbert Schneidau sees
marginality as having been written from the very beginning into the Jewish tradition: in
his discussion "The Hebrews Against the High Cultures",141 he argues that the "Hebrew
vision" informing the Old Testament is a critical, demythologising one,142 that of a
disenfranchised minority railing against the grandiose pride and hubris of dominant
urban culture. On the margins of Hebrew culture are those whom the biblical narratives
present as assimilating and becoming Egyptians, or Canaanites, or Babylonians; at the
centre are the dissenters. The biblical record of Israelite history establishes this pattern at
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an early, crucial stage:
The stage was set for Exodus by migrations of Semites to Egypt, in search of food
perhaps, and many prospered there; but deep hostility to Egyptian life kept some - the
ideological nucleus of the Hebrews - from immersion and disappearance in the population.
They kept their character, significantly, by insisting that they were shepherds, "for every
shepherd is an abomination to the Egyptians" (Gen. 46:34); they retained their identity at the
cost of being stigmatized....The pastoral badge that allowed these Hebrews to evade the
sacralized social system bespoke not only an alien's occupation, but also a religious declaration
of noncompliance: it was itself a demythologization.143
Whether we can accept Schneidau's implicit assumption here that the Hebrew Bible
offers a more-or-less accurate account of Israelite history, or whether we hold that the
biblical texts were compiled by an exiled intellectual class wishing to shore up its claim
to legitimate inheritance of the Yahwist covenant,144 the point still stands: the Hebrew
Bible tells the story of a people whose definitive condition, as depicted in the story, is
that of alterity. The Hebrews, entering Canaan under Joshua, are portrayed in the biblical
account as "the natural enemies of the Canaanite city-states";145 the books of the prophets
later denounce the power-political ambitions of Israel by calling on "the Yahwist heritage
of ambivalence toward culture and all its works";146 still later, the book of Daniel, with
its narrative relating the humiliation of a powerful despot, is written with the intention of
rallying Jewish opposition to the tyrant Antiochus Epiphanes;147 finally, the Jews in
Roman Palestine are shown as
a recurrent plague to the Caesars, infecting the eastern part of the empire with disorder; for
they could see Rome as only one more in the series that began with Akkad and ran through the
Seleucids.148
Many of the key narratives in the Hebrew Bible also develop the theme of spiritual and
physical affinity between the people of Yahweh and the wilderness. The desert, the
"marginal space" that formed a kind of no-man's-land between the ancient Near Eastern
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city-states, provides the venue for several crucial events in the formation of Israelite
religious consciousness. The people of Yahweh are not depicted as being completely at
one with the wilderness environment, but nevertheless the wilderness is a place of refuge
and, frequently, theophany, in spite of the dangers it affords; the prophets can be found
at times to speak of the period of wandering immediately following the exodus from
Egypt as "a period of special intimacy, a honeymoon, between Yahweh and his
people".149 Even in the wilderness, however, the centre of Israelite identity is deferred:
the people of Yahweh do not live in the desert but are led through it, by a God whose
most notable characteristic is displacement. Yahweh speaks but is never seen; his signs
may be natural phenomena (flood, plague, famine) or unnatural (a burning bush, a "still,
small voice"), but the sign is never itself Being-in-presence, never a full or perfect
manifestation, and even in the desert, the place in which he most dramatically reveals
himself to his people, Yahweh is always somehow absent or "elsewhere":
Yahweh, unlike the nature gods of the pantheons, is fittingly found in the wilderness, as
opposed to the cities, marketplaces, or grain-fields: the unearthly landscape of the desert is not
God's "home" but a scene appropriate to him, for he too is unearthly. It may be that djinn and
other desert demons are relevant to the ideas behind certain biblical passages (especially Exodus
4:24-26, where Yahweh tries to kill Moses), but Yahweh is not a "desert god", for he is not
localizable anywhere.150
Thus at the centre of the biblical construction of Hebrew identity, both political and
religious, can be found the concept ofmarginality and displacement, and it is not difficult
to see how this relates to midrash. Several centuries after the Babylonian exile, the
people of Yahweh were a handful of communities scattered throughout Palestine and
outlying regions, a people with neither a political nor a cultic centre, for whose religious
leaders the necessity to adapt, to survive in exile, was answered partly by the
development of a diffuse and elastic biblical hermeneutics. George Steiner has observed
that "there is a sense in which all commentary is an act of exile",151 and this statement is
surely never more apposite than when applied to midrash, a form of commentary which
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arose out of displaced communities, and which presents meaning not as residing in any
fixed place or time, but as a process of signification coincident - from the human
perspective - with changes in historical and cultural context. The "exile" Steiner refers to
is exile from the stable presence of the Word, from any unitary source of unambiguous
signification, and it is a condition palpable throughout midrash, reflecting among other
things "the Rabbis apparent lack of interest in making a theologically coherent whole out
of their disparate beliefs".152
I wish to argue that there is a certain symbolic affinity between Judaism and
feminism, an affinity which has considerable relevance to the project of feminist biblical
hermeneutics. As in Judaism, so in contemporary feminism, marginality and
displacement are crucial issues, because they have always been central to the experience
of women under patriarchy. By definition, patriarchy is structured around a male norm;
male-identified characteristics are held to be desirable and natural, while those identified
with femaleness represent either lack (e.g. intuition, passivity) or dangerous excess (e.g.
carnality, emotion). Women's roles and interests are, as a result, first determined
according to an androcentric ideal, and then given marginal or secondary status; men
dominate the "public" domain of political power and influence, while women are
relegated to the more silent, less visible sphere of domestic, family-oriented activity - a
situation which pertains even in these enlightened "post-feminist" times.153 This also
gives rise to the problem of women's identity. We have seen in chapter two how in
patriarchal dualistic thinking, the male and only the male possesses autonomy and
self-identity; woman is derivative, defined not as Self but as Other, having her identity
delineated for her in the negative sense of "not-man". The qualities allocated to the realm
of the Female by patriarchy are, on the whole, derived negatively from their
corresponding masculine virtues, and can usually be termed accordingly - inactive,
irrational, illogical, unspiritual, and so on. As Other, therefore, woman in patriarchal
society is perpetually "displaced", having no essential characteristic, role or self-image
that has not been assigned to her by the patriarchal order (this displacement is what Julia
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Kristeva refers to when she says that woman "does not....belong in the order of
being"154). Thus I believe it is not overstating the case to describe the condition of
woman in patriarchal society as a form of exile, as life in an environment where she is
defined as Other, as alien, by the guardians of the dominant culture, and where she
therefore finds that "belonging" is achieved only by speaking and behaving in ways
which do not disrupt or challenge the given order.
There are links, then, which can be made between alterity in Jewish experience and in
women's experience, aspects of commonality which have been noticed by such feminist
writers as Gail Shulman, who sees her Jewishness as being at the very root of her
struggle against patriarchy; it is in her identity as a Jew that Shulman finds "the readiness
to live in opposition".155 Marcia Falk is similarly aware of the ways in which Judaism
and feminism have both been shaped by marginality:
....the psychology of anti-Semitism has much in common with that of sexism. And
indeed, there is a significant Jewish teaching that focuses on the imperative to treat others as
one would the self, and to empathize with all outsiders on the basis of one's own experience as
a stranger.156
Identity is also a crucial issue in Judaism and feminism alike. Edmond Jabes has written
that the most pressing question at the heart of Jewish experience is:
"What justifies my considering myself Jewish? What makes my words and actions Jewish
words and actions?"
Thus a double questioning forms and develops in [the Jew]: his certainty challenging his
doubt, and his doubt, his certainty.157
This tension is similarly perceivable in feminist thought and experience: "what does it
mean to be a woman?" is a question whose answer oscillates, we have seen, between the
"certainty" of essentialism and the "doubt" of relativism. The fact of biology makes a
strong claim against those who would argue that gender is purely a social construct,
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while those who hold to that claim and say that biology somehow determines the Female
ignore the role of discursive "play" in fragmenting and destabilising all human subjects,
regardless of gender. While biological determinism does not figure in Judaism except as
part of the most nightmarish of historical recollections, the concept of Divine
"chosenness", of holiness as being set apart, can perhaps be seen as the corresponding
factor underpinning certainty of identity in Jewish religious experience. Qadosh, with its
connotations of sacredness and special relationship to God inextricably linked with the
idea of withdrawal or separation, is a definitive element in Judaism, and as such it poses
problems for Jewish feminists who perceive a conflict between qadosh as a religious
imperative and the "feminist value of relationship".158 This, however, is a conflict not
just between Judaism and feminism but also within each. To assert separateness, or
difference, is necessary for any sense of identity, but separateness is also what
determines otherness, and otherness is crucial to the logic both of anti-Semitism and
sexism. Relationship, or a sense of radical connection with all life, on the other hand,
restores the balance that separatism too easily upsets, but this in turn contradicts the
claim for distinctiveness which has protected both Jewish identity in exile and women's
selfhood under patriarchy. As Catherine Keller puts it:
....in this experience of the double threat of oppression and absorption, Judaism shares as
much with feminism as it does with patriarchy.150
Identity, then, is a problem which lies at the heart both of Judaism and of feminism,
an issue rife with contradictions for which there are no simple resolutions. Feminism (at
least of the non-separatist variety), stresses the need for difference to be simultaneously
celebrated and kept in check, while in an increasingly pluralistic world, the concept of
qadosh, integral to Jewish religious identity, becomes similarly fraught with ambiguity:
....in the last two hundred years, the concept of chosenness has been almost endlessly
refashioned as Jewish thinkers have tried to find ways to discard and retain it at the same
time.160
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At the risk of establishing naively simplistic oppositions, I would say that this problem
of self-identity has influenced the development of feminism and Judaism in a way that
cannot, on the whole, be held as characteristic of patriarchy or orthodox Christianity.
According to patriarchal logic, the male is supremely, confidently independent and
self-determining, while doctrinal declarations of Christian identity traditionally
necessitate a statement of unambiguous belief in one Word, one Incarnation and one
resurrection, one determinate Truth beyond doubt or interpretation. Patriarchal
discourses have always had much to say about what is and is not natural or proper, and
similarly the concept of heresy, of being fundamentally "in error" has played a
particularly prominent role in the history of the Christian Church: in both cases,
determinations of the acceptable and the unacceptable have served to delineate and
consolidate a power-base. Feminism and Judaism, on the other hand, both politically
marginalised, share common ground insofar as they evince a tendency to be "suspicious
of single-minded approaches to truth":161 the varied modes of experience of women
under patriarchy and of Jewish communities in diverse cultural contexts have given rise
to an awareness of difference-in-being; even monotheism, the belief in one God, can be
construed as a spiritual allegiance to an all-inclusive unity:
Judaism....contains such tendencies in its discussions of the deity's attributes (Justice and
Mercy), in discussions of relationship between deity and its Spirit (ruah ha kodesh) or Presence
(Shechinah), both of which are feminine, and most particularly in Kabbalistic discussions of
the deity's ten modes.162
Christianity, of course, is also officially monotheistic, and the Christian Trinity is a
theological construct which similarly embraces unity-within-Oneness. The point I wish
to make, however, is that Christianity has, in the course of its history, tolerated less
diversity in what its theological determinations are said to signify, or how they might be
applied, than has Judaism - and the periods ofmost extreme Christian intolerance have,
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significantly, been those periods at which Christianity has functioned as a state religion,
with the means at its disposal ofmobilising the "secular arm" of power in defence of its
interests.
A history of marginality and minority status, on the other hand, a history such as the
one we have seen outlined by Schneidau, has given a different character to the concept of
truth in Judaism, and this has had a significant bearing on hermeneutics. Judith Plaskow
has recently argued that Judaism is a religion rooted in memory, "living, active memory
that continues to shape Jewish identity and self-understanding", memory which is "not
simply a given but a religious incumbent on both Israel and God".163 God sends the
rainbow as a sign that he will remember the covenant made between himself and "every
living creature among all flesh" (Gen. 9:15), and in return the primary religious
obligation of Israel is that of remembering - and this memory, notably, is the memory of
marginality, of "the experience....of slavery and redemption".164 The great
commandment of Moses is that Israel should "remember this day, in which you came out
from Egypt, out from the house of bondage" (Exod. 13:3); the first commandment at
Sinai is similarly an injunction to remember ("I am the LORD your God, who brought
you out from the land of Egypt", Exod. 20:2); the same memory of oppression gives rise
to the ethical obligation not to "wrong a stranger or oppress him, for you were strangers
in the land of Egypt" (Exod. 22:20).165 This memory, Plaskow says, has shaped the
Jewish understanding of religious and political identity down to the present day, and
[i]t has fostered among some Jews an identification with the oppressed that has led to
involvement in a host ofmovements for social change - and has fueled the feminist demand for
justice for women within Judaism.166
The past has the power in Judaism to shape present reality to a profound degree: "it is in
telling the story of our past as Jews that we learn who we truly are in the present".167
Remembering, however, is not a matter of simple cultural identification with this
historical figure or that historical event; the cultural diversity to which Judaism has had to
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adapt since biblical times has resulted in the development of what might be called a
historical imagination. This, we have seen, is the kind of imagination which
characterises midrash, a point which Plaskow does not fail to make:
It is because of the past's continuing power in the present that, when the rabbis profoundly
transformed Jewish religious life after the destruction of the second Temple, they also
reconstructed Jewish memory to see themselves in continuity with it So deeply is the Jewish
present rooted in Jewish history that changes wrought in Jewish reality continually have been
read back into the past so that they could be read out of the past as a foundation for the
present....The point is not that such rereadings were a conscious plot to strengthen rabbinic
authority - though certainly they would have served that function - but that it was probably
unimaginable to the sages that the values they lived by could not be taught through the
Torah.168
The Rabbis, as the religious leaders of communities which were politically
marginalised, or at least displaced from the cultural environment which nurtured the
development of their sacred text, were called upon to exercise a mode of biblical
interpretation which made identification with the past more a matter of creative
reconstruction than of historical accuracy. It was an article of Rabbinic faith that they
were the inheritors of Israel's religious tradition following the fall of Jerusalem; that
being the case, they were constrained to read the literature of that tradition as being in
many ways "about" them. It is in this sense, Plaskow says, that the Rabbis adopted an
interpretative stance which is being taken up today by many feminists. The infrequency
of women's stories, and the marginal significance accorded to women's experience in
biblical narratives, is at odds with the experience of contemporary Jewish feminists who
take it as given that their lives and their experiences as women in the community of faith
are as integral to Judaism as are more traditional patriarchal concerns. This incongruity
necessitates a particular approach to reading and interpretation:
To accept our absence from Sinai would be to allow the male text to define us and our
connection to Judaism. To stand on the ground of our experience, on the other hand, to start
with the certainty of our membership in our own people is to be forced to re-remember and
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recreate its history, to reshape Torah.169
Monique Wittig, in a much-quoted passage has said: "There was a time when you were
not a slave, remember that....You say there are no words to describe this time, you say it
does not exist. But remember. Make an effort to remember. Or failing that, invent."170
This exhortation does not deny the value of feminist historiography, but it implies that
where historical memory has been erased, creative memory must take on the work of
recovering a past for women that is not appropriated by patriarchy. The program of
modern feminist exegesis, then, is markedly similar to the task which confronted the
Rabbis in the early centuries of the Common Era: that of making the bible address the
particular concerns of groups whose experience has little or no apparent link with the
explicit narrative concerns of the biblical text. The Torah shows us no Rabbis, yet the
Rabbis were able to read it as a document which addressed them directly. Feminist
biblical interpretation requires a similar leap of the exegetical imagination, a
hermeneutical approach which, like that of the midrashists, opens the text to new, often
unexpected readings, conjuring meaning "to rise out of the white spaces between the
letters"171 of the biblical text and be shaped according to the needs of the interpretative
community.
We have come a long way, it seems, from Derrida and the metaphysicians. But the
main points of this somewhat lengthy argument can be summarised without too much
difficulty, partly because this chapter has been largely concerned with making the same
one or two points over and over again, in different guises. It should first be noted that in
drawing comparisons, as I have, between deconstruction and feminism, deconstruction
and midrash, and (finally) midrash and feminism, I have attempted - no doubt at the
expense of clarity - to keep those comparisons as far as possible from crystallising into
strict identifications-and-oppositions. Derrida has shown, perhaps above and beyond
anything else, that things have always persisted, will always persist, in differing from
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what they "are", just as they maintain a perverse and radical identification with what they
"are not": thus does the binary thinking of logocentrism catch itself out. Even
deconstruction differs from itself; Derrida and many others have stressed that far from
being a concept or a "method", deconstruction is something you do, and that to explain it
in fixed conceptual terms is
to set aside the detailed and specific activity of deconstructive reading in favour of a
generalized idea of that activity, an idea assumed to comprehend all its differences of local
application.172
Accordingly, I have tried to avoid slipping too comfortably into the logic of typology:
there is a fine difference between arguing that midrash is a type of deconstruction (or
worse, that midrash is a type of feminism) and pointing out some ways in which the
Rabbis anticipated modem feminist and deconstructive concerns, but it is a difference
which I hope to have made more or less consistently.
The principal concern, however, of this discussion has been to show that
deconstruction - whatever it "is" - as a reading activity need not preclude, when it is
brought to the bible, a biblical faith of some kind. Philosophically speaking,
deconstruction's reliance on the postulations of metaphysics provides evidence of one
way in which a deconstructive theology need not - cannot - give the lie to determinations
of transcendent Truth in any absolute or uncompromising fashion. But what about the
more practical business of hermeneutics? It has been argued that there is no place for
God in the deconstructive reader's mind, and I would go along with this to the extent
that I believe God is much more dynamic than something as static as a "place" would
suggest. But if God is to be conceived of (like reading) as a Verb, a process, as "IWill
Be What I Will Be" - and such formulations are notably prevalent within Rabbinic
Judaism and feminist theology - then the thought of deconstructive exegesis is perhaps
not so much scandalous as necessary. John Caputo's comments on religion are worth
quoting at length here, as he speaks of the inevitability of reading and interpretation at the
very heart of faith, in terms which suggest a "deconstructive" awareness:
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Religion is a way of coming to grips with the flux, a struggle with the powers of
darkness, which is "authentic" only so long as it "owns up" to the contingency of its symbols.
Faith makes its way in the dark, seeing through a glass darkly, and it is genuine only to the
extent that it acknowledges the abyss in which we are all situated, the undecideability and
ambiguity which engulfs us all....The believer is not someone who has been visited from on
high by a supervenient grace but someone who, like the rest of us, does what he can to
construe the darkness, to follow the sequence of shadows across the cave, to cope with the
flux. To invoke grace from on high is just one more familiar way of bailing out on the flux -
just when we are needed the most. It is one more way to say that one has gained an exemption
from the human condition, that God has privileged a few with a lifeline that He has not thrown
out to others - which would be comic if it were not so dangerous.173
This is very close to Derrida's idea of the "Nietzschean affirmation", the kind of thinking
that resists the neat equation of non-Truth with falsity, which "determines the noncenter
otherwise than as the loss of the center".1741 would say that the affirmation of this kind
of faith is more easily read into the Jewish exegetical tradition than into that of
Christianity, at least to the extent that Christianity has invested more of its official
theological capital in the Platonic ideal of access to Presence, of direct, unmediated and
miraculous communion with God in the body of Christ. But even Christ is a sign that
calls for interpretation, and, as Stephen Finley has remarked, deconstruction in Christian
exegesis offers the opportunity to discover the regenerative possibilities in the way that
texts, like the incarnation of theWord itself, "suffer and break".175
All this suggests no more than that a deconstructive approach to reading the bible can
be a faithful one; we are left still with the question of what kind of readings such an
approach might throw up. Critics of deconstruction often demand to know "where it will
all end", what kind of horrors might be spawned in the name of biblical hermeneutics if
the deconstructionists are left to pursue their master-plan through to its logical
conclusion. Of course, logical conclusions are not necessarily the business of
deconstructive readers, but Derrida himself adopts an uncomfortably apocalyptic tone at
least at one point where he speaks of "the formless, mute, infant and terrifying form of
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monstrosity"176 that may be emerging as the difftrance of presence and absence takes
shape in the philosophical consciousness of the West. More pertinently, however, it
seems that for all the theorising taking place over deconstruction in biblical interpretation,
there still seems to be proportionately little deconstructive exegesis actually being carried
out, and what there is offers little solace to those who fear that to deconstruct means to
throw off every last vestige of critical respect for the text. If "play" equals limitless
intertextuality, a dissolution of conceptual clarity into labyrinthine verbal esotericism,
then those who are old-fashioned enough to want to read the bible in search ofmeaning
quite justifiably want nothing to do with it.
What I hope to have demonstrated, however, is that midrash is one kind of exegesis
which devotes itself seriously to the business of close reading, and yet which evinces a
species of interpretative play not entirely unrelated to the play of signification that
deconstruction exploits. Not that "exploitation" here should be understood in the
perjorative sense of the word: deconstruction should not be a process of coercion
brought to bear on the text from a point outside it, but rather a rigorous working-through
of possibilities within it; an operation that begins in the space "between rhetoric and
logic, between what [the text] manifestly means to say and what it is nonetheless
constrained to mean"}11 This, I have argued, is how the Rabbis read their bible: as a text
which spoke to them through gaps and fissures, which addressed them directly,
eloquently, "in spite of itself, i.e. in spite of its literal silence regarding the specific
questions they brought to it. So too, the project of reading the bible as relevant to
feminist religious concerns involves a similar - perhaps even more radical -
deconstruction of its ruling logic, in this case patriarchal logic.
Daphne Hampson, speaking of Christian feminism, has pointed out that those
feminists who have retained their avowedly Christian beliefs have tended to be
"historians and exegetes", while those who (like Hampson herself) count themselves as
"post-Christians" have on the whole been "trained in philosophy or theology".178 This, I
believe, testifies to the fact that feminist Judaeo-Christianity depends for its future
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development very much on a radical commitment to issues of reading and writing, of
textuality. Accordingly deconstruction, as a means of reading patriarchal texts "against
themselves", from the margins inward, and in legitimising the broadening of critical
focus to take into account the political stances of both author and reader, provides
perhaps the most useful approach to a feminist biblical poetics. To place deconstruction
and the insights of Derrida at the centre of the argument and proceed synchronically
(disregarding for the moment the problem of anachronism - itself a logocentric anxiety),
we can see midrash as one among numerous kinds of outworkings of certain reading
strategies discussed, shaped by its own particular concerns - religious faith not being the
least among them - and characterised by myriad deformations of what could be called
"true" deconstruction if such a thing existed. Another outworking could be feminist
exegesis, a critical practice which would, in many respects, be related to midrash - and
which would undoubtedly stand to gain much insight from close attention to Rabbinic
readings of scripture - but which would be somewhat inured to the ironies of such a
relationship by constant, creative reversion to the supreme irony: that of reading the
sacred texts of Judaeo-Christian religion as affirmative of the full humanity ofwomen. It
is an irony of the kind which deconstruction most closely investigates, to whose
implications the deconstructive reader is most closely-attuned, an irony of the kind
whose full and fully-articulated exploration is no less pressing for feminism than it is for
any other liberation movement.
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Chapter 5
Genesis 2:4b-3:24: Yahweh and the Sexuality ofRhetoric
The discussion offered over the past four chapters has been principally theoretical,
and I hope to have paid at least adequate attention to the contradictions which result when
a theoretical approach is taken either to feminism or to deconstruction. Indeed, I have
indicated that deconstruction's resistance to neat categorisation as a "methodology" or a
"concept" makes it a suitable set of strategies for a feminist hermeneutics. What remains
to be seen is how successful, or indeed how readable, something like "feminist
deconstruction" might be when actually exercised on a piece of literature, particularly on
biblical literature which has for so long been read and reread as embodying Meaning
with a vengeance, and as validating the monolithic doctrines of patriarchal religion. I
should immediately add that what follows will not be an attempt to piece together a
critical reading which illustratively puts into practice all the theory discussed so far.
David Jobling writes that as far as liberation theologies are concerned, there is still a
measure of "swallowing the negative" to be done before we can proclaim the advent of a
new egalitarian order,1 by which I take it he means that as long as repressive social
structures are maintained, an essential task of any movement for change must be to
analyse and dismantle the old while forging the new. A cautionary indicator of the
relevance of this observation to feminist hermeneutics can be seen in the work of Phyllis
Trible, whose "positive" feminist hermeneutics is undermined by insufficient attention to
the mechanics of patriarchal discourse. Accordingly, my aim at this point is not to come
up with an example of definitively "feminist" deconstruction, still less to try to formulate
a paradigm for it; rather, I hope to show one way in which the ground might be cleared,
at least partially, for such an operation.
Deconstruction, we have seen, firmly contextualises linguistic practice. If textuality is
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all-encompassing, then to write is not to pluck an eternal verity from a point outside
culture and present it to the world embodied in "literary " language; to read is something
other than the progressive apprehension of an invariable Presence. Rather, meaning is
produced, displaced, modified and contended with as part of an infinitely dense and
complex web of cultural assumptions and social codes. Subjectivity - the "discursive
constitution" of the reader - therefore plays a large part in the process, particularly in
biblical criticism where the vested interests of the interpreter are often bound up with
religious faith; the questions we ask of the bible at an intellectual level tend to have
answers provided for them at the more intuitive level of "belief before we even open the
book, and so in matters of exegesis,
....the kernel of "timeless truth" which remains after the chaff is stripped away usually
turns out to be very much like what the scholar hoped to find.2
This means that when we interpret, we often say as much about ourselves and our
society as we do about the text at hand, and it is partly in this sense that criticism has
been dubbed "the only civilised form of autobiography".3
With this in mind, deconstruction and other reader-oriented interpretative modes have
been attacked for cluttering the discursive field of criticism with too much subjective
baggage and relativising the focus of critical inquiry to the point of absurdity: if the
meaning of a text is something read into it rather than drawn out of it, and if every
reading of any text is really just a reflection of the reader, and if even the reader is an
ephemeral, culture-specific entity, then in what sense can "the text" be said to exist at all?
Some critics are content to remain agnostic on this point;4 my own tentative answer
would be that the text, with regard to the comments above, continues to exist in a rich
and varied array of forms; indeed, rather than reducing the text to no more than a
function of interpretation, deconstruction opens, multiplies and reproduces the text in as
many forms as there are readers of it. It is true that in critical discussion there is no
authoritative arche-text against which to measure the validity of this or that reading (the
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only "pure" text is that which has not yet been read), but complete incoherence in
interpretation is curtailed by what Frank Kermode has elegantly termed "the tacit
knowledge of the permitted range of sense"5 in the discursive community. And so in the
absence of any pure, self-evident or "uninterpreted" text, to deconstruct is - as the term
implies - to question the text as it is constructed and take issue not with the supposed
text-itself but with its readings, a movement prefigured in what the deconstructive reader
identifies as the text's own contentious rhetorical structure:
[cjritical disputes about a text can frequently be identified as a displaced reenactment of
conflicts dramatized in the text, so that while the text assays the consequences and implications
of various forces it contains, critical readings transform this difference within into a difference
between mutually exclusive positions. What is deconstructed in deconstructive analyses attuned
to this problem is not the text itself but the text as it is read, the combination of text and the
readings that articulate it.6
My interpretation of any biblical text, then, should make no pretence to being
innocent or without presuppositions, as my social/historical environment is saturated
with pre-existent biblical readings and traces of readings which profoundly influence
how I read - and indeed why I read the bible at all. This dilemma - should I wish to
perceive it as such - is particularly acute in the case of Genesis 2:4b-3:24, as there is
perhaps no other piece of biblical narrative (in the Christian tradition, at any rate) so
deeply sedimented with layers of cultural discourse. It is probably impossible, in
Western society, to read the Old Testament creation-and-fall narrative without some
sense of engagement or identification:
....we all (or most of us) confess that, although we do not read Genesis 2-3 as a
factual/historical account, we nonetheless find in it elements of a belief system, an ideology,
that has strongly informed our own, so that in the millenia-long dialogue with this text we
locate a good part of our cultural identity.7
The story has been passed down from generation to generation, interpreted and
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reinterpreted to the point where Adam and Eve must surely head the roll of dramatis
personae in the Western religious imagination, and none but the most isolated individual
could be ignorant of at least one rough version of what happened in the Garden of Eden.
But if the outline of the narrative is familiar, this should not imply that its meaning can
easily be grasped: everybody "knows" the Garden of Eden story, but who in all its
countless explications and analyses has finally determined what it is about? It seems safe
enough to say that like any respectable creation-myth, the story is about origins, but this
is not particularly helpful when we consider that the "origins" it deals with have
variously (and persuasively) been put forward as being the origins of sin, sexuality,
knowledge and death; the origins of male moral pre- eminence; of female moral
pre-eminence; of sexism; of sexual equality; of civilisation and the institution of labour,
of barbarism and the decline of civilisation; of religious apostasy; of the rise and fall of
the Israelite monarchy, and so on. All these readings are valid enough, yet none of them
is final or complete: evidently what we have here is a supremely enigmatic and elastic
text,8 and one in which the spaces between structural elements can accommodate endless
varieties of exegetical filling-in. In fact, it is a text whose gaps and inconsistencies are so
wide that the inevitablity of interpretation becomes more apparent the closer we read -
that is to say, a text which ultimately draws attention to its own indeterminacy.
In all this, Gen. 2:4b-3:24 could be said to be a fairly typical piece of Hebrew biblical
narrative, faithful to a genre whose chief characteristics are
the externalization of only so much of the phenomena as is necessary for the purpose of
the narrative, all else left in obscurity: the decisive points of the narrative alone are
emphasised, what lies between is nonexistent; time and place are undefined and call for
interpretation; thoughts and feeling remain unexpressed, are only suggested by the silence and
the fragmentary speeches; the whole....remains mysterious and "fraught with background".^
So fraught with background is this narrative, however, that even its "decisive points" are
obscure: out of all its indeterminacies and silences, the Garden of Eden story's most
puzzling inconsistencies emerge precisely at those points where we might expect to have
184
things spelled out for us in no uncertain terms. The story appears at a simple
sequence-of-events level to be about good and evil, knowledge and death; but by the end
of chapter three, the questions which most obstinately remain unanswered are: what is
the nature of "good and evil" that is supposed to have been made manifest to us? what
kind of "knowledge" have we really acquired? and what kind of "death" has everybody
been talking about?
So many unanswered questions raise the possibility of the indeterminacy ofmeaning
and the need to interpret at a very early stage in the Garden of Eden narrative, and this is
a paradoxical state of affairs in the light of orthodox readings of Gen. 2:4b-3:24 which
would have it that the story deals with concrete, prehistoric certainties and the
Divinely-prescribed consequences of mythic acts. Such interpretations, however, depend
upon the willing suspension of hermeneutical scepticism and accept the text's apparent
rhetorical structure as given: the story is a myth dealing with, say, sin and sexuality, and
elements within the story which contradict this logic must be harmonised or interpreted
into line with what we think we know is the myth's basic narrative thrust. Myths tend,
after all, to be told and retold but not fundamentally questioned by the society at large in
which they circulate; their shared symbolic significance is partly what makes them
myths, and to tamper with a myth in such a way that this communal significance is
disrupted and becomes disjointed or internally divided is not "reading" but a marginal
specialist activity requiring the obscure formal-analytical skills of the likes of
anthropologists, antiquarian linguists and source critics.
But just how ineffably "mythical" is the Garden of Eden story? It is now generally
recognised by all but the most hard-line fundamentalists that what we have in the
Judaeo-Christian creation-myth is in fact two stories - the so-called Priestly creation
account of Genesis l-2:4a, and the Yahwist text of 2:4b-3:24 - and even a brief
comparison between them throws up points which could serve as helpful indicators
when considering the problematic distinction between myth and fiction. The Priestly
account is altogether a more solemn, austere piece of work; with its liturgical tempo and
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its patterned, repetitive structure, Gen. l-2:4a has all the measured gravity appropriate to
an account of the in illo tempore of sacred prehistory. The Priestly tale is ritualistic in
tone and its structure seems to encourage, or at least to facilitate, word-for-word
reiterability - in short, it looks and sounds like a myth. More significantly, it describes a
sequence of events which take place in what Plato might have called the realm of the
Ideal. Indeed, rather than "events" we might call them successive Beings: God's first
unambiguous act is an act of signification, an utterance, and in this utterance is Presence
made manifest. God says yehi 'or, "let there be light", and by means of this speech act,
'or is brought into being. The necessarily linear sequence of the narrative implies that
some kind of time-lapse is involved - "God said, let there be light, and (then) there was
light" - but this is an inevitable result of the textual attempt to describe a pre-textual state:
what is in fact referred to is a direct, atemporal and substantial correspondence between
the Word and what it represents. Language in the Priestly creation account is not
differential but perfectly referential; spoken by God, each signifier is a signified. Light,
'or, is brought into being as a pure, self-identical entity, and God pronounces it good,
tobh, as such before creating difference and setting the play of day and night in motion.
This pattern continues over the six "days" of creation; God speaks the world into being,
all of it is tobh, none of it is interpretable or could have been said in any other way (each
Divine linguistic fiat is sealed with the concretising formula wayehi khen, "and it was
so"). The terseness of the narrative suits its subject:
[c]reation is depicted as so complete and so good in Gen. l:l-2:4a that little room is left
for narrative movement and development.10
Things are very different, however, from the opening sentence of Gen. 2:4b-3:24,
different in that we are introduced into a world of difference. The narrative overture to
this creation account ("on the day that YHWH-God made earth and heavens")
corresponds to yet differs from the beginning of the P-text in four significant instances.11
The first is that the scene is set in 2:4a by beyom, "on the day", rather than bere'shit, "in
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the beginning", and where the latter refers to a single, indivisible point of ontology,
beyom is situated in the realm of time and deferral, of day and night. Secondly, the act of
creation itself is denoted in the Yahwist- or J-text by a form of the verb 'asah, a verb
which carries the sense of doing ormaking on a human, social level, and in this it differs
significantly from P's bara', a word used exclusively throughout the Hebrew bible to
describe the creative activity of the Divine. Next we meet the Creator himself,
YHWH-'elohim, not the mythic, all-in-One God of the P-text but the more
historical/political Yahweh, God of the Israelites who is One and yet differs, who is not
Ba'al, Asherah or any of the other Gods in the Canaanite pantheon. Finally, what is
created by God at the beginning of the Priestly account is precise and unambiguous
{hashshamayim we....ha-'aretz, "the heavens and the earth"), while in the Yahwist
account, creation is described without the definite article ha-, and this signals a shift in
the direction of a more indeterminate environment, the fictional landscape of 'eretz
vfshamayim.
In addition to this, creation is described in the following verse in terms of lack or
incompleteness:
....no wild shrub was yet on the earth, and no herb of the field had yet sprouted, for
YHWH-God had not yet caused it to rain upon the earth, and there was no earth-creature to till
the earth (Gen. 2:5).
We are presented here not with fullness and plenitude, but with an unfinished page to be
written upon, something that needs to be added to; in particular the adverb terem, "not
yet", implies that in this story, what is created is defined as much by what is still to come
as by what is already present, and indeed further on in the narrative, Yahweh's first
explicit pronouncement on his own handiwork is to be lo'-tobh, "it is not good
[that]....". There is no wayehi khen here; we are in a world of deferral, of
absence-in-presence which, once introduced, "infects the narrative"12 throughout. This is
not to say that the Priestly creation-myth is somehow immune to the indeterminacy
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which is the condition and result of its own textual constitution,13 but in its concise
rhetorical structure it is not so clearly "about" deferral and textuality in quite the dramatic
way that the Yahwist account is.
Yahweh is not the speaking creator-God of Genesis l-2:4a. He fashions ha-'adam
not by Word but by hand, modelling ha-'adam from ha-'adamah and thus (from the
reader's perspective) making a linguistic connection, but regardless of whether or not
Yahweh himself is aware of this connection - and he is not, as we shall see, the Hebrew
speaker par excellence of Genesis 1 - he saves his breath for the task of animating his
earth-creature. In this primal silence, Yahweh's acts are concrete and possessed of some
relative finality; he successfully creates and gives life to ha-'adam, plants and cultivates a
garden, places the earth-creature in it. And then Yahweh speaks - and in so doing, he
effectively initiates the unravelling of ontological certainty or Being-in-presence. If the
Garden of Eden story chronicles a "Fall", it is surely at this point that it occurs:
And YHWH-God laid a command upon the earth-creature, saying: "You may freely eat
from all the trees in the garden, but you may not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil, for on the day that you eat from it, you shall most certainly die" (Gen. 2:16-17).
A Divine utterance, as Gen. l-2:4a demonstrates, is one in which signifier and signified
share a common identity; it is fundamentally uninterpretable. But the Creator's first
speech act in this story is quite manifestly a text, complete with the hallmarks of
textuality: inconsistency ("you may freely eat from all the trees....but you may not eat
from one of them") and rhetoric (mot tamut, "you shall most certainly die"). The P-text
shows us that the Divine creative attribute above all other Divine creative attributes is the
ability to speak "substantially", to possess immediate and absolute control over the
meaning of any utterance, and the words of the Priestly Elohim are presented as being
intrinsically Meaning-full. In the J-narrative, however, language is not so stable.
Yahweh himself is granted a certain freedom from interpretability: in a world where the
ability to name confers power, his own Name is a cluster of consonants and cannot be
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uttered. He signifies, but cannot be signified, being in a profound (and profoundly
literary) sense "above" criticism, and in this he perhaps represents the fulfilment of his
author's wildest fantasies. George Steiner has observed that the Judaic prohibition
against giving utterance to the consonantal designation YHWH has much to do with the
desire to keep the sacred Name from passing into "the contingent limitlessness of
linguistic play". Just as Israel's God is (as we have seen) often to be encountered in the
desert without being identified as a God of the desert, just as God intervenes in Israelite
history while at the same time transcending historical determination, so it must be
ensured by the biblical authors and redactors that "in natural and unbounded discourse
God has no demonstrable lodging".14 A fundamental tension may be observed here
between deferral as theological virtue - YHWH's spatial/temporal displacement sets him
apart from the more localisable gods of Israel's idol-worshipping neighbours - and
deferral as a force by which the Divinity must not be seen as influenced; it is a tension
equivalent to that between the sense of 'ehyeh 'asher 'ehyeh (Exod. 3:14) as (literally) "I
will be what I will be" and its common translation as "I am who I am",15 the latter
denoting a God undefinable on any terms other than his own, terms which are
inscrutable and which pertain above and beyond "the anarchic ubiquity of possible
discourse".16 But "possible discourse", or interpretation, the realm of linguistic play
which Yahweh in Eden seeks to control without inhabiting, is something which in fact
determines his very nature, by virtue of his agency in the biblical narrative. He is a
character in someone else's story, and although he seeks to exercise authority - the
privilege of unquestionable authorship - by prophesying dire consequences for failure to
obey his command, this is not quite the same thing as speaking Truth.
The Rabbinic commentators on Genesis show a certain sensitivity to this point.
Throughout Rabbinic literature, the Holy One appears as a character who can usually be
disputed with, and occasionally persuaded to change his mind; his language is
predominantly discursive. Indeed, on at least one occasion, his attempts at
self-sufficient, substantial Utterance are comically frustrated. The creation of woman
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(Gen. 2:22) in Bere'shit Rabbah depicts Yahweh as a kind of bumbling spell-weaver,
piecing the woman together and repeating over and over again the words 'ishshah
tsanu'ah ("woman, modesty!"), only to complain later that 'ishshah turns out in fact to
be frivolous, licentious, prying, jealous, thieving and flighty.17 Obviously, part of the
Rabbis' intention here is to make some familiar observations concerning the behaviour of
women. They also, however, show that not only do even Yahweh's determinations of
female nature fail to hold, but that they fail because Yahweh's language is not a
determinative medium.
In Gen. 2:16 (to return to the prohibition concerning the tree of the knowledge of
good and evil) we are told not wayyo'mer, "[Yahweh] said", but wayetzaw, "he
commanded", the latter verb denoting not plain utterance but persuasion or even
coercion. What Elohim says, is; Yahweh on the other hand is less secure and more
authoritarian, wishing to establish beyond any shadow of a doubt that what he says
"goes" - but in the light of subsequent events, we see that where it goes turns out to be
only where all language goes: out into the wilderness of interpretation. In the Priestly
creation account, God said "let there be light" and there was light; there was no gap
between the Divine Word and what it signified. But here, Yahweh says "let there be
obedience", and we find that he creates something other than what he commands. This is
because he has put the prohibition into language, and language in the Garden of Eden is
not pure reference but Derrida's "systematic play of differences, of the traces of
differences". What is present, in Eden as elsewhere, carries the trace of its Other, and so
when Yahweh speaks obedience, he invokes not a self-identical concept but the deferral
ofmeaning between what is and what is not. Ha-'adam may well have been created in a
state of innocence, but as soon as Yahweh tells him he must refrain from doing
something or face mortal consequences, he confers upon the earth-creature not just the
power to choose between one course of action and another, but the awareness that one
course of action is to be preferred above the other. I would call this a rudimentary
knowledge of good and evil; ha-'adam does not yet see it in those terms, but he already
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has a theoretical version of the knowledge that has been forbidden to him.18 Yahweh, for
his part, does not see that his own commands are fatally vulnerable to the vagaries of the
language in which they are handed down, and that humanity, required to recognise and
obey the "essence" of Divine ordinances, is in fact doomed to read them subjectively and
act accordingly.
So it is ironic that while the verb "he commanded" here is introduced - and authority
is thus invoked in a way that is not necessarily the case with 'amar, "he said" - the
command itself defies its author's power to enforce it as he would wish. There is a
similar irony in the pronouncement "you shall most certainly die": Yahweh announces
with a rhetorical flourish "mot tamut", employing a sonorous double-root verbal form
which again carries particular stress and helps to create an "overdetermined context"19
around the prohibition - the narrative strategy seems to be to make the reader sit up and
take notice, and maybe to anticipate a really satisfying death for ha-'adam, the tragic
hero. Once again, however, we are to find that Yahweh's authoritative certainties slide
inevitably into ambiguity.
The serpent appreciates this point. His opening words to the newly-created woman
are deeply sceptical: 'aph ki-'amar 'elohim, "did God really say....?" This is anything
but a straight question:20 its surface form indicates that the serpent is merely asking for
clarification of the Divine command, but given his legendary subtlety, we might well
expect to find more to his words than meets the eye. For a start, he says he wants to
know whether or not Yahweh said lo' to'khelu, "you [plural] shall not eat"; what was in
fact said was lo' to'khal, "you [singular] shall not eat", and the serpent may possibly be
drawing attention to this, suggesting in his oblique fashion that the prohibition was laid
upon the undifferentiated earth-creature alone, and so that the woman's responsibility in
this matter is far from clear. The reader might also notice that 'aph ki-'amar 'elohim
carries a verbal trace of wayyo'mer 'elohim, the formula used in the Priestly creation
account to herald God's creative activity, the Divine Word-in-Being: what is gradually
becoming clear in this story, however, is that Yahweh's power of signification is not that
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of 'elohim, and his utterances are not the substantial Sayings of Gen. l-2:4a. While the
serpent does not quite see things from the modern reader's perspective (if we accept that
his role as a character in the J-text denies him the critical distance from which to compare
his world with that of the P-text) he nevertheless knows that in the Garden of Eden,
linguistic practice in itself is not a window onto the way things really are, and he will go
so far as to question whether, or how effectively, Yahweh said what Yahweh said.
The woman's reply to the serpent seems to indicate that she does not trust her sly
interrogator:
We may eat the fruit from the trees in the garden, but of the fruit from the tree which is in
the middle of the garden, God said "you shall not eat it, and you shall not touch it, lest you
die" (Gen. 3:2-3).
As far as we know, Yahweh said nothing about touching the tree, but the woman may
sense that there is a power-play going on in this conversation, and it could be that she
seeks to fix the meaning of the original decree as she understands it, to protect her
reading from the onslaught of counter-interpretation which she feels may be imminent
(significantly, it is at this point in the Genesis text that the Rabbinic commentators cite
Proverbs 30:6 - "do not add to [God's] words, lest he rebuke you, and you be found a
liar" - and they continue with a salutary (if from a certain point of view ironic, given that
this is midrash) admonition not to make the interpretative "fence" taller than the (textual)
foundation permits.21) On the other hand, her information may have come from
ha-'adam who, having named her as he named the animals, sought to exercise a little
dominion over her and supplied his own interpretative addendum to the command,
laying his reading down as law in the inscrutable name of YHWH-'elohim and thus
providing the first recorded example of "phallogocentric" exegesis. In either case, it is
evident now that Yahweh's prohibition is a text, subject to the law of semantic deferral,
and beginning to differ from its original formulation in that "you shall not eat" has been
read as "you shall neither eat nor touch", while the tree of the knowledge of good and
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evil has become "the tree in the middle of the garden" - a tree which, according to Gen.
2:9, is actually the tree of life, and so in addition to interpretative embellishment we are
dealing at this very early stage with an error in transmission.
But the serpent is not a rhetorical critic, at least not in the sense that he is interested in
manipulating the text-itself to come up with "proper articulation of meaning". He is a
close reader: when he says to the woman "you shall most certainly not die", his words
are lo'-mot fmutun (3:4), a phrase which echoes and perhaps parodies the extravagant
verbal form used by Yahweh back in chapter two. But the serpent's critical approach is
to uncover the strategy of the prohibition, not to chase after its meaning; he offers no
alternative reading, but throws the text open to any number of possible interpretations
which undermine the authority of the "original", and he raises some uncomfortable
questions concerning the motives of the Divine author:
....God knows that on the day that you eat from [the tree], your eyes will be opened and
you will be like God [gods?], knowing good and evil (3:5).
The well-known Hebrew pun on "subtle/naked" begins to resonate here. The serpent is
subtle indeed; his own utterance is decidedly enigmatic, difficult to "read" in that we
have no idea as to either his motives or the source of his knowledge - but in another
sense, his words are as open and nakedly true as they could possibly be, as we are to
find that the eating of the fruit does indeed gain for the human couple a faculty of
perception which, by Yahweh's own admission, is God-like, rather than the
more-or-less sudden death that was originally threatened. The woman could be said to be
"naked", innocent and vulnerable in the face of this conflicting source of authority; on
the other hand, it could be that she is more than a match for the serpent, acting on her
own initiative and employing her own rhetorical subtlety in defensibly elaborating on
Yahweh's command. The latter explanation is that favoured by Phyllis Trible when she
confers upon the woman the composite title of "theologian, ethicist, hermeneut, rabbi",22
but this is a generous view, given that the serpent does in fact get the better of her; and
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interpretations of this part of the narrative which present the woman as freely and
courageously choosing maturity over innocence tend uniformly to ignore the fact that the
woman is persuaded to act against what appears to be her better judgement. At the end of
her brief dialogue with the serpent, the woman is faced with what amounts to a choice
between two very different interpretations of scripture: one (her own) predicated upon
what Yahweh's words "really mean", and a more politically-oriented one which
examines what the words are being used for, taking into account not what the author
means but what he knows. Interestingly enough, her choice is determined by factors
which are subjective, extrinsic and which should, by rhetorical-critical standards, have
no bearing upon "the text itself: the fruit has strong aesthetic and sensual appeal, and
like many an accomplished theologian, the woman decides what she wants in advance
and chooses to favour the interpretation of scripture which best supports her decision.
In the confusion which follows, what is most clearly apparent is that nobody has
quite spoken the whole truth. "On the day that you eat you will die", Yahweh threatened,
but as the evening breezes begin to blow he finds the human couple alive and well.
"Your eyes will be opened and you will be like God[s]", the serpent said, but all they see
is their own nakedness, and they perceive it not as a Divine characteristic but as a kind of
absence or incompleteness. Where sexual difference had been an inevitable and
functional aspect of the creation of man and woman, secondary to their common
humanity,23 it now assumes exaggerated importance and becomes a source of anxiety,
and it seems that the "knowledge" gained by the human couple is in fact a skewed
awareness of opposition, an entry into Yahweh's dualistic thought-world governed by
the good/evil dichotomy. Where the poem in 2:23 had celebrated z'tfenmy-in-difference
("this at last is bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh...."), what is now perceived is
non-presence, the other side of the coin: man and woman see themselves in their
nakedness as lacking, as different from each other in a way that must be rendered covert
and unspoken; hence the sewing together and wearing of the fig leaves. In this
atmosphere of uncertainty and fear, it is not surprising that the man and the woman are
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reluctant to enter into conversation either with the authoritarian Yahweh or the subversive
serpent, both of whom seemed to speak plainly, but neither of whom apparently said
what they meant. When called to account for themselves, what each of the human couple
has to say is revealing. The man implicitly blames Yahweh for giving him the woman,
more clearly blames the woman for giving him the fruit, and thus provides an account of
the human condition which will later become known for centuries as orthodox Christian
anthropology:
The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave me [the fruit] from the tree, and I ate
(3:12).^*
In this statement we hear the firing of the first shot on the battlefield of sexual politics,
and characteristically it is the man who tries to establish himself as independent and
autonomous. He presents himself as the object of two acts of giving: Yahweh gave him
the woman, the woman gave him the fruit, and in both instances his professed
relationship to the "given" is passive and uncommitted. He no longer recognises that the
woman is nothing less than the condition of his identity, that it was only when and
because she was formed that "he" passed from an undifferentiated, ungendered
earth-creature to 'ish who differs from 'ishshah, and so that the woman was not "given"
to him but created with him. Like the proto-patriarch he is, the man projects his maleness
back onto the sexually ambiguous point of human origin, existing by his own account in
intrinsic relation to nothing and nobody, participating in no being but his own, and no
doubt already regretting his "flesh ofmy flesh" speech in 2:23.
The woman, on the other hand, perhaps in spite of herself gives a more perceptive
account of what happened; she too is labouring under a misapprehension, but one which
paradoxically reflects the truth:
The serpent deceived me, and I ate (3:13).
Whether or not we can legitimately accuse the serpent of deception, as the word is
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commonly understood, is unlikely; the course of events is beginning to show that the
serpent in fact accurately predicted the outcome of the eating of the fruit. The RSV Bible
translates the Hebrew ha.nnacha.sh hishshi'ani as "the serpent beguiled me", and this is a
more suggestive translation, implying not that the serpent baldly lied, but that he used
guile, charm or persuasion - all species of rhetoric - to win the woman over to his way of
thinking. She indicates, rightly enough, that her action was the result of her entering into
dialogue, a relational state of psychological interconnection between subject and object
where the contradictory play of identity and difference takes place - identity in that
dialogue involves, however imperfectly, a meeting of minds and a language shared;
difference in that any understanding reached is incomplete, leaving room for the deferral
and obscurity of meaning that "beguiling" inevitably entails. We have seen that the
serpent's speech is largely unfathomable, "fraught with background" of the most
irrecoverable kind, and in the absence of hard evidence to the contrary it is difficult not to
assume along with a host of other interpreters that he appears in the Garden as a catalyst
for discord. But we have also seen that his words to the woman were less manifestly
deceptive than traditional exegesis has made them out to be. The serpent is an exploiter
ofmeaning and has not spoken the whole truth, but neither has he lied, and so it could
be said that his "critical reading" of Yahweh's prohibition, more clearly than the
prohibition itself, constitutes in its curious moral and semantic indeterminacy a
paradigmatic or exemplary linguistic performance - if language is inseparable from
intention, and if words unavoidably defer final signification rather than yielding it up,
then discourse involves the manipulation of relative degrees of truth and falsity, and
"beguiling" is inevitably what we do whenever we speak.
To read the Garden of Eden story with this understanding in mind is to adopt a
perspective from which the "conflicts dramatised in the text" appear as conflicts that stem
from the intersection of language, interpretation and power. Adopting this perspective
can usefully serve a more specifically feminist approach to the text, as it can help to gain
some insight into how patriarchal language and power defines, asserts and ultimately
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defeats itself. Yahweh, for example, is unmistakeably a male God, a father-figure to his
creatures. Materially and psychologically, his relationship to the human couple is
patriarchal and evinces patriarchal authority, working exclusively from the "separated" or
physically distanced side of the generative equation:
The father is at no time physically united with the child. His psychological orientation
toward the child tends to be one of confrontation rather than coincidence....When fatherhood is
applied to God, it is characterised by the parallel concepts of creation out of nothing - i.e. the
father's own substance is not committed to the offspring - and of relations of the will, such as
covenant, obedience, loyalty, and faith....An aura of contingency colours the whole
relationship, with at least some hint of threat in the background.25
"Fatherhood....applied to God": a helpful phrase to keep in mind as it reminds us that
Yahweh himself is a fictionally constructed character, whose personality and actions
reveal the controlling hand of an author or editor (this in turn has a suggestive bearing on
his name: YHWH-'elohim, not so much a name as a political title, denoting YHWH the
historical God of the Patriarchs of Israel who has attributed to him the mythical power and
unapproachability of 'elohim, absolute Godhead26). It could be argued that Yahweh's
inspiriting of ha-'adam with the breath of life involves a direct physical relationship, but
this act in fact prefigures the patriarchal-biological theory that the male's role in
fertilisation is to quicken or animate "inert" (female) matter, and in no sense is Yahweh
substantially immanent in his creature, or vice versa.
In addition to this, there is the issue of identity, a crucial element in any patriarchal
power-structure. I have argued above that the opening words in this creation account,
beyom 'asot YHWH-'elohim, place Yahweh already in the world of history and time (as
opposed to the bere'shit bara' 'elohim of Genesis l-2:4a which begins, as it were, at the
beginning); again, this aptly symbolises his "writtenness" or constitution within a
pre-existent text. There are many other factors in the story which similarly indicate that
Yahweh is more a literary character than a Divine Author, and thus that his power and
authority are no more absolute than the meaning of his words. The Garden of Eden, for
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example, understood as the Divinely-established scene of an aetiological drama, might be
expected to occupy some kind of sacred space: within its boundaries, every significant act
should be a causal antecedent, "mythically" prescriptive of what goes on in the profane
world of history and time. This is how the story has been read by those who (like Paul)
say that because the first Woman opened the door to disobedience, all women do
likewise; because the first Man was granted dominion over his wife, all men wield
authority over all women for all time; and so on. What happened in the Garden of Eden,
in other words, is paradigmatic of all things because the Garden was there at the sacred
and absolute Beginning of all things. But this is not unarguably the case: to draw a
comparison once more from the Genesis 1 text, we can see that mythical time and space
have, to all intents and purposes, no recognisable context, nothing before or around them,
and that the mythical creation of the world in the Priestly narrative began at a point where
all was tohu wabhohu, empty but for a disembodied Presence moving over the face of
chaos. The Garden of Eden, on the other hand, is not created ex nihilo or even ex vacuo;
it is planted "in Eden, to the east", a place with which the narrative seems to presuppose
some geographical familiarity on the part of the reader. So the Garden has a context, and
significantly this context is described partly with reference to the world of the reader - we
know exactly where the Tigris and the Euphrates (2:14) are - and partly with reference to
an unknown world where the mysterious rivers of Pishon and Gihon (2:11-13) rise: the
correspondence between Eden and reality, therefore, has elements both of identity and of
otherness, it is a correspondence that occurs somewhere between history and myth,
partaking of both worlds simultaneously and giving the Garden the indeterminacy which
is entirely appropriate to afictional environment.
Yahweh, then, speaks and acts in a world created not by himself but by a narrator, a
manifestly "written" world whose landscape is literary and whose laws are those of
language. In his relationship with his human creatures he wields a certain inevitable
authority, but this authority is not grounded so much in ontological superiority as in a
superior level of experience in the ways of the world, experience which eventually proves
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only too accessible to the human couple. In his story "The Circular Ruins", Jorge Luis
Borges writes of a man who succeeds in dreaming another man and introducing this
creature of dreams into the waking world; the dreamer-creator rests fulfilled in his task
until the point (at the end of the story) where he finds that he himself is a shadow, the
product of some previous dreamer's dream, no more substantial than his own phantom
creation.27 In much the same way, Yahweh creates, animates and instructs the human
couple, but to the extent that he puts himself forward as the ultimate and authoritative
Source of being, he obscures the fact that he too is the creature of a pre-existent author,
and so that he differs from humanity principally in terms of knowledge or fulfilled
potential.
There are signs in Gen. 2:4a-3:24 which indicate a strong identity-in-difference
existing between Yahweh and the human couple. First, we see Yahweh as more an artisan
than a supernatural creator, fashioning ha-'adam from ha-'adamah in much the same way
that an earthly potter would fashion a clay figurine, and appropriately enough the verb
used to describe this activity is yatsar (2:7 wayyitser YHWH-'elohim, "and the LORD
God formed....") rather than the more literally "theological" bara'. Here, Yahweh shows
clear traces of local mythological antecedents, as he follows the Egyptian god Khnum and
the Mesopotamian goddess Mami in forming humanity out of clay; indeed, the Hebrew
word for "potter" (yotser) derives from the verb yatsar and provides a particularly strong
link between Yahweh and "Khnum, the potter".28 Similarly, Yahweh's creation of
ha-'ishshah (2:22) is an act described in human terms - wayyibhen, "and he built"; banah
being (like yatsar and 'asah) a verb used to denote creation in the social world beyond the
perimeters of Eden 29 These terms are appropriate to all Yahweh's creative activity, as
there is something decidedly "human" about the way in which he pieces his handiwork
together; assessing and adjusting ("it is not good that ha-'adam should be alone"),
working by trial and error (cf. the first unsuccessful attempt at finding a mate for the
earth-creature in 2:18-20) and, most significantly, maintaining only partial control over
his creatures and having to take defensive steps to stop them from usurping his power
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(3:22-3). Yahweh learns from experience and is thus not strictly omniscient;30 he appears
to perceive a potential threat from the human couple and thus cannot be said to be utterly
omnipotent; he strolls in the Garden at evening, searching for ha-'adam and calling
"where are you?", and so his presence must somehow be bounded by time and space.
Yahweh's dimensions are, at least in part, human dimensions, and this is reflected in the
fact that his medium of communication is human discourse:
[t]he biblical writers present us with a picture of a personal God who, when addressing
humanity, does so in the manner of all human speech,31
and in his dealings with humanity, therefore, Yahweh can be said both to differ and to
inhabit the order of the same, the relationship being one in which understanding is
incomplete, interpretation is inevitable, and yet "communion through mutuality"32 is
achieved.
The Garden, however, is a world-within-a-world where mutuality is subordinated to
hierarchy, and relationships are conducted according to the exercise of power. A close
reading of Genesis 2:8 reveals that the scene of this primal drama is not, in fact, the
commonly-termed "Garden of Eden" but gan-be'eden, "a garden in Eden": the Garden is
a sectioned-off part of the pre-existent world, its boundaries are constructed and
delineate not the sphere of Divine presence-in-communion, but of Yahwist rule - and this
rule exhibits all the characteristics of patriarchy. As we have seen, Yahweh's authority is
that of the father: imposed from above, centred around obedience, and reinforced with
threat. In addition to being hierarchical, it is patrilineal: once ha-'adam has passed from
undifferentiated earth-creature into two gendered individuals, the important power of
naming rests in the hands of 'ish alone, and significantly he identifies 'ishshah as a
subspecies of his own gender ("this shall be called woman, because she was taken out of
man", 2:23), names his wife chawwah and thus assigns her a chiefly procreative role
(she is to be 'em kol-chay, "the mother of all living", 3:20), and he finds both tacit
approval and authority for these acts in Yahweh's pronouncement (3:16) which seeks to
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concretise childbearing and willing obedience to the male as sacred womanly obligations.
Yahweh's authority is also patriarchal in that it is based on the implicit claim to
self-evident, "natural" rectitude: it is all-encompassing and admits no alternative. When
Yahweh warns the human couple away from the tree of knowledge, the one question that
must not be asked is why such a command has been issued, and as long as silence is
observed on this point, Yahweh is able to maintain the inscrutable Otherness appropriate
to 'elohim. But events prove that Yahweh's authority, like his speech, is by no means
pure or absolute - it can be questioned, subverted and contextualised, as the serpent
demonstrates when he reveals the defensive will-to-power operating underneath the
decree: rather than being predicated upon "the way things are", Yahweh's command is
designed to protect the way he wants things to be. This strategy serves to uphold another
mainstay of patriarchal power: the dualistic separation of self/other. I have indicated
above that there are various ways in which Yahweh does not differ from his creatures,
ways in which he belongs to the order of the same, particularly as far as his language
and the limits of his power are concerned. But otherness is precisely what Yahweh
stresses and seeks to maintain in his relationship with humanity - otherness is what he
defends when he forbids God-like knowledge to ha-'adam\ otherness is what is
significantly threatened when the human couple eat from the tree of knowledge;
otherness is what Yahweh fears will be eradicated altogether if ha-'adam eats from the
tree of life. What principally separates Yahweh from humanity at the beginning of the
story is the ability to create, along with individual immortality. The former power is
conferred upon 'ish and 'ishshah when they become aware of sexual difference and thus
realise their potential to engender life;33 the latter attribute, as the one remaining factor
separating Yahweh from his creatures, is to be defended at all costs, and so the way to
the tree of life is barred once and for all.
We can see, then, that the Garden, far from being the blank slate of prehistory where
knowledge, meaning and intention are "pure" and devoid of any covert social or political
interest, is in fact the scene of struggle where language equals interpretation, and
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meaning requires the exercise of coercive power for its stability. It is a place where
authority is wielded by a creator-figure who, while being in many respects of a kind with
his creatures, attempts to safeguard his otherness by keeping humanity ignorant of their
own God-like potential. The Garden is the troubled dream of patriarchy, representing at
once the apex of patriarchal power and the anxious awareness of its own insecure
foundations. Within the Garden, creation is effected in solitary splendour by a male God
who, in alone possessing the power to engender life, has no need of (or dependence
upon) a female consort; indeed, the Female only exists at all as his own handiwork, and
both his human creatures are brought into the world as innocent, obedient subjects:
Yahweh desires the human beings to abide as two naive children....[he] intends to create
only two human beings, two children eternally worshipful of their creator.34
But a sacred Garden, as the medieval allegorists knew, should be an enclosure within
whose walls the unpredictable chaos of nature is subordinated to Divine harmony and
order. The Garden of Eden is no such place; the security of its inside/outside structure is
undermined by the fact that the law of "outside" holds sway over the "inside", and this is
not the law of dualistic patriarchal order but of ambiguity and indeterminacy. When
Yahweh's command is disobeyed, the human couple realise that the division between
creator and creature, for example, is not a clear one, as they now see that they have the
potential to do what Yahweh can do. Their eyes are opened, and Yahweh's punitive
response to this betrays the wrathful dismay of the father whose children inevitably
"grow up" to claim his power. The same goes for the good/evil dichotomy: according to
the prohibition, "good" signifies obedience and "evil" disobedience, but these moral
certainties become blurred when the serpent asks how a deceptive command can be
fundamentally "good", and when we wonder how human responsibility and maturity can
be completely "evil". Opposing concepts become enmeshed, and the human couple learn
to perceive sameness-in-difference: what is perhaps most significant, and paradoxical, is
that the dualism of identity/difference itself is disrupted when 'ish and 'ishshah, resting
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comfortably in their common humanity, eat from the tree of knowledge and begin to
know sexual difference, that most undecidable of phenomena which both fundamentally
divides and substantially unites female and male. It is important to note that none of this
deferral is initiated by the eating of the fruit of knowledge; it has been, from the
beginning of the story, very much a part of Yahweh's creation. Even though Yahweh
himself dissembles indeterminacy, and the humans are initially ignorant of it, the serpent
- not some kind of supernatural adversary, but one of the wild creatures that
YHWH-'elohim has made (3:1) - happily lives and breathes it, and for this reason above
all others he is silenced and cursed by his creator. The Rabbinic commentary on Gen.
3:14, where Yahweh executes judgement on the serpent, elaborates on the idea of the
creator being somehow at a loss when directly confronted with his wily creature, and
thus having to resort to summary justice. The midrash relates that
with 'adam [Yahweh] engaged in dialogue; with chawwah he engaged in dialogue, but with
the serpent he did not engage in dialogue. Rather, the Holy One (blessed be He) said: "this
serpent is wicked; he is an expert at replies. If I say [anything] to him, he will say to me: 'you
commanded them, and I commanded them; why did they set aside your commandment and
follow my commandment?'" Instead, [Yahweh] shut him up and cut him off.35
The question which the Rabbis here depict Yahweh as wanting to evade is pertinent to
say the least, as it is the question which above all others indicates that the structure of
meaning in Eden, the "text" in which Yahweh's authority is inscribed, is deeply divided
against itself: why indeed did the human couple follow the words of the serpent rather
than those of their creator? The answer must have much to do with the fact that
Yahweh's words, the Divine ipsissima verba, admit interpretation and ambiguity, even
when spoken and heard directly against a background of primal silence. The question
also leads us inevitably to remember that the woman at least, in her brief argument with
the serpent, displays a definite (if unsophisticated) awareness of what she should and
should not do in a given situation, an awareness of what is tobh (i.e. in perfect
agreement with the Divine word) and what is not - a form of knowledge which, as I have
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noted, should not as yet be part of humanity's ethical repertoire, and which therefore
strangely contradicts Yahweh's command even before the question of disobedience
arises. Like any author, Yahweh has created a world in which differance operates, a
world where the significance of words and events can never be final, and where the
author's own intentions concerning meaning are subject to the play of infinite
counter-readings - and all this because he inhabits a "host-text of pre-existent language"36
whose possibilities for signification extend far beyond his immediate control.
In the midrash quoted above, the Hebrew expression translated here as "engage in
dialogue" is nasa' wenatan, literally "take and give", and also carrying the sense of
argument, transaction and bargaining. The expression is apposite in this context because
it implies that what is at stake in linguistic exchange is not Truth but (to put it perhaps
over-simply) vested interest; to engage in dialogue involves various means of persuasion
- even "beguiling" - with the end in mind of fixing meaning in much the same way as
one would fix a price, i.e. by common agreement. Nasa' v^natan also implies that the
relationship between interlocutors is one of (ideally) equal power; less a relationship of
writer/reader than one of writer/writer, in accordance with a discursive concept of "take
and give" rather than a static one of "give and receive". Yahweh's relationship with his
"readers", however, is unequal in that the power to signify rests with him alone, and this
power imbalance (as the midrashists realised) is what the serpent, a ba'al fshubhot,
exposes when he challenges Yahweh in 3:4-5 and offers a new reading - a perfectly
legitimate one, as it turns out - of the Divine command. Yahweh's authority rests, like all
structures of patriarchal rule, on the claim that he is the ultimate source ofmeaning, that
his commands in particular are intrinsically meaningful and thus demand to be received
and observed strictly according to the letter of the law. The serpent knows, however,
that this kind of power is dependent upon the ability to conceal its own motives and
mechanisms, to disguise its tactics as certainties; but as soon as Yahweh's "textual
politics" are exposed, he is shown to be every inch a literary character, a participant in
discourse and not its creator. His words lose their unquestionable authority, and in
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cursing the serpent, Yahweh does no more than what many authors would like to do to
their more perceptive critics.
Exactly who or what Yahweh is is not clear; his origins are as obscure as the origins
of patriarchy itself, and accordingly his power is grounded in the myth of an eternal
Presence - his name, according to most translations of Exod. 3:14-15, is I AM, a name
which, harnessed to the title 'elohim, implies that his authority is absolute and that
obedience is due to him because this is how things have always been - a classic
patriarchal claim if ever there was one. What Genesis 2:4b-3:24 shows us, however, is
that Yahweh's claim to the status of 'elohim is self-defeating, and that its subversion is
not an act of criminal intent or perverse nihilism, but simply the inevitable condition of
the language in which the claim is made - when Yahweh speaks, he creates a text, and
one of the legitimate possibilities offered by any text is that it can be read as ambiguous
and internally divided. In the Garden of Eden story, then, the "Fall" chronicled is one
which occurs both before and after the fruit of knowledge is eaten (i.e. whether we
know it or not), and it is not so much a Fall as a collapse sideways, the inescapable slide
of linguistic certainty into undecideability and interpretation, a movement that threatens
above all those who claim ontological primacy and a monopoly on Truth. It is from this
understanding that the Garden of Eden story can be read as an ironic critique of
patriarchy, a critique which is overtly "feminist" to the extent that the serpent chooses
ha-'ishshah as his partner-in-subversion, and that she takes the initiative in eating the
fruit before ha-'ish, but which stops short of valorising the mythical woman-as-Woman
or in any other way perpetuating epic-heroic female chauvinism. This critique falls
somewhere between "a certain assertion of women" (to use Derrida's term) and the
displacement of the essential Female; to put it more simply, it may be properly feminist
in intent, but not by definition.
Perhaps the Garden of Eden stoiy's canniest critic is its own earliest casualty, the
serpent, and the deconstructive reader could do worse than to pay close attention to what
this character represents. There exists an extremely suggestive symbolic parallel between
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the role of the serpent in the Genesis text and the function of writing as discussed by
Derrida in one of his key works. In "Plato's Pharmacy",37 Derrida provides an extensive
commentary on Plato's dialogue the Phaedrus, a commentary which touches on many of
the issues discussed in these pages, in particular the issue of speech and writing. Plato's
principal concern in the Phaedrus is to demonstrate the superiority of speech over
writing, to show that writing is a lifeless simulacrum, a deceptive and even dangerous
substitute for the plenitude and truth inherent in the oral transmission of knowledge.
Plato presents his argument in the form of a mythical dialogue: the Egyptian king
Thamus is visited by the god Theuth, a god accredited with having invented (among
other things) the art of writing. Theuth exhibits his art to the king and declares that it will
be eminently beneficial both to himself and to all his subjects ("This discipline, my King,
will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memories' ). The King refuses
Theuth's proffered gift, arguing that the art of writing, if widely adopted, will in fact
result in the dereliction ofmemory and the devaluation of direct (i.e. spoken) instruction:
This invention will produce forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learned it because
they will not need to exercise their memories....[t]hanks to you and your invention, your
pupils will be widely read without the benefit of a teacher's instruction; in consequence, they'll
entertain the delusion that they have wide knowledge, while they are, in fact, for the most part
incapable of real judgement.39
At issue here is the difference between the "real" wisdom which direct speech and
instruction are said to impart, and the so-called sophistry engendered by the written
word: as we have seen, a logocentric distinction. Derrida's analysis of the issue is
lengthy and complex; relevant to our purpose here is his discussion of the term
pharmakon, a word which surfaces at several important points in Plato's (Greek) text.
Theuth offers writing as a pharmakon for memory and instruction, and writing's efficacy
as pharmakon is what the King disputes. This word, however, commonly translated as
"remedy", in fact has a double, divided sense; it also - and equally - denotes "poison".
Derrida points out that translations of the Phaedrus which opt (as they invariably do) for
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the former, remedial sense ofpharmakon are incapable of conveying the important idea
that
the stated intention of Theuth being precisely to stress the worth of his product....he turns
the word on its strange and invisible pivot, presenting it from a single one, the most
reassuring, of its po/e5....interrupting, for his own purposes, the communication between the
two opposing values.40
Theuth, in other words, presents writing as pharmakon in only one sense of the word;
the King, in his reply to Theuth, indicates that he is aware of the god's duplicity, that
Theuth "has passed a poison off as a remedy".41 In his suspicion of writing, the King
evokes the perjorative denotation of pharmakon, and thus he restores the
"communication" between the two opposed senses of "remedy" and "poison" within the
one signifier. This is ironic, given that the King rejects writing according to a logic
which privileges univocity of meaning and which "does not tolerate such passages
between opposing senses of the same word"42 The main point here, however, is that in
Plato's text,
the two interlocutors [i.e. the King and Theuth], whatever they do and whether or not they
choose, remain within the unity of the same signifier. Their discourse plays within it, which
is no longer the case in translation 43
Here, Derrida seeks not so much to discredit those translators who have reduced
pharmakon to only one of its disjunctive senses, as to suggest that (in the words of one
commentator)
what is really "on trial" in these efforts to cope with the pharmakon of writing is an ethics
of language that has always privileged authentic, self-present speech over the vagaries of
textual inscription....there is simply no reckoning, on logocentric terms, with an instance like
Plato's pharmakon that disrupts the very logic of self-identity, that opens up a play of
semantic substitutions beyond all hope of assured conceptual grasp.44
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I wish to suggest that the serpent in Genesis 2:4b-3:24 is a kind of biblical
pharmakon, operating in much the same way as Plato's pharmakon and presenting much
the same problems (or opportunities) for the interpreter. The idea is suggestive partly
because we do not have to go as far as Derrida or the twentieth century to find an explicit
intertextual link: we already have, in Numbers 21:4-9, a biblical instance of serpents
acting both as poison and as remedy for the people of Yahweh. Moreover, as the
Israelites in the wilderness, bitten by hannechashim hassfraphim ("fiery serpents" - or are
they angelic? cf. Isaiah 6:2-3) and dying, look to Moses' bronze serpent for healing, we
can see that there is a sense here in which the authentic, "true" thing kills while its
representation gives life. These are ambiguous serpents indeed, sent to cure Israel's
poisoned faith by poisoning the people and eliciting their faith in the restorative power of
a simulacrum; never did Derrida's comment seem so resonant that "[t]here is no such
thing as a harmless remedy. The pharmakon can never be simply beneficial".45
So too, the Edenic pharmakon embodies strange inversions and contradictions. As
part of Yahweh's creation, we might reasonably expect the serpent to be fundamentally
tobh, and yet it is impossible to consider its words and actions without conceding
somewhere along the line that the serpent is something other than the agent of
unqualified tobhah. The serpent is not "good" for the human couple in any absolute
sense of the word, or even for itself; the results of the encounter between serpent and
humanity are silence, enmity, pain, toil and exile for all concerned. This is not to say,
however, that the serpent in itself represents complete discord. As pharmakon it plays an
undeniable part in poisoning the fruits of Yahweh's creative labour, but at the same time
it can be said - as I have argued - to provide a remedy for human moral ignorance, as
well as offering a crucial insight into the workings of language and power, and thus
"remedying" the injustice perpetrated by Yahweh's duplicitous command. Referring to
Plato's pharmakon, Derrida writes that translations which render the word "remedy" or
"cure", at the expense of its opposite sense,
produce on the pharmakon an effect ofanalysis that violently destroys it, reduces it to one
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of its simple elements by interpreting it, paradoxically enough, in the light of the ulterior
developments it itself has made possible. Such an interpretative translation is thus as violent
as it is impotent: it destroys the pharmakon but at the same time forbids itself access to it,
leaving it untouched in its reserve.46
Moreover, when pharmakon is translated into only one of its possible meanings,
what is in question is not just a localized example of semantic insensivity, but a need to
ignore the problematical effects of a writing that nonetheless resists such reduction.47
Similarly then, to "translate" the serpent in Genesis into terms which are morally or in
any other way unambiguous (after the manner of, say, Milton in Paradise Lost, who
portrayed the serpent as Satan, or of the medieval and Renaissance iconographers who
gave the serpent a woman's face) is to curtail the play of signification, to erase one side
of the dual inscription which can be traced in and through this most undecideable of
characters. As diffirance could be said to be the pharmakon ofmeaning - poison from
the logocentric perspective, cure from a relativist point of view, both at once for those of
us who oscillate precariously between both poles - so the serpent in Eden represents
much that is uncomfortably yet necessarily contradictory in human thought and
experience. It is not to be wondered at, and (more importantly) it is not to be denied, that
we might well respond to such a character both with mixed feelings and with
hermeneutical caution. Many critics have noted - some with dismay - that Milton gave
Satan all the best poetry and made him by far the most dynamic, three-dimensional
character in his epic. Satan's gift to literature is neither more nor less than the gift of
Theuth to King Thamus, or the gift of the serpent to the human couple in Eden - a
pharmakon, a hard cure, perhaps ironically best expressed in the oxymoron familiar to
Christian theologians: a felix culpa.
The serpent, then, is not a resolver but an underminer of oppositions, one who
mingles dichotomous forces "within the unity of the same signifier". I have argued that it
is in and through the serpent that good and evil take on a non-identical "sameness", as do
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truth and falsity, Edenic harmony and discord, remedy and poison (and it is important to
note that the same agency could be attributed to Yahweh and the humans; only the
serpent, however, accepts and exploits the undecideable). In the serpent we also see a
flickering back and forth of identity between beast and human (the "wild creature"
speaks and reasons), earthly and Divine (the serpent is subject to Yahwist rule, and yet
privy to intimate knowledge of his Creator), mortal and immortal.48 Most significant
here, however, is the serpent's ambiguous sexual orientation. The pun in Gen. 2:25-3:1
on 'arumim (describing the naked human couple)/'arwm (referring to the serpent's
subtlety) establishes a strong linguistic link between the themes of sexuality and
wisdom, a link which in turn suggests an intertextual connection between the Garden of
Eden story and other such ancient Near Eastern myths as the Gilgamesh epic, in which
wisdom and sexual experience are closely associated. The mythological background to
Gen. 2:4b-3:24 confers upon the serpent a sexuality that is highly indeterminate, as
resistant to definition or evaluation as the knowledge the serpent makes available to 'ish
and 'ishshah. Traditionally associated with fertility cults (and in particular the worship of
the Canaanite goddess Astarte49), the serpent is a well-documented Goddess-icon, but its
status as such is paradoxically affirmed by the fact that it functions as aphallic emblem.
The serpent "is" the phallus and yet it signifies the Female, its metaphorical being and its
symbolic function curiously intertwined. This makes its role in the Garden of Eden story
extremely complex, a great deal more complex than readings of the text allow which seek
to establish determinative parallels between either evil snake/weak woman or bringer of
knowledge/brave heroine. Derrida, in his discussion of woman and gender in
"Choreographies", speaks of the possibility of "a choreographic text with polysexual
signatures", a multivocal reading-writing matrix evincing a diffuse discursive "sexuality"
which is not so much neutral as plural:
....what if we were to approach....the area of a relationship to the other where the code of
sexual marks would no longer be discriminating? The relationship would not be a-sexual, far
from it, but would be sexual otherwise: beyond the binary difference that governs the decorum
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of all codes....I would like to believe in the multiplicity of sexually marked voices. I would
like to believe in the masses, this indeterminable number of blended voices, this mobile of
non-identified sexual marks whose choreography can carry, divide, multiply the body of each
"individual", whether he be classified as "man" or as "woman" according to the criteria of
usage.50
The serpent could, in many senses, be said to represent the realisation of this possibility.
Referred to in the Genesis text as "he" (and, in the course of this study, somewhat
confusedly both as "he" and "it" according to context), the serpent would in fact be better
designated some kind of loose combination of the male and female pronouns. Far from
being androgynous, sexually specific, or statically hermaphroditic, the serpent is "sexual
otherwise", embodying an undecideable dynamic of both genders. At once phallic totem
and Goddess-representative, symbolising male and female fertility, the serpent
encapsulates the movement of deferral between sexual designations, a body at once
divided and multiplied. A certain alignment between serpent and woman in the biblical
narrative cannot be denied, but this is necessitated by a narrative environment - both
within the story and in the ancient society from which it has emerged - in which the text
to be read, the meaning to be disputed, and the accumulation of power to be questioned,
is male-identified. In a text compiled by patriarchal authors and editors, and subject to
centuries of patriarchal exegesis, the meaning to be deconstructed is patriarchal. But
cultural conditions change, and appropriately enough the serpent is a skin-shedder,
whose sexual orientation might not be so specific according to a different "criterion of
usage". What the story shows us is not only that this kind of fluidly-gendered approach
to meaning and interpretation is potentially dangerous - likely to provoke harsh executive
counter-measures from authoritarian arbiters of objectivity and hermeneutical neutrality -
but also that it confers freedom; the serpent is silenced, but not before it has shown the
human couple a way out of the Garden of circumscribed awareness and into a world of
knowledge, choice and responsibility. In this world, this historical continuum where we
speak and hear, write and read, the closest approach we can make to pure, unadulterated
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Presence of any kind (sexual, experiential, Divine) is through a signifying system, a text
- stable meaning may be a necessary fiction, but it is a fiction nonetheless,
always-already "written". If Genesis 2:4b-3:24 is to be read as an aetiology, a
prescriptive myth, then it should be read as such in the light of this understanding, as
chronicling the way in which logocentrism of all kinds (whether patriarchal or otherwise)
must always fall prey to language. The Garden of Eden thus becomes the setting for a
troublesome genesis of the tension between fixed structures of signification and
approaches to meaning that explore
flux, continuity and phases of alternation, offering [images] not of exclusive realities, nor
of final beginnings and endings, but of infinite cycles of transformation.-51
This tension is readily discussed and explored in the context of feminist discourse, but it
operates wherever oppressive, rigidly dualistic modes of thought and language are in
conflict with ambiguity and change. To imagine a complete and final resolution of this
existential tension, an escape from the "implacable destiny which immures everything for
life in the figure 2",52 is to imagine nothing less than a new language and an
as-yet-unimagineable understanding of being. "But where would the 'dream' of the
innumerable come from", Derrida asks, "if it is indeed a dream? Does the dream itself
not prove that what is dreamt ofmust be there in order for it to provide the dream?".53
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In the introduction to this thesis, I suggested that the would-be deconstructor of these
chapters might begin by looking at the contradiction between my endorsement of Derrida
as the architect of an aesthetics of egalitarian textuality - as one who takes the author out
of authority - and my habitual reversion to him as, precisely and personally, an
authority, a master-philosopher whose name can be invoked as a kind of charm to ward
off criticism. This incongruity is one of the many perils encountered by those who wish
both to practice or study deconstruction and to satisfy the discursive requirements laid
down by the academic institution. The demands of philosophical logic, appeals to
demonstrative sense and "rules of competence", to say nothing of the language of
pedagogy:1 all these are unavoidable, and the best one can hope to do is to walk a fine
line between feigning ignorance of such ironies and wallowing in a morass of critical
self-consciousness. Derrida himself never completed his state doctorate.2
Another inconsistency (related to the one above) is apparent in the way in which I
have argued, with equal insistence, both that deconstruction is a specific programme,
inseparable from its particular applications, and that it forms an "approach" to reading, or
a "reading strategy" - these latter phrases, and others like them, are all part of the attempt
to avoid labelling deconstruction as a "method" or a "concept", and while they are to
some degree useful in this respect, they still, to my mind, carry unwelcome typological
connotations. Again, I believe that this dilemma should be weighed pragmatically against
the demands of a certain kind of argument, and yet at the same time the resulting
compromises must be acknowledged, largely because they provide a good illustration of
how the serious political implications of deconstruction - in this case implications for
how knowledge is required to be understood, processed and disseminated within the
academy - are never far from its more apparently innocuous activity as literary/philo¬
sophical criticism. The difference between deconstruction as a reading strategy and
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deconstruction as something more obviously political is principally a function of where
one chooses to stop. One can begin, for example, by reading deconstructively the
patriarchal "meaning" inscribed within the narrative boundaries of Genesis 2:4b-3:24,
but such a reading will inevitably lead to the realisation that this so-called original
inscription is a cultural product, not a kernel of truth to be disputed but an interpretation
of the text to be reworked, as is one's own deconstruction. The idea that the Garden of
Eden story's meaning lies in its interpretation leads to the consideration of which
interpretations have been traditionally held as legitimate, why they have been deemed so,
which interpretations might be repressed and by whom, and so on. Almost before we
know it, what is being interrogated is no longer a comfortably familiar bible story, but
the biblical canon, the workings of power within religious institutions, the function of
religion in society, and other issues which can lead alarmingly rapidly to visions (albeit
intellectual ones) of the wholesale deconstruction of language, history and culture. That
way madness lies, and we take refuge back in literary criticism, where we may now be
surprised at the complaints of those who argue that deconstruction fails to respect "the
text" - I would say that the power attributed by deconstruction to the text and to literary
language is granted in decidedly respectful measure, and furthermore that those who
believe the study of literature begins and ends with formal codes of expression
grievously underestimate the discourse they defend.
The problems posed by these contradictions between what deconstruction logically
"is" and what we more humbly make of it are perhaps rooted in the fact that we call it
"deconstruction", and thereby ground it in the work of one thinker and one putative
school of thought. Deconstruction is too often misunderstood as an activity which is
applicable to structures of meaning, necessitating a facility of sleight-of-hand to be
learned from a master illusionist. It is better, I have argued, to think of deconstruction as
something which is at work within structures of meaning, necessitating more a kind of
perception than a box of critical tricks. One commentator on Derrida recommends that his
introductory guide to the French philosopher be understood as "a ladder to be
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unceremoniously kicked away once it has served its purpose",3 and there are many
points in the texts of Derrida himself at which he similarly disclaims pretensions to
critical mastery or authoritative wisdom. Derrida has (with heavy and necessary reliance
on Plato, Rousseau, Hegel, Husserl, Nietzsche, Heidegger and others) pointed out
various things concerning language, culture and history; to label all those who
appropriate or develop these insights as "deconstructionists" is misleading to the extent
that it implies both a critical homogeneity and a quality of discipleship, neither of which
is always in evidence. Those who read with a deconstructive perception exhibit not so
much a necessarily Derridean affiliation as an awareness of certain aspects or character¬
istics of signification. The awareness which deconstruction demands and fosters is an
awareness of the differential nature of language, of the constructed nature ofmeaning, of
the tendency of our dominant Western philosophical tradition to ignore or sideline these
paradoxes and of our need to maintain both the awareness and the ignorance. This matrix
gives scope to an infinitely varied number of critical styles and strategies which range
from (it must be admitted) jargonistic cultural catastrophe theories to more
conventional-looking approaches; again, the difference between both poles is a matter
not of how authentically deconstructive one or the other is, but of where one wishes to
arrest one's exemplary slide into linguistic "play" and buy into the more conveniently
familiar structures of logocentrism. The conventional approach errs on the side of irony
or logical ambiguity, the radical on the side of incoherence; ambiguity and incoherence
alike are what deconstruction argues for as legitimate linguistic/philosophical
possibilities, phenomena which are as natural or essential to all signifying structures as
are univocity and stable sense.
The preceding pages constitute, basically, the attempt to forge strong links between
deconstruction, feminism and biblical interpretation, and it cannot by any means be
expected that the move to bring these three fields together will please all feminists,
deconstructionists or exegetes - as one critic puts it: "there is a war on, and he who
ventures into no-man's-land brandishing cigarettes and singing carols must expect to be
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shot at".4 Opposition may well arise to the fact that the links I wish to forge depend very
much on the provisional legitimacy of paradox, of ambiguity and incoherence. The kind
of feminism I have put forward as redemptive within an ailing culture is that which
undermines the identity/difference dualism (a construct which underlies common sense
and perception at its simplest level) in patriarchal thought and society, and which
subverts the logic of rationality and objectivity in favour of more diffuse, undecideable
structures of value and meaning. Particularly in feminist theology, "coherence" as a
yardstick for legitimate discourse about God is seen as upholding "the false abstractions
and overly rationalistic conceptualisations"5 of patriarchal theology, and the less
quantifiable areas of intuition, subjectivity and experience are affirmed as valuable fields
for exploration and experimentation. Similarly in biblical interpretation, the "meaning" of
the text, both from a feminist and a deconstructionist perspective, is as much as anything
else a function of the subjectivity and experience of the reader: fragmented, divided,
unstable and yet possessing a conventional (and vulnerable) cohesiveness. This tension
between the necessity to mean and the undecideability of meaning, I believe, lies close to
the heart of religious experience, in that it reflects the need both to make profound sense
of the world and to acknowledge the risk and uncertainty, the openness to
meaninglessness, that faith demands. It is this tension to which I would draw the notice
of those who hold that feminism and deconstruction have little to do with each other, and
even less to do with "devoted" biblical interpretation. For feminism and for
deconstruction, as for the religious individual, the centre cannot hold, and yet its
invocation is a necessity. The diffirance of this difference shakes the structures of
patriarchal thought and logocentrism, and opens on to possibilities for their
reconfiguration, for "a dismantling that enables a more intimate kind of knowing",6 for a
way of envisioning humanity, society and truth which acknowledges the workings of
power and the political implications of what we believe.
Where this dismantling might end, or what this "more intimate kind of knowing"
might involve, is as yet largely undecideable; patriarchal and logocentric concepts alike
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are deeply sedimented in language, and so to rewrite them in any far-reaching way
necessitates recourse to a new understanding of signification, a new language whose
structures and dynamics cannot be adequately delineated in currently familiar terms. That
this rewriting is necessary (in the ethical sense of the word) is the foundational
imperative of feminism; that it is necessary (in the sense of inevitability, of being
always-already the case) is a deconstructive axiom: the fact that these necessities appear
to contradict social norms on one hand and common sense on the other is an indictment
not upon feminism or deconstruction, but upon the pervasiveness and persuasiveness of
"phallogocentric" logic, which sees rewriting or radical interpretation not as the
affirmation of "play" but as the perversion of truth. That this tension has an immediate
bearing on biblical interpretation is manifest in the argument that determinations of
meaning have a strongly theological programme attached to them; Derrida writes that "the
intelligible face of the sign remains turned toward the word and face of God....[t]he sign
and divinity have the same place and time of birth",7 and it is no coincidence that reading
strategies like deconstruction which pay full respect to the unintelligibility of the sign are
often branded by biblical scholars as atheistic. Between the myth of perfect intelligiblity,
of full Presence, and the chaos of non-signification, lies a crisis whose form and
implications can, as yet, be only vaguely perceived:
Here there is a kind of question....whose conception,formation, gestation, and labour we
are only catching a glimpse of today. I employ these words, I admit, with a glance toward the
operations of childbearing - but also with a glance toward those who, in a society from which I
do not exclude myself, turn their eyes away when faced by the as yet unnamable which is
proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in the offing, only
under the species of the nonspecies....8
So wrote Derrida in 1966; the degree of pertinency which his comments hold today for
biblical interpretation testifies to the fact that appeals to determinate Truth are still very
much alive and well, and reinforcing the official discourse of exegesis. Where this
notional Truth sanctions patriarchy and sexist oppression is where feminist biblical
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interpretation must read the text against itself; the points of conflict between the bible's
patriarchal nature and its calls for justice provide the aporia where this deconstruction
becomes not just a critical strategy but an imperative, a positive step from the margins of




1: Derrida (1988), p.146.
2: Cf. Norris (1987), pp.12-15.
3: Ibid. p. 17.
4: Kermode (1983), p.7.
5: King (1989), p.167.
6: Lentricchia (1980), p.209.
7: Derrida (1976), pp. 13-14.
8: Derrida (1978), p.293.
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